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Abstract 
 
Home automation systems (HASs) seek to improve the quality of life for 
individuals through the automation of household devices. Recently, there has been a 
trend, in academia and industry, to research and develop low-cost Wireless Sensor 
Network (WSN) based HASs (Varchola et al. 2007). WSNs are designed to achieve 
a low-cost wireless networking solution, through the incorporation of limited 
processing, memory, and power resources. Consequently, providing secure and 
reliable remote access for resource limited WSNs, such as WSN based HASs, poses 
a significant challenge (Perrig et al. 2004).  
This thesis introduces the development of a hybrid communications 
approach to increase the resistance of WSN based HASs to remote DoS flooding 
attacks targeted against a third party. The approach is benchmarked against the 
dominant GHS remote access approach for WSN based HASs (Bergstrom et al. 
2001), on a WSN based HAS test-bed, and shown to provide a minimum of a 
58.28%, on average 59.85%, and a maximum of 61.45% increase in remote service 
availability during a DoS attack. Additionally, a virtual home incorporating a 
cryptographic based DoS detection algorithm, is developed to increase resistance to 
remote DoS flooding attacks targeted directly at WSN based HASs. The approach is 
benchmarked against D-WARD (Mirkovic 2003), the most effective DoS defence 
identified from the research, and shown to provide a minimum 84.70%, an average 
91.13% and a maximum 95.6% reduction in packets loss on a WSN based HAS 
during a DoS flooding attack. Moreover, the approach is extended with the 
integration of a virtual home, hybrid communication approach, and a distributed 
denial of defence server to increase resistance to remote DoS attacks targeting the 
home gateway. The approach is again benchmarked against the D-WARD defence 
and shown to decrease the connection latency experienced by remote users by a 
minimum of 90.14%, an average 90.90%, and a maximum 91.88% 
Keywords: Denial of Service, Wireless Sensor Networks, Home 
Automation, Remote Access, Security. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1  Background to the Research 
Over the last two decades, there has been an exponential growth in the 
number of computers. In parallel with the rapid adoption of computers, large 
networks such as the Internet have emerged as a popular means to exchange data 
and information between computerised devices (Tanenbaum 2003).  
Recent developments in technology have seen an increase in the range and 
diversity of computers used in industry and by consumers. Computer technology in 
the consumer domain is no longer limited to personal computers occupying fixed 
desk space in offices and bedrooms. Instead, there has been an increasing trend 
towards ubiquitous computing, where by computers integrate seamlessly into the 
peripheral environment to assist and provide services for users. Often users are not 
aware of the computers and networks operating in the environment, working 
together to provide them with services (Hawizy 2007).  
WSNs are an emerging technology for providing intelligent ubiquitous 
computing environments. WSNs consists of low cost, resource limited sensor nodes 
that can be randomly distributed across areas of varying sizes to autonomously form 
wireless networks (Tanenbaum 2003). WSN nodes monitor their surrounding 
environment and share information collected with other nodes in the same network. 
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Sensed information is used by devices connected to the WSN to provide tailored 
services that are responsive to environmental changes.  
Through integration with existing networks, such as the Internet, WSNs 
have created the potential for many new applications (Baker et al. 2007). The scope 
for potential WSN based applications is enormous, existing applications include, 
patient monitoring in hospitals, tracking of military ordinance, location tracking, 
environmental monitoring in extreme or remote locations such as near volcanoes or 
in the tropical rainforest respectively, and home automation (Akyildiz et al. 2002). 
The work outlined in this thesis primarily focuses on WSN based HASs. 
There are many definitions of home automation available in the literature. (Bromley 
et al. 2003) describes home automation as the introduction of technology within the 
home to enhance the quality of life of its occupants, through the provision of 
different services such as telehealth, multimedia entertainment and energy 
conservation.  
The introduction of WSN based HASs offers the potential for new 
applications (Baker et al. 2007), however significant challenges also arise, primarily 
due to the resource-limited nature of WSNs. One of the greatest challenges to have 
emerged is that of providing sufficient security for the creation of secure and 
reliable WSNs, such as WSN based HAS, with the limited resources available 
(Perrig et al. 2004). As identified from the literature review (see Chapter 3) most of 
the existing research reviewed, related to the reliability of WSNs, focuses on 
protecting the availability of WSNs from DoS attacks originating from within the 
WSN or from attackers in close proximity to the WSN. From the reviewed research, 
there is limited research available on the effects of DoS attacks (see Chapter 3), 
targeting the reliability of WSNs that originate from connected networks, such as 
the Internet. 
1.2 DoS Attacks 
The objective of a DoS attack is to render a resource inaccessible or degrade 
a resource for other users (Mirkovic et al. 2004). DoS attacks can take many 
different forms, a review of which is available in the literature review (Chapter 3). 
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However in general DoS attacks involve one or more attacking machines, either 
accessing a service with the intention of overwhelming the victim’s resources and 
preventing other users from gaining access or alternatively an attacker may exploit a 
known vulnerability in the victim system to disrupt services (Mirkovic et al. 2004). 
This problem is an order of magnitude greater for resource limited WSNs, where a 
potential attacker may wield relatively limitless resources against a WSN’s limited 
resources. This asymmetrical situation complicates protecting WSNs from DoS 
attacks (Perrig et al. 2004). From the literature review (see Chapter 3), there is a 
substantial amount of literature available on DoS attacks, on large relatively 
resource rich networks that originate from the same network or from connected 
networks such as the Internet, and also on DoS attacks on WSNs that originate from 
the same WSN or from an attacker in close proximity to the WSN. However, as 
previously stated, there is limited work, which has reviewed the effectiveness or 
scalability of the existing DoS defence approaches for protecting resource limited 
WSNs from DoS attacks originating from relatively resource rich connected 
networks, such as the Internet.  
The work in this thesis focuses on the development of an enhanced secure 
and reliable remote access approach for WSN based HASs. The incorporation of 
DoS defences is crucial for the provision of reliable communications and is 
dependent on the remote access approach adopted. Moreover, the connection of 
WSN based HASs with the Internet results in the security weaknesses in the remote 
access approaches directly affecting connected networks (Mirkovic et al. 2004), 
such as WSN based HASs. Consequently, enhancing the security of remote access 
approaches also enhances the security of connected networks (Kumar et al. 2006), 
such as WSN based HASs. 
1.3 Research Challenge 
The research in this thesis investigates the effects of remote DoS attacks on 
WSN based HASs and the effectiveness of the existing DoS defences for providing 
WSN based HASs with protection. Protecting WSNs from remote DoS attacks 
presents a challenge, because WSNs are resource limited and as such do not have 
sufficient resources available to implement the same security mechanisms as 
relatively resource rich computers, such as DoS defences (Perrig et al. 2004). 
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Additionally, the challenge is increased when defending against a remote DoS 
attack, where there may be multiple, resource rich, attackers targeting a single 
resource limited WSN (Kumar et al. 2006). Moreover, as identified by (Mirkovic 
2003) the most effective DoS defences do not effectively filter out all attack traffic, 
which poses a problem for resource limited WSNs, where due to their resource 
limited nature, a low-level DoS attack is sufficient for a DoS attack, as identified 
and evaluated in Chapter 7. 
1.4 Motivation for the Research 
As discussed, WSN based HASs offer the potential for a significant 
improvement in the quality of life for homeowners. Moreover, in the current climate 
with increasing evidence supporting the case for global warming and increasing fuel 
bills, WSN based HASs offer the potential for the development of novel energy 
saving applications. However, for WSN based HASs to be successfully adopted the 
associated security challenges must be addressed. Additionally, in relation to the 
provision of secure and reliable remote access to WSN based HASs, there remains a 
large gap in the knowledge. There is little research available to suggest that existing 
DoS defences are effective at protecting WSN based HASs.  
1.5 Objectives of the Research 
The primary research aim, of the research, is to further the work by 
designing and implementing an improved secure and reliable remote access 
approach for WSN based HASs, that has an increased resistance to DoS attacks 
whilst providing an increased level of privacy for the homeowner’s personal 
information.  
1.5.1 Objectives 
The specific research objectives associated with obtaining the research aim 
are as follows: 
• Investigate the existing literature available on WSN based HASs and the 
associated methods for remotely accessing WSN based HASs.  
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• Design and implement a WSN based HAS test-bed that incorporates the 
common remote access approaches, for evaluating the approaches developed as 
part of the research. 
• Research the current literature available on DoS attacks and Defences for WSNs 
to obtain a better understanding of the topic. 
• Propose and evaluate approaches for enhancing the security and reliability of 
WSN based HASs, with an emphasis on improving the DoS resistance of WSN 
based HAS’s and the associated remote access approaches. 
o Develop the existing dominant remote access approach “GHS”, 
identified from the literature review (see Chapter 2), on the WSN based 
HAS test-bed. 
o Develop a model of the most effective DoS defence “D-WARD”, 
identified from the literature review (see Chapter 3) and integrate it with 
the WSN based HAS test-bed. 
o Develop a DoS attack tool capable of launching an application level DoS 
flooding attack. 
o Develop and implement a conceptual model of an improved hybrid 
communications approach for mitigating DoS flooding attacks targeted 
at the third party mediating communications.  
o Evaluate the effectiveness of the approach, using the existing GHS 
approach as a benchmark on the WSN based HAS test-bed. 
o Develop and implement a conceptual model of an improved hybrid 
communication approach for mitigating DoS flooding attacks that 
directly target WSN based HASs. 
o Evaluate the effectiveness of the approach, using the existing D-WARD 
approach as a benchmark on the WSN based HAS test-bed. 
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o Develop and implement a conceptual model of an improved hybrid 
communication approach for mitigating DoS flooding attacks that target 
the home gateway. 
o Evaluate the effectiveness of the approach, using the existing D-WARD 
approach as a benchmark on the WSN based HAS test-bed. 
1.5.2 Contributions of the Research 
The contribution of the research detailed in this thesis consists of five parts. 
The first contribution is the design of a WSN based HAS test-bed for empirically 
analysing the existing and proposed approaches. Most of the existing work is 
theoretical, consequently providing a test-bed to empirically evaluate the existing 
and proposed approaches, adds to the available knowledge from a different 
perspective, which takes into consideration environmental variables that cannot be 
fully represented in theoretical models. Moreover, the test-bed allows for the 
creation of benchmarks from existing approaches (GHS and D-WARD) to contrast 
with the proposed approaches (RHS-1, RHS-2, and Hybrid). The quantitative results 
derived from the evaluation of the proposed approaches on the test-bed are 
described in the following contributions. 
Secondly, this thesis presents the first study to summarise the existing 
methods for remotely accessing, monitoring, and controlling HASs. Namely, the 
Direct and GHS communications approach. The approaches have been qualitatively 
evaluated to highlight the direct access approach is not suitable for monitoring and 
controlling WSN based HASs, due to the dynamic nature of the IP addresses in the 
UK, where the IP address of a HAS cannot be known before a direct connection 
attempt. Moreover, the approaches have been quantitatively evaluated to show that 
the direct access approach is the fastest of the existing remote access approaches 
analysed to login, share secure parameters and send three consecutive commands, 
taking on average 2661ms (a minimum of 2604ms and a maximum of 2793ms). For 
the same experiments, the GHS approach is shown to be a minimum of 39.23% 
slower, on average 45.81% slower, and a maximum of 46.60% slower. 
The third contribution is the identification of a vulnerability in the 
communications privacy of remote users communicating with HASs using existing 
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third party mediated communications approaches, at the third party. The 
vulnerability allows users at the third party to view homeowner’s confidential 
information, when it is decrypted at the third party for rerouting. Consequently, a 
secure tunnelling approach for protecting the communications privacy of remote 
users communicating with WSN based HASs (called the RHS-1 approach) has been 
designed and implemented. The dual tunnelling method adopted in the RHS-1 
approach removes 100% of the confidential information that is visible using the 
current GHS communications approach. 
The fourth contribution is the creation of a hybrid remote access approach 
for mitigating the effect of DoS attacks targeted at a third party mediating 
communications between remote users and the WSN based HAS. The hybrid 
communications approach has been quantitatively analysed in terms of the 
improvement of DoS resistance compared to the benchmark GHS approach. The 
results shows that compared to the GHS approach the proposed hybrid approach 
decreases the time the HAS services are unavailable by a minimum of 58.28%, on 
average by 59.85%, and a maximum of 61.45%. 
The fifth contribution presents an analysis and experimental evaluation of a 
generic model representing existing DoS defences. The model represents the most 
effective DoS mitigation tool identified from the domain analysis D-WARD 
(Removes 99.4% of attack packets). The evaluation shows that this approach is 
ineffective for protecting resource limited WSN based HASs. The evaluation 
highlighted that a flooding DoS attack directly targeting a WSN based HAS in a star 
configuration, at a 256ppm attack rate, results in a sufficient amount of attack data 
penetrating the existing D-WARD DoS defences to result in an average packet loss 
rate of 86.25% (a minimum of 84.38% and a maximum of 93.75%). In the partial 
mesh configuration, the 256ppm attack rate results in an average packet loss rate of 
91.25% (a minimum of 85.75% and a maximum of 94.75%). Moreover, a flooding 
DoS attack targeting the home gateway at 1090 attacks per minute, results in a 
minimum connection latency of 7130ms, an average latency of 7431ms and a 
maximum latency of 7942ms. A defence called the “virtual home” is implemented 
at the edge of the WSN, alongside existing defences, to filter all incoming traffic, 
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using a cryptographic approach to remove all attack traffic, preventing it from 
reaching and disrupting the WSN.  
The virtual home has been experimentally shown to reduce the percentage 
packet loss on the WSN during an effective DoS attack. In the case of the WSN 
based HAS in the star topology, the proposed defence approach has been shown to 
reduce the percentage packet loss on the WSN, during a flooding DoS attack, by a 
minimum of 84.70%, with an average reduction of 91.13% and a maximum 
reduction of 95.6%. In the case of the WSN based HAS in the partial mesh 
topology, the proposed defence approach has been shown to reduce the percentage 
packet loss by a minimum of 78.34%, with an average reduction of 91.20% and a 
maximum reduction of 95.60%. 
Additionally, the proposed approach has reduced the average connection 
latency experienced by remote users connecting to a WSN based HAS during an 
effective DoS attack against the gateway sensor node in all of the trials conducted. 
In an experiment with a 799 attacks per minute rate, the proposed approach resulted 
in a minimum reduction in connection latency of 56.11%, an average reduction of 
56.71%, and a maximum reduction of 57.77%. In the experiment with a 2300 
attacks per minute rate, the proposed approach resulted in a minimum reduction of 
connection latency of 90.14%, an average reduction of 90.90%, and a maximum 
reduction of 91.88%. 
All of the contributions aim to create an improved approach for securely and 
reliably accessing WSN based HASs and consequently enhance the overall security 
of WSN based HASs. 
1.6 Organisation of the Thesis 
The structure of this thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the development 
of WSN technologies and WSN based HASs. Chapter 3 provides a thorough review 
on the existing state of research into the field of WSN security, with a special 
emphasis on existing DoS attacks and counter measures. Chapter 4 defines the 
research methodology adopted. Chapter 5 introduces the development of a state of 
the art WSN home automation test-bed, on which the proposed approaches are 
implemented and evaluated. Chapter 6 introduces an improved approach for the 
secure remote access of WSNs, focusing on providing improved protection against 
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attacks targeting third parties involved in the communication process. Additionally 
an evaluation contrasting the proposed scheme against existing secure remote access 
approaches is provided. Chapter 7 identifies a new low-level DoS attack against 
WSN based HASs, and extends the proposed approach introduced in the previous 
chapter to include protection against DoS attacks focusing on the home end of 
communications. A new scheme for detecting DoS attacks is proposed, alongside a 
new mechanism for responding to DoS attacks. Chapter 8 provides the analysis of 
an evaluation of the proposed approaches conducted through focus group studies, 
questionnaires and a field trial. Moreover, the chapter introduces the first study to 
identify the social and ethical issues that arise, from the adoption of WSN based 
HASs and the associated remote access approaches. Chapter 9 concludes the thesis 
with a summary of the main contributions of the research as well as areas for future 
research.  
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Chapter 2  
Wireless Sensor Networks and Home 
Automation 
2.1  Introduction 
This chapter provides a comprehensive review of WSNs, with a special 
emphasis on WSN based HASs. The review is undertaken to partly meet the 
research objectives set out in Chapter 1. This includes conducting a thorough review 
of related work to aid in the development of a WSN based HAS test-bed for the 
subsequent identification and verification of security weaknesses in existing remote 
access approaches for WSN based HASs and testing of the proposed improved 
approaches. 
2.2 Computer Networks 
Computer technology plays an important role in the lives of many people 
around the world. Computers are present in people’s homes, workplaces, and are 
increasingly present throughout the whole of society. Computerised technology 
takes many differing forms including, personal computers, aeroplanes, trains, traffic 
lights, DVD players, and recently clothing comprised of one or more computerised 
devices. 
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Over the last decade and in parallel to the advances in computerised 
technology, communications technology has seen an exponential growth in the 
consumer market. In 2008, 16 million households, 65% of the population of the 
United Kingdom had access to the Internet (National Statistics 2008). However, it 
should be noted that the success of computer and network technology is not 
independent from one another. The merger of these technologies to form computer 
networks “a collection of autonomous computers interconnected by a single 
technology” (Tanenbaum 2003), have encouraged wide spread adoption of these 
technologies through the development of revolutionary new services that have 
fundamentally changed the way people live their lives. These services include, 
email, the World Wide Web (WWW), social networking, blogging, and home 
automation.  
There are a number of different types of computer networks. The most 
popular types of network include personal area networks (PANs), local area 
networks (LANs), metropolitan area networks (MANs), wide area networks 
(WANs), and the Internet. These computer networks differ, primarily in their 
geographical distribution, see Table 2-1 (Tanenbaum 2003). 
Table 2-1: Different types of networks based on geographic distribution 
Distance between 
nodes 
Possible location of neighbour 
nodes 
Network type 
1 m Square Metre Personal area network 
10 m Room Local area network 
100 m Building 
1 km Campus 
10 km City Metropolitan area network 
100 km Country Wide area network 
1000 km Continent 
10 000 km Planet Internet 
2.2.1 Personal Area Networks 
PANs are short-range networks, potentially only a few metres in range, 
which are normally in close proximity to the individuals interacting with them. 
Moreover, PANs provide relatively low bandwidth communications for either short-
term networks created solely for the purposes of performing a single task, such as 
transferring a picture between connected devices, or longer-term networks for 
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performing low data rate activities. Examples of recent PAN standards include 
Bluetooth, ZigBee, IEEE 802.15.4 and Z-Wave.  
2.2.2 Local Area Networks 
LANs normally operate within a relatively small area (10 to 100m), 
providing coverage for a single room, building or campus. There are wired and 
wireless versions of LANs, normally with stable architectures, that can traditionally 
provide data rates of 10 to 100 Mbps, with newer LANs providing support for up to 
1 Gbps. These LANs are conventionally used for sharing resources such as printers, 
scanners, Internet connections, and network storage servers amongst connected 
devices.   
2.2.3 Metropolitan Area Networks 
MANs normally operate over large areas (10km) and provide services for a 
large number of users, potentially providing citywide access. MANs can be 
composed of a single large network providing services within the boundaries of a 
city or be composed of smaller interconnected LANs. However, due to the longer 
range and larger number of potential users, the data rates received by individual 
users are less than those offered by LANs. 
2.2.4 Wide Area Networks 
WANs span a very large area (100km – 1000km), often encompassing a 
country or even an entire continent. WAN can be private networks, where only 
users authorised by the network owners have access rights, or public networks, 
where everyone has access rights.   
2.2.5 Global Networks 
Global networks span the whole Earth, the most famous global network is 
the Internet. The Internet is comprised of a complex architecture of interconnected 
networks, including all of the previously introduced network types. The complexity 
of the Internet’s architecture is further increased because the different types of 
networks consist of different hardware, software and protocols.  
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The work in this thesis focuses on WSN based HASs. WSN’s are a form of 
PAN that are becoming more popular for domestic and industrial applications, 
where people wish to monitor environmental conditions. 
2.3 Wireless Sensor Networks 
 
Figure 2-1: A generic WSN architecture 
A WSN is composed of low cost, low power, multifunctional sensor nodes 
that are small in size and communicate wirelessly over short distances (Akyildiz et 
al. 2002).  The sensor nodes collaborate to sense and collate information about their 
environment, through a set of transducers and a radio receiver (Barontib et al. 
2007), and to forward information towards a central sink node. Moreover, 
information from the sensor node is accessed through a gateway sensor node as 
depicted in Figure 2-1, which provides a point of ingress between the WSN and 
either a direct link to a relatively resource rich computer or indirectly through a 
LAN to a resource rich computer.  
There is a greater deal of flexibility when it comes to the deployment 
choices for WSNs compared to other networks. WSN nodes once distributed 
randomly in an environment organise themselves into a coherent information 
sharing network. Consequently, the design time considerations arising from the use 
of a fixed network structure, do not apply. 
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Figure 2-2: The structure of a WSN node 
A WSN node, as depicted in Figure 2-2, consists of five main components, a 
processing unit, memory, transceiver, sensors and power supply. The processor unit 
is responsible for making the WSN node collaborate with other sensor nodes, and 
execute application code. The memory unit stores the node’s programmes, including 
the network stack and application programmes. The transceiver allows the node to 
communicate with neighbouring nodes. The sensor component consists of two parts. 
Firstly, there is the analogue sensing component that physically measures 
environmental characteristics such as temperature. Secondly, there is the analogue 
to digital converter that transforms the analogue environmental readings into a 
digital representation that can be handled by the nodes processor. One of the most 
important components of the node is the power supply. The power supply provides 
the node with life, and is normally limited so that once the node’s power supply is 
exhausted the node can no longer operate. There are other elements that a node may 
consist of such as power generating components (i.e. solar panels and 
thermocouples) to recharge the node’s power supply , however the five components 
discussed are crucial for a node to be considers a WSN node, whereas the other 
components are optional. 
2.3.1 Types of Wireless Sensors 
A WSN node may consist of one or more sensors. Moreover, there are 
numerous different types of sensors produced by different manufactures. However, 
the primary objective of all sensor nodes is to monitor their immediate environment 
for a wide variety of ambient conditions. A short summary of the ambient 
conditions monitored by existing nodes that have been identified by (Akyildiz et al. 
2002) and (Lewis 2004) follows: 
• Temperature, 
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• humidity, 
• vehicular movement, 
• lightning conditions, 
• pressure, 
• soil component levels, 
• noise levels, 
• the presence or absence of certain kinds of objects, 
• mechanical stress levels on attached objects, and 
• the current characteristics such as speed, direction, and size of an object. 
2.3.2 WSN Stack 
The Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) seven-layer model, proposed by 
the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), forms the basis of the 
design of the WSN protocol stack. However, unlike the seven-layer OSI model that 
consists of the physical layer, data link layer, network layer, transport layer, session 
layer, presentation layer and, application layer, the WSN protocol stack does not 
adopt all seven layers of the OSI model. In reality, the seven-layer OSI model has 
too many layers making it overly complex and difficult to implement 
(Aschenbernner 1986). Consequently, the protocol Stack adopted by WSNs consists 
of five layers, as depicted in Figure 2-3. 
The five-layer WSN protocol stack consists of the physical layer, data link 
layer, network layer, transport layer and the application layer. Each layer is 
designated a specific set of task to perform independently of the other layers of the 
protocol stack. 
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Figure 2-3: WSN protocol stack 
The first layer of the protocol stack, the physical layer, is responsible for 
defining and managing the connections between respective devices and their 
communication medium. The physical layer is responsible for frequency selection, 
carrier frequency generation, signal detection, modulation and data encryption. 
Moreover, the physical layer defines the type of connectors and cables compatible 
with the communication medium.  
The second layer of the protocol stack, the data link layer, is responsible for 
providing services that allow multiple nodes to successfully access and share a 
communications medium. These services include medium access control, reliable 
delivery, error detection and error correction. 
The third layer of the protocol stack, the network layer, is responsible for 
establishing the communications paths between nodes in a network and successfully 
routing packets along these paths. The objective of different routing protocols and 
hence the communication paths set up can vary. Some routing protocols will favour 
communication paths that help the WSN deliver the best Quality of Service (QoS), 
other energy saving protocols may choose the path that helps the WSN achieve the 
best lifetime and other will use a hybrid of objectives. 
The fourth layer, the transport layer, is responsible for providing higher-
level layers of the protocol stack and consequently users with transparent and 
reliable communications between end users. There are varying forms of transport 
layer protocols, two of the most popular and contrasting are transmission control 
protocol (TCP) and user datagram protocol (UDP). Connection oriented transport 
layer protocols, such as TCP, provide a reliable communication service, with 
extensive error handling, transmission control, and flow control. Whereas, 
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connectionless transport layer protocols, such as UDP, provide an unreliable service 
with the minimum error handling, transmission control, and flow control. In terms 
of WSNs, TCP/IP is generally not employed directly on WSNs because, as 
identified during experiments by (Kuorilehto et al. 2006), the flow control 
mechanisms adopted by TCP is too aggressive for WSNs, where most errors are 
caused by bit errors and topology changes instead of congestion. Moreover, TCP/IP 
requires a large processing overhead, which in experiments resulted in five times 
more power consumption than a WSN specific TDMA-based MAC protocol. There 
are a number of routing protocols designed specifically for WSNs. For a review of 
these protocols, please refer to (Akkaya and Younis 2005). 
The fifth and final layer, adopted by most WSNs, is the application layer. 
The application layer resides close to the users of the system. There are many 
potential applications implemented at the application layer including, Telnet, 
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), File Transfer Protocol (FTP), and Simple Mail 
Transfer Protocol (SMTP). In terms of WSN’s, the application layer programming 
primarily deals with the processing of sensed information, encryption, formatting 
and storage of data. Moreover, the application layer examines the underlying layers 
to detect if sufficient network resources and services are available to meet the user’s 
network requests. 
2.3.3 Wireless Sensor Network Standards 
A standard is a documented specification, or other precise criteria composed 
through the collective discussion and agreement by members of a group formed 
from interested parties such as governments, manufactures, research organisations, 
consumers, or a selection from some or all of the aforementioned interested parties 
(British Standards Institution 2009). 
Standards allow for the development of products, services or procedures that 
meet certain minimum levels of quality, safety and performance, whilst providing a 
greater level of compatibility between devices produced by different manufacturers. 
Consequently, the compliance with widely known standards provides a certain level 
of assurance for consumers of the compatibility, and performance to expect from 
device or services.  
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Adopting a standard based approach offers a great deal of advantages for 
both adopters of standards and for consumers. However, there are two primary 
drawbacks. Firstly, standards normally take a considerable amount of time to be 
drafted and modified. Consequently, standards do not reflect the latest technology 
available and require constant and frequent updating to remain competitive. 
Secondly, standards are a compromised set of specifications agreed upon by 
different interested parties with different viewpoints. Hence, the standardised 
approach may not provide the optimal approach. Nonetheless, wireless 
communication standards have provided consumers with devices that support a vast 
array of communication technologies for transferring information, such as pictures, 
electronic documents, sensor readings, between devices.  
Recently, the need for low cost, low data rate, battery powered, time 
sensitive network applications has encouraged further research into the development 
of Low-Rate Wireless Personal Area Network (LR-WPAN) standards. The most 
widely researched and adopted wireless standards include Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, Z-
Wave, KNX RF, and ZigBee. 
Bluetooth is one of the most wide spread LR-WPAN standards in existence. 
The standard defines a wireless, frequency hopping communication standard 
capable of forming short-range ad hoc networks. Many devices including mobile 
phones, headsets, PDA’s, laptops, and cars increasingly come equipped with 
Bluetooth technology for a vast range of applications including transferring 
pictures, music, files and, GPS data. However, there are two major weaknesses in 
the Bluetooth standard for use as a LR-WPAN standard of choice. Firstly, Bluetooth 
technology consumes a considerable amount of energy. Consequently, applications 
that require real-time monitoring, which require the transceiver to be on for 
significant periods, need the device’s battery to be regularly charged. Moreover, a 
Bluetooth network or Piconet supports a maximum of one master node and seven 
slave nodes. Although, Piconets support bridging of co-existing Piconets to form a 
scatternet. The scalability of Bluetooth is limited for large-scale networks (Salonidis 
et al. 2005). 
  The Wi-Fi standard is present in homes and offices across the world and is 
commonly used for creating LAN’s for the connection of devices such as laptops, 
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printers, and mobile phones. Recently, (Linx 2009) proposed the use of Wi-Fi for 
creating a PAN in which up to seven devices connect directly, in an ad hoc fashion, 
with a laptop. Unlike existing Wi-Fi based ad hoc networks the laptop retains the 
ability to connect and stay connected to a Wi-Fi based LAN. The problems 
associated with the use of the Wi-Fi standard as a LR-WPAN, as with the problems 
associated with Bluetooth, include limited connectivity, which reduces the 
scalability of the standard for large-scale networks. Moreover, the Wi-Fi standard 
requires a relatively large power supply, which can exhaust the limited power of 
batteries within a few hours. Consequently, the technology is not, in its current 
form, appropriate for long term LR-WPAN. 
The Z-Wave LR-WPAN standard operates at 908.42 MHz +/- 12kHz in the 
US and 868.42 MHz +/- 12 kHz in Europe, uses FSK (frequency shift keying) 
modulation, and supports a data rate of 9.6 Kbps. The standard defines that a Z-
Wave network consists of a single network controller, routing-slaves, and slave 
nodes. The controller maintains information about the network topology and is 
responsible for autonomously creating and maintaining the Z-Wave network. 
Routing-slave nodes communicate with predefined destination nodes using routing 
information downloaded during the initialisation of the routing-slaves. Slaves are at 
the end of a communication chain and perform actions directly on received 
messages. Slaves are not capable of routing messages. The standard defines the use 
of source routing, in which nodes can only communicate with other known nodes. A 
single Z-Wave network is capable of supporting up to 232 devices, however 
different Z-Wave networks can be bridged to increase the number of devices 
supported in a given area. Z-Wave provides a hardware solution for the provision of 
security features, such as encryption, however the standard does not incorporate a 
security model. Consequently, security is the responsibility of the system developer. 
This increases the difficulty of implementing secure LR-WPANs, as developers 
may not have the necessary security expertise. Moreover, the difficulty of creating 
compatible systems designed by different manufactures is increased. 
The KNX RF is a wireless version of the KNX (Konnex) home and building 
control standard. KNX RF operates at 868.3 MHz +/- 40-80 kHz using FSK 
modulation and theoretically supports up to 256 devices. The limited number of 
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devices supported by the standard may not be sufficient for WSN based automation 
systems. Moreover, the KNX RF protocol does not support any security 
functionality as part of the standard, although security features can be adopted by 
systems programmers at the application layer.   
Due to the drawbacks of existing standards such as Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, Z-
Wave, and KNK RF as candidates for implementing LR-WPANs, the IEEE 
(Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers) proposed IEEE 802.15.4 as a new 
LR-WPAN standard. The IEEE 802.15.4 standard is explicitly designed for LR-
WPANs such as WSNs and aims to overcome the aforementioned problems 
associated with the existing standards. Subsequent evaluation of the IEEE 802.15.4 
standard after its initial release has identified areas where improvements could be 
made such as ease of network configuration, need for application programs, and a 
need for advanced security features. Consequently, the ZigBee Alliance was formed 
from a consortium of semiconductor manufactures and technology provider from 
around the world. The IEEE 802.15.4 standard provides the basis of the new 
standard defining the Physical (PHY) and Medium Access Control (MAC) layers. 
The ZigBee standard complements the IEEE 802.15.4 standard and provides the 
Network (NWK) layer, and the Application layer (APL). The IEEE 802.15.4 layers 
and ZigBee layers combine to form the full layers, see Figure 2-4, of a low cost, low 
power, and low data rate WSN standard. 
2.3.4 IEEE 802.15.4 
 
Figure 2-4: IEEE 802.15.4 and ZigBee stack 
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The IEEE 802.15.4 standard supports the star and peer-to-peer network 
topologies, as depicted in Figure 2-5. Moreover, the IEEE 802.15.4 standard 
supports a 64-bit long address and a 16-bit short address, theoretically resulting in a 
single network being able to support a maximum of 216
As previously discussed, the IEEE 802.15.4 standard defines the PHY and 
MAC layers for LR-WPANs. The PHY layer is responsible for characterising the 
physical attributes and behaviours of LR-WPAN nodes. This includes turning the  
 ≈ 65,000 devices.  
 
Figure 2-5: IEEE 802.15.4 topologies 
transceiver on and off, selecting the appropriate channel, estimating the link quality 
(LQI), receiver energy detection, and clear channel assessment (CCA) (Barontib et 
al. 2007). Moreover, the PHY layer supports three licence free ISM (Industrial, 
Scientific, and Medical) frequency bands including 2.4 GHz with 16 channels and a 
250 kbps data rate, 902 to 928 MHz with 10 channels and a 40 kbps data rate and, 
868 to 870 MHz with 1 channel and a 20 kbps data rate (Craig 2005 and Ergen 
2004).  
The MAC layer defines the network structure of LR-WPANs. The IEEE 
802.15.4 standard defines two types of devices, full function devices (FFDs), and 
reduced function devices (RFDs), that can constitute a compliant LR-WPAN. FFD 
incorporate all the MAC layer functions, including the ability to connect to any 
node in range and forward messages. This means that a FFD can act as a network 
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coordinator or a common node. Moreover, FFDs acting as the network coordinator 
send network beacons providing synchronisation, communication, and network join 
services. However, it should be noted that due to a lack of a NWK layer, only the 
coordinator forwards messages. The other common node FFDs can only 
communicate with their one-hop neighbours. On the other hand, RFDs have access 
to a limited range of MAC layer functions. RFDs are equipped with sensor and 
actuators such as temperature sensors and light switches respectively for monitoring 
their respective environments. Once the RFD is ready to transmit sensed 
information, the RFD may only communicate with one FFD (Barontib et al. 2007).  
The IEEE 802.15.4 MAC layer supports super-frame and non super-frame 
communications. In super-frame communications, the network coordinator emits a 
synchronising beacon to indicate the start of a super-frame and a beacon to indicate 
the end of the super-frame. The super-frame is divided into active times and inactive 
times where network nodes sleep to conserve energy. The active period is further 
divided into contention access period (CAP) and contention free period (CFP). 
During the CAP, nodes compete for access to the communication channel using the 
Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA-CA) protocol. 
During the CFP the network coordinator splits the available CFP into guaranteed 
time slots (GTS) and assigns each slot to a particular device to communicate 
without contention from any other device on the network. Alternatively, in the non 
super-frame based approach all devices on the LR-WPAN compete for access to the 
channel using CSMA-CA. In this case, all devices have an equal chance of gaining 
access to the channel or not gaining access.  
2.3.5 ZigBee 
The ZigBee standard is implemented on top of the IEEE 802.15.4 PHY and 
MAC layers. The objective of the addition is to standardise the upper layers of the 
protocol stack, through the addition of the NWK and APL layers. As depicted in 
Figure 2-6, the APL layer consists of the Application framework for distributed 
application development and communication, the ZigBee device object (ZDO), and 
the application support sublayer (APS) (Barontib et al. 2007).The application 
framework can consist of up to 240 “application objects” (APO), user defined 
modules that comprise the ZigBee application. The ZDO provides services to the 
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APO, allowing them to discover each other and organise themselves into a 
distributed application. The APS provides a user-friendly interface for the APS and 
ZDO to access underlying data and security services provided by the lower levels of 
the protocol stack.  
Figure 2-6: ZigBee stack architecture (ZigBee Alliance 2007) 
The NWK layer defines three device types, end device, router, and 
coordinator, that map on to the FFD and RFD specified by the IEEE 802.15.4 
standard. Firstly, ZigBee end devices are RFD or FFD providing simple functions. 
Secondly, ZigBee routers are FFD with routing capabilities and thirdly, ZigBee 
coordinators are FFD responsible for managing the whole network. The NWK layer 
supports the underlying topologies discussed earlier, however through the 
introduction of router nodes provides multi-hop communications. Consequently, 
more complex topologies such as tree and mesh topologies are supported as 
depicted in Figure 2-7. Additionally, the NWK layer provides services for route 
discovery, security, and management of nodes joining and leaving the network.  
The ZigBee standard defines a comprehensive security policy. ZigBee 
assumes an open trust model (Barontib et al. 2007), whereby all the layers, of the 
protocol stack, are trusted. Consequently, the ZigBee stack distributes the 
implementation of security across different layers of the stack including the MAC, 
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NWK, and APS layers, as depicted in Figure 2-6. The basic security primitives 
defined by the ZigBee stack include: 
• Freshness: each ZigBee device records a history of incoming and outgoing 
freshness counters against which the counters of received messages are checked. 
 
Figure 2-7: ZigBee topologies 
• Message Integrity: the standard provides a default level of 64-bit data integrity, 
and provides 0, 32, and 128 bit data integrity as optional choices. 
• Authentication: ZigBee provides network and device level authentication. 
Network level authentication requires significantly less resources with a single 
network key used to authenticate all devices. Device or link level authentication 
requires a unique key for each connection authenticated. 
• Encryption: ZigBee provides network level encryption and device or link level 
encryption. Network level encryption requires one global encryption key, 
whereas link level encryption requires a unique key for each device or link.  
2.3.6 WSN Applications 
There is a range of diverse applications that lend themselves to WSNs. 
(Akyildiz et al. 2002) categorises these under five-application areas, military, 
environment, health, home and other commercial areas.  
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WSNs are suitable for use in many military applications including command 
and control applications, surveillance and reconnaissance of enemy targets, 
monitoring for the release of biological and chemical weapons and tracking of 
ordinance. The ability of WSN nodes to be quickly deployed, organise themselves 
autonomously into functional, fault tolerant networks makes WSN technology ideal 
for these and many other military applications. 
Environmental applications of WSNs include monitoring the movement of 
wildlife such as birds and insects, monitoring factors that affect the growth of crops, 
exploring inhospitable parts of the earth that remain unexplored, detecting and 
tracking forest fires, detecting and monitoring the progress of floods, and measuring 
levels of pollution across distributed locations.  
One of the most promising applications of WSNs for the elderly and infirm 
is health care. WSNs provide the potential to offer these vulnerable groups a greater 
level of independence in their lives. Potential applications include integrated control 
of household devices from a single controller, remote patient monitoring, better 
real-time monitoring of patients in hospitals and tracking staff and equipment in 
hospitals. 
Home automation technology has been the subject of research for many 
years. However, largely due to the expense and intrusiveness of installation of these 
systems, they have failed to achieve wide scale consumer adoption. However, with 
the low cost, small size, non-intrusiveness of installation, characteristics of WSNs, 
many of the cost and installation problems identified with existing systems are 
overcome. The potential applications for home automation technology are diverse, 
such as multi-media entertainment, automatic houseplant watering, domestic robots, 
home security, energy saving, and automated pet feeding. 
The work in this thesis focuses on the challenges facing the application of 
WSNs for home automation. The next section explores the existing literature on 
home automation and the research challenges facing the development of WSN 
based HASs. 
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2.4 Home Automation and WSNs 
There are many definitions of home automation available in the literature. 
(Bromley et al. 2003) describes home automation as the introduction of technology 
within the home to enhance the quality of life of its occupants, through the 
provision of different services such as telehealth, multimedia entertainment and 
energy conservation. The existing research into home automation can be categorised 
based on the communication and networking technology used to create the HAS. 
Early HASs relied on the wired medium for networking and communication. 
The X10 industry standard, developed in 1975 for communication between 
electronic devices, is the oldest standard identified from this review, providing 
limited control over household devices through the home’s power lines. 
HASs based on the wired medium provide reliable and secure systems. 
However, the use of the wired medium for the formation of networks to facilitate 
communications between connected devices requires extensive rewiring incurring 
an intrusive installation and increased installation cost. Additionally, the use of the 
wired medium limits the positioning of devices to locations close to the physical 
wired medium (Reinisch et al. 2007). Consequently, recent research into the home 
automation domain has shifted towards systems incorporating LR-WPAN 
technology, in particular WSN based HASs are currently the focus of research in the 
home automation field. The incorporation of WSN technology allows for the 
creation of smart HASs that monitor and respond to environmental phenomenon. 
The existing research into WSN based HASs can be categorised based on the WSN 
standard used to create the HAS.  
The Bluetooth standard has been investigated for creating a WSN based 
HAS. (Sriskanthan et al. 2002) introduced a Bluetooth based HAS, consisting of a 
primary controller and a number of Bluetooth sub-controllers. In the proposed 
system, each home device physically connects to a local Bluetooth sub-controller. 
The home devices communicate with their respective sub-controller using wired 
communications. From the sub-controller all communications are sent to the 
primary controller using wireless communications. As discussed earlier, the system 
suffers from drawbacks attributable to the use of Bluetooth. Furthermore, it is 
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desirable for each home device to have a dedicated Bluetooth module. However, 
due to the fiscal expense of Bluetooth technology, a single module is shared 
amongst several devices. Consequently, devices have to wait for other devices to 
finish using the Bluetooth module before they can access the module and transmit 
messages. This has the disadvantage of incurring an additional access delay.  
The WSN standard to receive the most attention, for the purposes of home 
automation and for other LR-WPAN applications is the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. 
Numerous HASs facilitate the IEEE 802.15.4 standard for the implementation of 
communication and networking including (Reinisch et al. 2007), (Bolzani et al. 
2006), (Gauger et al. 2008), and (Baker et al. 2007). A summary of the recent 
investigations of the IEEE 802.15.4 standard as a suitable communication protocol 
for creating a HAS follows: 
Certain approaches have integrated the IEEE 802.15.4 standard with existing 
home automation standards. This facilitates the use of IEEE 802.15.4 features to 
overcome weaknesses in existing protocols, whilst maintaining the strengths of well 
known and trusted home automation standards. For example, (Reinisch et al. 2007) 
proposes the extension of an established wired home automation protocol KNX/EIB 
(Konnex/European Installation Bus) to the LR-WPAN domain through the 
integration of the standard with IEEE 802.15.4 to form KNX RF (Konnex Radio 
Frequency). The combination of the two standards provides security features 
available in the IEEE 802.15.4 standard, whilst adding the potential for future 
compatibility with the ZigBee standard.  
Other approaches have relied solely on IEEE 802.15.4 as the basis of the 
HAS, including (Bolzani et al. 2006), (Gauger et al. 2008), and (Baker et al. 2007). 
(Bolzani et al. 2006) evaluated the ability of IEEE 802.15.4 to provide real-time 
environmental information for home automation applications. This research project 
has implemented an IEEE 802.15.4 based sensor network and integrated it with a 
simulator of a HAS called “Home Sapiens”. The simulator generates normal user 
behaviour and requests functions from the integrated IEEE 802.15.4 network. The 
evaluation tested the ability of an IEEE 802.15.4 based HAS to respond to normal 
user activities. The evaluation concluded that IEEE 802.15.4 sufficiently dealt with 
the demands placed on the network from simulated activity without incurring 
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abnormal behaviour such as excessive communication delays or incorrect operations 
on the home automation network.  
(Baker et al. 2007) conducted one of the most comprehensive studies into 
the potential home health care applications for the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. Five 
home health applications based on IEEE 802.15.4 WSN technology, were 
developed including:  
• “Sleep safe” a sensor to alert parents when their baby roles over onto its 
stomach, increasing the risk of sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS).  
• “Baby glove” a blanket for premature babies that has sensors to measure the 
baby’s temperature and hydration level more accurately and economically than 
existing approaches.  
• “Fireline” a shirt embedded with sensors to monitor the heart rate of fire fighters 
and raise an alarm when their heart rate becomes abnormal.  
• “Heart@home” integrated WSN technology with an existing blood pressure 
monitor to send and store sensed information to a local PC.  
• “LISTEN” located a sound sensor close to devices, such as doorbells, and other 
noise making devices, when the sensor detected sound a visual alarm was 
triggered. Alerting deaf or hearing impaired users of household devices that 
require attention.  
 As discussed, the IEEE 802.15.4 standard offers a low cost, battery 
powered, solution for networked applications. However, the standard does not 
provide an approach for different manufactures to produce compatible home 
automation devices. Moreover, the complexity of creating compatible devices is 
increased, as there is no common network layer, resulting in IEEE 802.15.4 home 
automation devices incorporating varying routing protocols and network topologies 
(Barontib et al. 2007). Consequently, ZigBee based HASs have emerged to tackle 
the shortcomings of IEEE 802.15.4 based HASs, including (Varchola et al. 2007), 
(Wu et al. 2008), (Sun et al. 2008), (Collotta et al. 2009), (Jin et al. 2008), and 
(Virone et al. 2006). ZigBee builds upon IEEE 802.15.4 to increase the ease of 
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deployment, and scalability of the home automation network whilst providing 
reconfiguration and self-organisation abilities for home automation devices. Most 
ZigBee based HASs identified have focused on a single application, for example 
(Sun et al. 2008) shows the development of a ZigBee based lighting system, and 
(Collotta et al. 2009) develops a central heating control system using multiple 
distributed temperature sensors to more accurately control heating levels within the 
home. There is limited literature available on research investigating the 
appropriateness of ZigBee for use with a complete HAS. However, (Wu et al. 2008) 
has attempted to address this gap in the literature through the development of a 
ZigBee based “Intelligent Home System” consisting of a Home Server, GSM 
Module, intelligent home appliances, and environment detection sensors. The HAS 
adopts a one-hop, star topology, with all sensors and appliances connected directly 
with the home server. The home server is the network coordinator and all other 
devices are end devices. The system is integrated with commercially available 
temperature, humidity, luminance, vibration and security sensors. The home server 
waits for an alert from the connected devices and sensors. Once an alert is received, 
the GSM module sends a text message to the respective homeowners, informing 
them of the alarm. In turn, a homeowner may send a text to the GSM module 
containing instruction, which the home server interprets and consequently modifies 
the respective home automation device.  
The existing HASs, developed as part of academic and industrial research, 
have normally provided remote access for the monitoring and control of household 
devices. Remote access involves creating a bridge between HASs and neighbouring 
networks with a greater geographic range, such as LANs, MANs, WANs, or global 
networks. In many WSN applications, where WSNs are deployed to measure 
extreme environments in remote locations, such as monitoring volcanoes, remote 
control is a critical component of the WSN infrastructure, allowing inhospitable 
environments to be monitored from a safe distance and at leisure. In the case of 
WSN based HASs, many of the applications, such as telehealth, which utilise the 
expertise of specialist individuals or organisations, incorporate remote access as a 
critical component of the WSN infrastructure. The following section reviews a 
summary of the most popular, existing remote access approaches. 
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2.5 Remote Access Approaches 
The earliest remote access approach, identified by the authors review, was 
proposed by (Corcoran et al. 1996). A method for remotely accessing a CEBus 
home automation network, using the WWW was proposed. The system proposes the 
use of a direct connection from the remote access device to the HAS. The user loads 
a webpage using a HTML browser, stored on the home’s web server. An applet is 
loaded by the html page, which initiates a TCP/IP (Transmission Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol) connection with the home’s web server. All incoming 
messages are routed, by the web server, to the CEBus network. This system shows 
an early example of remote access with no security implemented. However, this 
approach outlines the fundamental framework used for remote access by most 
systems today. 
More recent “secure remote access approaches” fall into two general 
categories. Firstly, there are those, like the aforementioned system, that connect 
remote devices directly with the destination system. Secondly, there are those that 
use a third party to mediate the connection between the remote device and the 
destination system.  
(Duncan et al. 2000) proposes and implements a scheme for direct remote 
access. The system comprises of a medical data repository in a hospital which 
remote users can access using a handheld PDA. A dedicated domain name is 
assigned to the hospitals static IP address. Remote users connect to the repositories 
domain name using a PDA and by submitting a username and password. The 
connection is protected using a combination of SSL (Secure Socket Layer) and 
elliptic curve cryptography. Moreover, the repository is located within a 
decentralised zone, where a firewall filters the types of connections allowed from 
public networks. In the eventuality of a breach in security, the system automatically 
generates an analysis of the system usage, allowing any unauthorised access to be 
detected.  
(Hu et al. 2007) propose creating a virtual private network (VPN) between 
authorised entities. The connections between the communicating entities, that form 
the VPN, are created by establishing SSL tunnels between them. Once these 
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connections have been established messages flow, through these tunnels, between 
entities as if they were connected on the same network.  
There are many other direct access approaches; however, the underlying 
approach used for direct access approaches is the same. In terms of accessing WSN 
based HASs using direct access approaches, there are several problems. Firstly, 
most homes in the UK do not have a static IP address. Consequently, there is no 
method for the remote user to know the IP address of their respective home or WSN 
based HASs. Moreover, the use of a static IP address provides a fixed point for 
attackers to launch a prolonged attack. In Addition, the direct access approaches 
place the emphasis of maintaining security on the owners of the HAS. For example 
if the earlier discussed system proposed by (Duncan et al. 2000) is adopted for 
HASs, the users need extensive security knowledge on the use and maintenance of 
SSL certificates, and firewalls. Consequently, the use of a direct access approach for 
WSN based HASs may not be possible or appropriate. 
Recently third party based approaches for providing remote access have 
been suggested to overcome the problems identified with direct access approaches 
for WSN based HASs. (Bergstrom et al. 2001) proposed a scheme in which a server 
located in the home environment establishes a connection with a trusted third party, 
called a Global Home Server (GHS) and supplies it with its current IP address. The 
remote user connects to the GHS, and sends it encrypted messages. The GHS 
decrypts the messages and looks up the messages destination in the database of 
connected homes. The GHS re-encrypts the information and forwards the message 
to the appropriate home’s IP address. In parallel (Kara 2001), and later (Kara 2004) 
proposed an almost identical scheme. In this scheme the mobile client’s first 
message to the trusted third party contains security information required by the HAS 
to establish end-to-end security. This information is passed to connecting remote 
entities by the trusted third party. The remote entity and HAS use this information 
to establish end-to-end security and encrypt all communications. The third party 
based approaches differ from direct access approaches primarily due to the direction 
of communication connections. Direct connections are initiated by a client and are 
received by a HAS as incoming connections. Whereas, in third party based 
approaches the HAS initiates an outgoing connections to a third party and waits for 
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data from a client on the outgoing connection, routed through the third party. 
Although the third party based approaches have been shown to provide effective 
remote access for HAS, no comparative analysis evaluating the differences and 
compromises between using direct and third party based remote access approaches 
for accessing WSN based HASs is available. Moreover, from this review no 
research is available, which analyses the security of these approaches. 
2.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has provided an overview of the development of WSN 
technology. Moreover, an overview highlighting the development of HASs from 
wired to WSN based HASs is presented. The earliest wired HAS identified from 
this review is presented, showing the weaknesses identified by subsequent research 
including the intrusive, costly installations of wired HASs and the incompatibility of 
systems designed by different manufactures. Wireless networks and in particular 
WSNs based on standards are shown to overcome many of the problems associated 
with the earlier wired HASs.  
Figure 2.2: Technical analysis of Wireless Standards  
Wireless 
Standard 
Power  
Usage 
Maximum 
Devices Data Rate 
Manufacturer 
Interoperability Security 
Bluetooth High 8 1,3 Mb/Sec Profiles Pass code 
Wi-Fi High 8 54, 600Mb/Sec Profiles WPA/WPA2 
Z-WAVE Low 256 9.6 Kbps Non AES 
KNX-RF Low 256 16.384 Kbps Non Non 
IEEE 802.15.4 Low 65000 20, 40, 256Kbps Non AES 
ZigBee Low 65000 20, 40, 256Kbps Profiles AES 
 
Table 2.2 provides a technical summary of the different wireless standards 
investigated in this chapter. The ZigBee standard due to its low power consumption, 
support for up to 65000 devices, use of a well established security mechanism (the 
advanced security standard, discussed further in Chapter 3), and support for device 
profiles is considered the most suitable standard for the creation of WSN based 
HASs. Where, Bluetooth and Wi-Fi’s reliance on a relatively high power supply 
makes them unsuitable for battery-powered devices. Additionally, the low data rate 
of both Z-WAVE (9.6Kbps) and KNX-RF (16.384Kbps) and lack of support for the 
creation of compatible products from different manufactures, supports the 
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appropriateness of ZigBee as the most suitable  WSN based HAS standard. 
Moreover, for the same reasons, the lack of manufacture interoperability offered by 
IEEE 802.15.4 also supports the use of ZigBee as a WSN based HAS standard. 
In addition, the remote access approaches used commonly to access HASs 
are categorised based on the approaches, which form direct connections and those, 
which use third parties to mediate connections. The direct access approaches are 
shown to have an inability to directly connect to HASs in the UK due to the 
common use of dynamic IP addresses, resulting in direct access approaches not 
having the required IP address to successfully establish a connection. Moreover, the 
direct access approaches are shown to place the emphasis on maintaining security 
on the homeowners, although they may not have the required expertise.  
Third party based remote access approaches are shown to overcome the 
dynamic IP address problem. However, there is a lack of quantitative analysis of the 
comparative performance of the direct and third party based GHS remote access 
approaches. Furthermore, most research on remote access approaches focuses on the 
formation of communication links and ignores security concerns such as the 
resilience to DoS flooding attacks of direct and third party based approaches. 
The existing security threats faced by WSN based HASs and the respective 
remote access approaches are reviewed in Chapter 3. Moreover, the following 
chapters introduce a WSN based HAS test-bed, designed based on the literature 
review, which is used to provide a quantitative performance analysis of the existing 
direct and GHS remote access approaches, a benchmark based on the GHS approach 
and the evaluation of proposed approaches based on the GHS benchmark. Please 
see Chapter 6 for the results of the Quantitative analysis.  
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Chapter 3  
DoS Attacks in WSNs 
3.1 Security Overview 
Computer security is a relatively recent development. In the time before 
computers data was kept locked in filing cabinets. When computers were developed 
a strategy was required to keep data on these computers safe, this was termed 
Computer Security. Due to the advent of distributed systems connected by networks 
across the internet, there arose a need to keep data safe between these networks, this 
was termed Internet Security (Stallings 2002). 
Standards have emerged to help system designers develop systems that offer 
a comprehensive range of security services, in an attempt to provide an acceptable 
level of security for adopters of the standards. A widely accepted standard is the 
ITU-T (International Telecommunications Union Standardisation Sector) defined 
X.800 standard. The standard provides a security architecture for the OSI Model, 
defining security requirements and suggesting approaches for satisfying these 
requirements. There are, as identified by the X.800 recommendation and argued by 
(Stallings 2002), security categories which must be satisfied in order to classify a 
system as secure, these categories include authentication, access control, 
confidentiality, data integrity, non-repudiation, availability, and fairness.  
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3.1.1 Authentication  
The authentication process is concerned with the verification of the identity 
of an entity (peer authentication) or the verification of the source of a received 
message (data authentication). In peer authentication, the identity of an entity is 
confirmed in order to gain physical access to a building or electronic access to a 
service. The traditional form of peer entity authentication is password 
authentication. This form of authentication is commonplace across society from 
traditional systems employing username and password combinations to authenticate 
users before providing them with services such as logging into an email account, or 
signing into an ISP. Through to modern day alternatives, including chip and pin for 
credit cards to access epos (electronic point of sale) services, or swipe card systems 
to gain physical access to buildings. Recently, the use of smart cards (Hwang et al. 
2000), (Sun 2000), (Shen et al. 2003), (Ku et al. 2004), and biometric data 
(Khurram et al. 2007) to provide a more secure method for authentication, than 
passwords, have been proposed. In data authentication the data received is validated 
to make sure the data was sent from the entity claimed. The objective of data 
authentication is to prevent third parties from inserting data into pre-existing 
communications with authenticated entities. Data authentication is a continuous 
process carried out throughout an authenticated communication. The most common 
approach for providing data authentication is to use a secret key, only known by the 
sender and receiver, to encrypt data. The recipient of the data checks the received 
data has been encrypted with the correct secret key, only if the data has been 
encrypted with the correct secret key is the data considered authentic. 
3.1.2 Access Control 
There is a certain degree of overlap between access control and the 
previously discussed authentication. However, authentication is concerned solely 
with the verification of an entities identity. Access control, involves the assignment 
of different levels of access to entities once they have been authenticated. The 
advantage of assigning different access levels is that the damage a legitimate entity 
or a malicious entity, using stolen access details, can do to a system is reduced. The 
disadvantage of this approach is the added complexity to the system design. 
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3.1.3 Confidentiality 
Confidentiality is concerned with keeping data secret from third parties not 
authorised to view the contents of communications. A system, which implements 
confidentiality, must protect data from direct and indirect interpretation by 
unauthorised entities. Direct interpretation involves unauthorised entities 
intercepting and viewing data. Indirect interpretation involves unauthorised entities 
viewing communications traffic patterns and deriving the contents of the 
communications, through traffic analysis.  
The primary approach for providing confidentiality is through the use of 
encryption. There are two categories of encryption used to provide confidentiality, 
symmetric key cryptography and public key cryptography. The oldest form of 
encryption is symmetric key cryptography. A function f(x) is shared amongst 
authorised participants and is used for both encryption and decryption of data. This 
type of encryption is very fast and is securer than other methods, however requires a 
secure communication channel for keys to be distributed. Examples of symmetric 
key cryptography are Caesar cipher, Hill Cipher, One time pad, DES (Digital 
Encryption Standard) and AES (Advanced Encryption Standard). 
The alternative approach to symmetric key-based confidentiality is known as 
public key cryptography (PKC). In this approach, there are two keys, a public key 
and a private key. The public key is used to encrypt data and the private key to 
decrypt data. The advantages of public key cryptography over alternative 
approaches include not having to disclose private keys to any participants and not 
requiring a secure channel for key distribution.  
3.1.4 Integrity 
Data integrity is concerned with preventing the unauthorised modification of 
data, without detection by a legitimate user. There are three established approaches 
for verifying that a message has not been tampered with, message encryption, 
message authentication codes, and hash functions. 
Message Encryption: The message encryption approach to data integrity, 
works by creating a message structure and amending a checksum to the message. 
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The output is encrypted with a secret key. This verifies that only the person with the 
secret key could have created the message. When decrypted if the message is not in 
the correct format or the checksum is incorrect, it is surmised the message has been 
tampered with.   
Message Authentication Code (MAC): The MAC is a non-reversible hash 
code, which computes a smaller output than the source message, using a publicly 
available function and a secret key. The sender generates the MAC code and sends 
it with the encrypted data. The receiver regenerates the MAC code using a pre-
shared key. If the MAC codes do not match, then it is surmised the message has 
been modified. The problem with this approach, is that two secret keys are required, 
one for the encryption and one for the MAC function.  
Hash functions: A hash function is similar to a MAC code however does not 
require a secret key. It relies on the fact that it is difficult to find another message 
that will produce the same hash quickly. There are two strengths of hash functions. 
Firstly, there are strong collision resistant hash functions, where it is infeasible to 
find the same output for two different inputs. Secondly, weak collision resistant 
functions, where it is infeasible to find a second input that will produce the same 
hash output when the first input is known. 
3.1.5 Non-repudiation 
Non-repudiation is the method employed to prove that an entity sent a 
message and that the recipient entity in the communication received the message. 
There are two primary approaches used to provide non-repudiation services, digital 
signatures, and notarization. 
When using digital signatures the communications participant sending the 
message signs the message with a secret key. If the recipient can decrypt the 
message using the sender’s public key, it is implied that the sender is in possession 
of the corresponding private key so must have sent the message.  
In notarization, a trusted independent third party verifies that entities have 
sent and received messages. The third party keeps records of messages sent and 
received, so providing Non-repudiation services to the interested parties. 
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3.1.6 Service Availability  
The E.800 recommendation of the ITU-T defines availability as the “ability 
of an item to be in a state to perform a required function at a given instant of time or 
at any instant of time within a given time interval, assuming that the external 
resources, if required, are provided” as defined by (Grottke et al. 2008). In the 
security domain, service availability research focuses on the protection of service 
providing systems from attackers that attempt to overwhelm the resources of these 
systems in an attempt to either permanently remove the service from availability, or 
to sufficiently degrade a service intermittently removing it from availability. There 
are numerous methods employed by malicious users to adversely affect the 
availability of services.  However, the methods utilised to adversely affect the 
availability of services are collectively termed DoS attacks.  
The research outlined in this thesis focuses on the improved protection of 
systems resources, and service availability of WSN based HASs and the respective 
remote communications infrastructure from DoS attacks originating remotely from 
other networks. The following section provides a detailed review of known DoS 
attacks and the existing defence approaches.  
3.2 Denial of Service Attacks 
A DoS attack is an attempt by an attacker to render a service completely 
inaccessible or significantly degrade the level of service availability experienced by 
legitimate users of the service (Mirkovic et al. 2004). Distributed Denial of Service 
(DDoS) attacks have the same objective as DoS attacks. However, DDoS attacks are 
carried out from a number of attacking hosts, whereas DoS attacks are carried out 
from a single host. In this thesis, the term DoS is used to refer to both DoS and 
DDoS attacks. This chapter and thesis focus on DoS attacks in the realm of 
computers. In particular, DoS attacks that threaten the availability of WSN based 
HAS services for local and remote users.  
3.2.1 Goals of a DoS Attack 
The goal of launching a DoS attack is to inflict damage on a victim. 
However, there are normally underlying factors behind the desire to inflict damage 
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on a victim including personal, material, and political factors. In summary, personal 
factors may include a desire for revenge against the victim from such sources as, 
disgruntled employees, or a gain in prestige from hackers in the attacker’s social 
network (Mirkovic et al. 2004). An attacker may wish to make a financial gain from 
the extortion of money from individuals or organisations in exchange for stopping 
or not instigating an attack against their services. The first recorded large-scale DoS 
attack conducted over the public Internet occurred in August 1999 on a local 
network at the University of Minnesota. The attack originated from 227 zombies 
and resulted in the shutdown of the network for two days (Garber 2000). In terms of 
political attacks, during a period of war or civil unrest a government may launch 
DoS attacks on the resource infrastructure of other nations or organisations. An 
example of such an attack is during the 2009 civil unrest in Iran, the government 
attempted to block incoming satellite transmissions of media organisations, which 
were blamed for encouraging the unrest, by jamming the communication 
frequencies employed by the respective media organisations satellites (Horrocks 
2009). Additionally, (BBC 2009) reported on a new wave of DoS attacks targeted 
against leading South Korean organisations, including the country’s largest bank, 
national newspaper, and spy agency. It was largely reported at the time, that these 
attacks were politically motivated.   
3.2.2 Stages of a DoS Attack 
A DoS attack generally consists of four stages, three of which occur before 
the actual attack takes place. Firstly, to avoid detection, attackers tend not to use 
their own computers to launch an attack, preferring instead to search the Internet 
looking for machines with security vulnerabilities that will allow the attacker to 
subvert them.  
Secondly, an attacker hacks into the machines identified during the previous 
stage and infects them with malicious code. The malicious code contains the attack 
code, a backdoor to allow the attacker easier access to the infected machine in the 
future, and code to search for and infect other vulnerable machines. The infected 
machines are called “Zombies” reflecting the fact the owners of the machines may 
not be aware their machines are infected. There are many approaches for infecting 
vulnerable machines including, directly hacking into vulnerable machines, using 
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automated methods such as sending email with attachments containing the attack 
code, and using Trojans (legitimate applications containing attack code). A detailed 
review of the methods available to attackers for infecting vulnerable machines is 
outside the scope of this thesis, consequently for more information please refer to 
(Mirkovic 2003). During the third and optional stage, infected machines search for 
and infect other vulnerable machines.  
The fourth and final stage involves the initiation of zombies to start a DoS 
attack against a victim. The method for initiating an attack may include pre-
programming the attack date, time and victim in the attack code or intelligent 
methods may deliver this information to the Zombies after infection. The second 
approach has the advantage that the same Zombies can be reused and leveraged 
against more than one victim. A detailed review of methods for initiating Zombies 
and starting an attack is outside the scope of this thesis, consequently, for more 
information please refer to (Mirkovic 2003). 
3.2.3 Types of DoS Attack 
There are numerous methods for achieving the objective of DoS attacks. 
However, there are two categories of DoS attack, “Brute Force” attacks and 
“Vulnerability” attacks. (Mirkovic 2003). Firstly, brute force DoS attacks attempt to 
overload a network with excessive data in an attempt to overload a network service 
or connection. Secondly, “Vulnerability” DoS attacks exploit vulnerabilities in a 
systems hardware or software in order to overload a network service or connection 
with disruptive data that causes the connection or service to fail. Brute force attacks 
are harder to prevent because the scale of an attack, in terms of incoming 
bandwidth, may be significantly higher than for a vulnerability attack. Additionally, 
it is harder to trace all of the attacking hosts and deal with a sufficient number of 
attacking hosts in order to stop a brute force DoS attack. Conversely, a vulnerability 
attack exploiting a weakness in a system may be undertaken from a single host. 
However, vulnerability attacks can be easily fixed through a software patch or 
hardware update, once the weakness has been identified. 
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3.2.4 Source of DoS Attacks 
 
Figure 3-1: Local and remote DoS attacks against a WSN node 
As depicted in Figure 3-1, DoS attacks can be categorised based on the 
source of the attack. Remote DoS attacks originate from outside the network under 
attack, normally from other publically accessible networks. The Internet is the most 
widely employed public access network, virtually providing worldwide coverage, 
adopted by individuals and organisations to interconnect their respective private 
networks and offer services to connected users. Consequently, the Internet is often 
the medium over which remote DoS attacks are initiated. Moreover, remote DoS 
attacks using the Internet may originate from all over the world and incorporate a 
large number of attacking Zombie drones. Local DoS attacks originate from within 
the network under attack. For example, an attacker may subvert a number of 
computers or sensor nodes on the local network and coordinate the subverted nodes 
to launch an attack on a local server providing critical network services such as 
security or local storage.  
The research in this thesis focuses on DoS attacks targeted against WSN 
based HASs and the respective remote access approaches. Consequently, the 
remainder of this chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of the local and remote 
DoS threats and the current defences for WSNs and the respective remote access 
approaches. 
Chapter 3: DoS Attacks in WSNs 
 
-42- 
3.3 Local DoS Attacks on WSNs 
Recently, one of the most challenging research areas to receive attention in 
the field of network security is concerned with the investigation of  local DoS 
attacks against WSNs and the design of WSN based DoS defence approaches and 
architectures. This section reviews the local DoS attacks identified in the existing 
literature and the potential defence approaches for protecting WSNs from local DoS 
attacks originating from within WSNs.  
There are a number of approaches for classifying WSN based DoS attacks. 
(Raymond et al. 2008) and (Wood et al. 2002) propose the classification of DoS 
attacks based on the five-layer ISO model adopted by WSNs. The known DoS 
attacks are classified based on the protocol layer the attack targets. This includes the 
physical layer, data link layer, network layer, transport layer and the application 
layer. Consequently, this section adopts the five layer classification to review the 
varying WSN based DoS attacks and defences identified from the literature. A 
summary of the classification is provided in Table 3-1. 
Table 3-1: WSN based DoS attacks and defences categorised by the targeted layer of the 
protocol stack, adapted from (Wood et al. 2004) 
Layer Attack Defence 
Physical Layer Node Tampering or 
Destruction 
Tamper resistant casing, camouflage 
Wireless Signal 
Jamming 
Spread spectrum communications 
using frequency hopping, re-routing 
messages around affected areas 
Link/Medium 
Access 
Control Layer 
Collision  Spread spectrum communications 
using frequency hopping, re-routing 
messages around affected areas 
Interrogation Link layer encryption, 
anti-replay mechanisms 
Packet Replay Link layer encryption, 
anti-replay mechanisms 
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Denial of Sleep Link layer encryption, 
anti-replay mechanisms 
Network Layer Black Hole Implicit acknowledgements,  
message duplication, use of multiple 
communication paths 
Hello Flooding Geographic knowledge 
node authentication 
Cluster Head Attack Encryption, anti-replay mechanism, 
authentication, and trust based cluster 
head election 
Homing Message header encryption, 
dummy packets 
Transport Layer Flooding Client puzzles 
De-synchronisation Authentication 
Application Layer Environmental 
stimulus 
Data Aggregation, and fixed sensing 
intervals 
Path-Based DoS Unique secret keys for all nodes, 
secret key for each path, packet 
histories, rate limits, and one way 
hash chains 
Node Software 
Updates 
Hash chain authentication, and cluster 
key authentication 
3.3.1 Physical Layer DoS Attacks 
There are two primary DoS attacks that target WSN nodes at the physical 
layer of the protocol stack. Firstly, due to the nature of many WSN applications 
nodes are often widely and openly distributed across large regions. Consequently, 
attackers are often provided with physical access to nodes, during which an attacker 
may tamper with a node with the intention of gaining access to confidential data 
contained on the node or subverting the node for performing other elicit activities 
on the WSN. Alternatively, an attacker may simply destroy nodes in an attempt to 
disrupt the functioning of the WSN or cause sensor blackouts where large portions 
of the WSN region remain unmonitored. 
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Although the destruction and tampering of nodes cannot be prevented, 
current defence measures focus on increasing the difficulty of node destruction and 
tampering, and decreasing the potential benefits of node destruction and tampering. 
In the case of node destruction, camouflaging nodes from attacker’s sight and 
placing WSN nodes in tougher cases offers additional protection. Additionally, 
adding redundant nodes to the WSN infrastructure decreases the effect on network 
functionality from the destruction of a few nodes. In the case of node tampering, the 
existing defence measures include camouflaging nodes, and the placement of nodes 
in cases more resilient to tampering, and the use of self-terminating nodes, which 
wipe information from memory. The advantage of self-terminating nodes is to 
render tampered nodes useless to attackers. 
Secondly, due to the wireless nature of WSN communications an attacker 
does not have to be in direct contact with a node to perform an attack. Instead, an 
attacker may launch an attack from a safe distant unobserved and potentially 
unnoticed by those under attack. The primary physical layer attack against WSNs is 
the jamming attack (Raymond et al. 2008). (Xu et al. 2005) categorises jamming 
attacks as constant, deceptive, random, or reactive.  
In a constant jamming attack, the attacker continuously floods the victim’s 
frequency range, leading to the corruption of packets transmitted between legitimate 
nodes on the victim’s WSN. In a constant jamming attack, the attacker requires 
significantly more power than the victim network over a long period, or the attacker 
risks exhausting its power supply and so ending the attack. Consequently, a long-
term constant jamming attack is not normally effective if the attacker is under the 
same constraints as the victim’s WSN.  
In a deceptive jamming attack, the attacker sends a constant stream of bytes 
into the network instead of a random signal. Causing nodes in many WSNs, such as 
TinyOS based WSNs, to remain in receive mode and never enter transmission 
mode. 
In a random jamming attack, the attacker employs constant or deceptive 
jamming. The attack differs in that the attacker performs the jamming attack at 
random intervals for random durations and sleeps for the remainder of the time. 
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This conserves a significant amount of the attacker’s power compared to constant 
and deceptive jamming alone, increasing the duration over which an attack may 
occur. However, during periods where the attacker is sleeping the communication 
abilities of the victim’s WSN return to normal.   
 In a reactive jamming attack, the attacker monitors the radio frequency of 
the victim’s WSN for traffic. Once traffic is detected, the attacker starts a constant 
or deceptive jamming attack. The reactive jamming approach saves the attacker a 
considerable amount of energy compared to constant or deceptive jamming alone. 
Moreover, the level of difficulty for detecting the attack is increased because the 
packet losses may mimic normal packet loss due to normal network packet 
collisions. Furthermore, the reactive attack provides more consistent blocking of 
normal network communications, although random jamming may provide a greater 
energy saving for attacks against WSNs with a higher level of network traffic, 
which keeps an active attacker constantly engaged.  
The primary defence against jamming attacks is spread spectrum 
communications. The technique uses frequency hopping to spread communications 
across a larger frequency range than that taken by the original data to overcome 
jamming attacks that target a single frequency. For an attack to be effective against 
a node employing spread spectrum communications, the attacker must continuously 
switch the frequency jammed to match that of the victim or flood the whole 
frequency range. The additional scanning and channel hopping or brute force 
flooding of the whole frequency spectrum, if possible, significantly increases the 
rate of energy consumption for the attacker. Consequently, spread spectrum 
technology has been widely adopted and proven as an effective defence against 
jamming attacks. For example, spread spectrum communications have been adopted 
in wireless standards such as Bluetooth (Salonidis et al. 2005) and shown through 
extensive, practical real world use to offer sufficient protection. However, low cost, 
resource limited WSN nodes primarily consist of simple radios incapable of using 
spread spectrum communication techniques. Consequently, alternative defence 
approaches appropriate for resource limited WSNs have been suggested including 
placing victim nodes to sleep, and routing traffic around regions experiencing a 
jamming attack. In the first instance, placing nodes under a jamming attack to sleep, 
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waking only to detect if the jamming attack has stopped, allows the victim node to 
protect energy resources and resume normal operations once the jamming attack has 
ended. However, during the attack the whole region under attack is placed in sleep 
state, blocking network functionality and achieving the attacker’s objectives of 
denying services to legitimate users. Alternatively, defences focused on maintaining 
network functionality during jamming attacks have emerged. These defences 
operate at the network layer, building on existing routing algorithms and routing 
communications around areas suffering from jamming attacks. For example, 
TinyOS Destination-Sequenced Distance Vector Routing continuously measures the 
quality of communication routes and directs traffic to avoid low quality 
communication paths, avoiding areas suffering from jamming attacks. 
3.3.2 Link/Medium Access Control Layer DoS Attacks 
The link layer hosts the MAC protocols employed by nodes to gain access to 
the communication medium and communicate with neighbouring nodes. Attackers 
exploit the link layer and associated MAC protocol to prevent legitimate nodes from 
gaining access to the network’s communication medium. There are four primary 
DoS attacks against WSNs at the link layer including collision, interrogation, packet 
replay and denial of sleep attacks (Raymond et al. 2008).  
The collision attack attempts to prevent legitimate messages from reaching 
the intended destination by sending packets from an attacker during the 
communication period of a legitimate user, thus causing packet collisions. If a 
collision attack is significantly strong, most packets sent from a legitimate user will 
collide with attack packets and fail to reach the intended destination. Moreover, the 
effect of packet collisions for MAC protocols employing backoff periods is 
considerably worse. An attacker may increase the backoff period of the victim, 
decreasing the victim’s availability, with little expense to itself. The collision attack 
is similar to the PHY layer based reactive jamming attack. Consequently, the 
defences against this attack are also the same.   
The interrogation attack exploits the request-to-send/clear-to-send 
(RTS/CTS) handshake employed by many MAC protocols to overcome the “hidden 
node problem” (Rahman et al. 2006) and establish a communication connection. An 
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attacker may continuously send RTS messages to elicit CTS replies from the victim, 
diminishing network bandwidth and the victim’s resources. Alternatively, an 
attacker may continuously broadcast CTS messages, with long duration fields, in an 
attempt to fool neighbouring nodes that the communication medium is congested. 
The standard defence against the interrogation attack is strong link layer encryption 
to detect bogus RTS or CTS messages and the use of a cryptographically secure 
pseudo random number generator to provide secure nonce values for use with an 
anti-replay mechanism. The anti-replay mechanism prevents the attackers from 
replaying captured valid RTS or CTS values to overcome message encryption. 
Moreover, the use of the anti-replay mechanism overcomes the general threat of 
replayed messages sent to diminish the victim’s resources. However, victim nodes 
still consume resources in receiving the RTS, CTS or general messages, due to the 
added requirement to decrypt all incoming messages. Nevertheless, the 
effectiveness of the interrogation attack is significantly decreased. 
The denial-of-sleep attack was first identified by (Stajano et al. 1999), 
although at the time the attack was termed “sleep deprivation torture” attack. Since 
the denial-of-sleep attack was first discovered, a number of studies have been 
conducted into the effects of the attack on WSNs. The studies state that a denial-of-
sleep attack is an attempt to quickly exhaust a nodes energy supply by keeping the 
nodes transceiver active and preventing it from entering sleep mode (Raymond et al. 
2008).  
Most denial-of-sleep attacks, targeted at the link layer of the protocol stack, 
focus on exploiting the MAC protocols that operate at the link layer. The MAC 
protocols control the period a transceiver remains active and inactive (sleep mode). 
Furthermore, most WSNs incorporate MAC protocols that are energy aware and 
designed to keep the WSN nodes in sleep state for as long as possible, whilst not 
affecting the nodes functionality, to extend the lifetime of the WSN.  Accordingly, 
the MAC protocols make an attractive target for an attacker, because the transceiver 
consumes more energy than any other component on most WSN nodes. 
Consequently, subversion of the node’s transceiver control mechanism allows the 
nodes energy supply to be quickly exhausted.  
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As a result, the denial-of-sleep attack is one of the most effective methods 
for conducting a DoS attack against a WSN. Other DoS attacks such as jamming 
attacks may take months to completely exhaust the energy supply of a node, 
whereas a denial-of-sleep attack may exhaust the energy supply of a node within a 
few days (Raymond et al. 2008). Moreover, the attack costs relatively little in terms 
of consumption of the attackers resources compared to those of the victim.  
(Raymond et al. 2008), (Law et al. 2005), and (Raymond et al. 2009) 
evaluate the vulnerability of Sensor MAC (S-MAC), Berkley MAC (B-MAC), 
Timeout Mac (T-MAC), and Gateway MAC (G-MAC) to denial-of-sleep attacks. 
These energy efficient MAC protocols provide a representative sample of current 
WSN MAC protocols (Law et al. 2005), allowing for the assumption that 
weaknesses in these protocols may be present in other MAC protocols not 
evaluated. The following section provides a summary of the analysis of the most 
popular MAC algorithms to denial of sleep attacks. 
The S-MAC protocol mediates access to the WSN’s communication 
medium by dividing time into slots of 1300ms. Each time slot is divided into a sleep 
period and a wake period. The default setting of the S-MAC protocol puts each 
sensor node to sleep for 90% of the slot period, only waking for 10% of each slot 
period to communicate, significantly improving the lifetime of the WSN. In S-MAC 
a new node listens for a period of time to receive a SYN packet, to help the new 
node synchronise sleep and wake slots with neighbouring nodes. If no SYN packet 
is received after a period of time the new node emits a SYN packet allowing 
neighbouring nodes to synchronise with the new node. If a node receives two 
different SYN packets, the node synchronises with both nodes. An attacker may 
attempt to spoof SYN messages encoded with a sleep delay longer than that of the 
whole time slot. Resulting in neighbouring nodes failing to enter sleep mode, 
quickly exhausting the nodes power supply. However, the use of strong link layer 
encryption and anti-replay mechanisms, as previously discussed, provide an 
effective defence against this attack. However, encryption and anti-replay 
mechanism do not provide protection against subverted nodes in possession of 
cryptographic material, using spoofed SYN packets encoded with the correct 
cryptographic material.      
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The T-MAC protocol follows the same methodology as the S-MAC protocol 
for the synchronisation of nodes. However, incorporates an “adaptive time out” 
mechanism whereby nodes incorporate a time-to-sleep counter, if a node finishes 
counting down the time-to-sleep counter and has not detected any network traffic 
the node goes to sleep. T-MAC requires nodes to transmit during the start of the 
active portion of the time slot. If the node detects network traffic before the node 
has completed counting down the sleep counter, the node receives the message and 
resets the sleep counter, the process is repeated until no network traffic is detected 
and the sleep counter finishes and places the node into sleep mode. Consequently, 
an attacker may transmit or replay a constant stream of small packets to keep the 
nodes permanently active. As with the S-MAC protocol, link level encryption and 
anti-replay mechanisms can be adopted to protect against this type of attack. 
The B-MAC protocol does not require synchronisation of neighbouring 
nodes to establish a communication link, unlike other MAC protocols such as S-
MAC. Instead nodes in a network employing the B-MAC protocol use a method 
called “low-power listening” wherein nodes periodically check the wireless channel 
to see if any node wishes to communicate. Transmitting nodes broadcast a preamble 
longer than the check interval employed by neighbouring nodes to check if any 
node wishes to communicate. This allows all of the neighbouring nodes to detect the 
transmitted preamble. During a node’s wakeup and check phase, if no transmitting 
node is detected the node goes back to sleep mode. However, if a preamble is 
detected indicating a node wishes to communicate the receiving node establishes a 
connection with the transmitting node, potentially using the earlier discussed 
RTS/CTS methodology, and waits to receive the message. Once the message is 
received the receiver repeats the sleep and check cycle. (Polastre et al. 2004) 
showed that under ideal conditions, B-MAC could have duty cycles as low as 1% in 
a low-traffic network providing for a very energy efficient MAC protocol. An 
attacker may transmit an unauthenticated stream or a stream of replayed broadcast 
packets to act as a preamble, causing legitimate WSN nodes to stay awake. 
(Raymond et al. 2008) state that an attacker instigating such an attack can keep B-
MAC nodes awake for, on average, half the network lifetime. Again, link layer 
encryption, and anti-replay mechanisms help to overcome such attacks. 
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The G-MAC protocol adopts a frame-based approach for the coordination of 
communication within a WSN cluster. G-MAC divides time into different frames 
and each frame into a collection period and a contention free period. During the 
collection period or “contention period” nodes which have data to transmit to within 
the cluster send a future request to send (FRTS) message to a gateway node (cluster 
head). Moreover, nodes that have data to transmit destined for nodes outside the 
cluster, send the data to the gateway node using a standard RTS/CTS/DATA/ACK 
approach (Raymond et al. 2009). During the contention free period the gateway 
node broadcasts a gateway traffic indication message (GTIM), used for 
synchronisation of cluster nodes and to provide a schedule of message transmissions 
between members of the cluster. The gateway or cluster head in a G-MAC network 
is chosen through a periodic election process, resulting in the node with the most 
resources acting as the gateway. If the standard G-MAC approach is used without 
link layer encryption and anti-replay mechanisms, the protocol is vulnerable to 
attacks. An attacker may imitate the gateway and using faked GTIM messages force 
all nodes in a cluster to stay active all of the time, resulting in a reduction of the 
network lifetime. Experiments conducted by (Raymond et al. 2009) into the effects 
of DoS attacks against WSNs not employing link layer encryption and anti-replay 
mechanisms showed that a denial of sleep attack could lead to a reduction in 
network lifetime of up to 97% (12 days for WSNs under a DoS attack compared to a 
normal network lifetime of 371 days). However, even with the use of encryption 
and anti-replay mechanisms the FRTS packet must be received by the gateway and 
checked to see if it is authentic. Consequently, the gateway will disregard FRTS 
packets that fail to authenticate, however the authentication process will slowly 
deplete the gateways energy levels, although at a greatly reduced rate.  
Denial-of-sleep attacks focus on keeping the transceiver active, which 
exhausts considerably more power than attacks targeting other aspects of the node 
such as processing or sensing. Thus, the advantage of denial of sleep attacks 
includes the ability to launch longer, more intelligent, reactive attacks against 
WSNs, avoiding the need for traditional energy expensive jamming attacks. All of 
the reviewed MAC protocols highlight the vulnerability of MAC protocols, in their 
native form, to denial of sleep attacks. Moreover, even with the adoption of 
encryption and anti-replay mechanisms the analysis of MAC protocols adopted by a 
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WSN can provide an attacker with valid information on how and when to launch 
attacks. Furthermore, cryptographic defences are only useful against outsider nodes 
or insider nodes designed to wipe cryptographic material during node tampering 
attacks. If an attack is launched, from a subverted node with access to cryptographic 
material, such as encryption keys and nonce values, cryptographic defences are 
rendered practically useless. Additionally, the literature review has revealed little 
research on the effectiveness of denial-of-sleep, and more generally DoS, attacks 
from subverted insider nodes targeting MAC layer protocols and little evidence of 
defences against such attacks.  
3.3.3 Network Layer DoS Attacks 
DoS attacks targeted at the NWK layer of the communication protocol stack 
seek to disrupt the routing of messages between members of the WSN (Raymond et 
al. 2008). General network level attacks include the spoofing, replaying or altering 
of messages as they are routed through the WSN. The most common forms of these 
attacks include black hole attacks, hello flooding attacks, cluster head attacks, and 
homing attacks. Following is a summary of these network layer attacks, together 
with the normal defence measures used against these attacks where available. 
In a “Black hole attack”, a subverted routing node makes itself part of many 
communication paths and then drops either all packets it receives or selectively 
drops packets to avoid detection mechanisms. Defences for black hole attacks 
include:  
Implicit acknowledgements, which make sure messages are forwarded as 
intended. However, this approach requires the transceiver of the source sensor node 
to remain active to verify acknowledgements from router nodes along the message 
path. This places an additional burden on the energy resources of the already 
resource limited sensor node sending the message. Alternatively, the same message 
can be duplicated and sent through multiple routes across the WSN to the 
destination node, increasing the chance that at least one of the paths will avoid the 
subverted routing nodes. However, this approach wastes the WSNs already limited 
energy, processing, and bandwidth resources. Firstly, a number of redundant 
communication paths have to be engineered into the network. Secondly, the total 
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amount of energy required to send a message across the WSN is increased a number 
of times. Due to the resource-limited nature of WSNs, incorporating redundant 
paths into a WSN may not be feasible. Furthermore, energy conservation is one of 
the most important considerations in the design of resource limited WSNs. 
Consequently, neither of these defence approaches offers an attractive solution, for 
resource limited WSNs.   
During a “Hello flooding attack”, an attacker exploits routing protocols that 
advertise the existence of a node to one-hop neighbours through the broadcast of 
hello messages. In the case of a “Hello flooding attack” the attacker is a relatively 
resource rich node (e.g. a laptop) with a greater transmission range than nodes from 
the WSN under attack. During the initial stage, the attacker intercepts a valid hello 
message broadcast from a legitimate node. During the next stage of the attack, the 
resource rich attacker replays the earlier intercepted hello message to nodes outside 
the one-hop transmission range of the node from whom the hello message was 
originally intercepted. Consequently, nodes from outside the one-hop 
communication range of the source of the original hello message form nonexistent 
communication links with the original node. When these nodes attempt to route 
message to the original node they are unsuccessful. To defend against hello flooding 
attacks, legitimate nodes must either have prior knowledge of the WSN topology or 
verify nodes are within one-hop before adding them to routing paths. Location-
based routing protocols have prior knowledge of the structure of WSNs (Santos et 
al. 2006) and can ignore hello messages from nodes known to be outside a one-hop 
communication range. Alternatively, nodes can authenticate the source of a hello 
message in a three-way handshaking process before adding a node to its routing 
path. 
For ease of management, improved energy efficiency, and reduced 
bandwidth requirements large scale WSN’s often adopt clustering topologies. In a 
cluster topology, a WSN is logically split into clusters (groups) of nodes. Each 
cluster has one node, which plays the role of a cluster head. The cluster head is the 
point of ingress between different clusters and the point at which all data from a 
cluster is aggregated before being routed towards the destination cluster. This 
reduces the amount of duplicated messages sent across the network as well as 
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incurring less transmission energy cost per sending node. The process of choosing a 
cluster head varies based on different routing protocols. However, in general a 
number of nodes volunteer to act as a cluster head. The nodes advertise their 
resources including how much energy they have and their current transmission 
power. The nodes with the higher level of resources are chosen as the cluster heads. 
An attacker may launch a “Cluster Head Attack”, where a subverted node 
either advertises more resources than it poses, such as a higher power level, in order 
to get as many nodes in the WSN to pick it as their cluster head. Alternatively, a 
relatively resource rich attacker, such as a laptop, may use its higher transmission 
power to be selected as the cluster head, or a node may capture and replay messages 
from other nodes volunteering to be the cluster head. Once a subverted node is 
chosen as the cluster head, it may choose not to route any received messages or it 
may randomly drop messages in order to evade detection by DoS defence 
mechanisms.  
As with the other DoS attacks discussed in this section, the encryption of 
messages, the use of an anti-replay mechanism, and the authentication of messages 
including volunteer messages from potential cluster head nodes helps to protect 
against cluster head attacks. However, cryptographic mechanisms alone are not 
sufficient to provide protection against subverted nodes with access to valid 
cryptographic material. To overcome the threat of a cluster head attack, schemes for 
electing a cluster head have been proposed, instead of the current approach of 
allowing nodes to volunteer as the cluster head. However, many of the election-
based schemes rely on the cluster nodes providing correct information about their 
resources (Crosby et al. 2006). A subverted node may manufacture a message with 
falsified data concerning its resources, encrypt the message with valid cryptographic 
material, broadcast the message to neighbouring nodes and be selected as the cluster 
head based on the falsified data. For example, (Crosby et al. 2006) proposed a 
secure process for electing cluster heads based on an asymmetric trust based 
approach, where nodes use cluster-wide and pair-wise public key cryptography to 
authenticate potential cluster head nodes. However, this scheme does not protect 
against subverted nodes with access to cryptographic material such as the public 
keys. Furthermore, the use of asymmetric cryptography adds a significant burden to 
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resource limited WSNs. Moreover, the use of a large number of pair-wise and 
cluster-wise keys may not be feasible for large scale WSNs. 
Other, more sophisticated attacks target key nodes in a WSN such as the 
WSN coordinator, gateway node, cluster heads, and trusted third party nodes to 
cause widespread disruption across the network. The difficulty in performing such 
attacks arises from the identification of the key nodes in a WSN. “Homing attacks” 
analyse network traffic to identify traffic patterns that may point to key nodes. Once 
key nodes have been identified, the attacker launches a DoS attack, such as those 
previously discussed, on the key nodes causing the maximum disruption to the 
WSN for the least effort. There are two primary approaches for tackling traffic 
analysis in WSNs. Firstly, the encryption of message headers can prevent 
eavesdroppers from identifying the destination of an intercepted message. However, 
on a relatively small scale WSN an attacker can observe different volumes of traffic 
across the whole network to identify key WSN nodes. The use of dummy packets to 
normalise the network traffic volume across the WSN has been proposed (Deng et 
al. 2004). However, this wastes a significant amount of bandwidth and energy. 
Consequently, it has been suggested this approach should only be used when the 
prevention of traffic analysis is crucial (Raymond et al. 2008).   
This section has reviewed a selection of the most popular NWK layer WSN 
attacks and the current defence mechanisms against these attacks. Link layer 
authentication and anti-replay mechanisms have been shown to be an effective 
defence against most NWK layer attacks. However, there are certain NWK layer 
attacks, such as Homing attacks, which do not require cryptographic measures to be 
overcome, which remain significant challenges. Moreover, the defence measures 
reviewed do not provide protection from DoS attacks originating from subverted 
nodes with access to cryptographic material.  
3.3.4 Transport Layer DoS Attacks 
The focus of transport layer DoS attacks is to exploit communication 
protocols that use connection oriented communications and maintain connection 
information. The main transport layer attacks against WSNs include “De-
synchronisation attacks” and “Flooding attacks”. 
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During a “De-synchronisation attack”, an attacker targets active 
communications employing connection oriented communication protocols and 
modifies or forges the parameters of captured messages, such as control flags and 
sequence numbers. The modified or forged messages are introduced back into an 
active communication stream between two participants (Yang et al. 2008). 
Consequently, when modified or forged messages arrive at their respective 
destinations they are rejected as out of sequence or as corrupted, leading to the 
sender retransmitting messages and wasting energy and network bandwidth. An 
intelligent attack may repeatedly forge or modify messages leading to legitimate 
messages being incorrectly rejected at the receiving node for the duration of the 
attack. The encryption of message headers or the whole message can prevent 
attackers from modifying existing messages and creating forged packets. Moreover, 
anti-replay mechanisms can prevent legitimate messages from being inserted into 
legitimate communication streams undetected. 
Likewise, the targets of a “Flood attack” are networks employing connection 
oriented communication protocols. The attacker requests a connection from a node 
in the WSN, the node reserves space in its open connection buffer and sends a SYN 
acknowledgement. At this point, the attacker should respond with an 
acknowledgment completing the connection in a three-way handshake. However, 
the attacker does not respond leaving the victim node waiting for an 
acknowledgment. After a period of time has passed a timeout counter expires 
causing the victim to clear its open connection buffer. However, an attacker may 
repeatedly request a number of connections and leave them half open, exhausting 
the victim’s connection buffer, and preventing legitimate connection requests for the 
duration of the attack (Yang et al. 2008). One approach for protecting against 
flooding attacks in WSNs requires connecting nodes to complete a complex puzzle 
before a node reserves connection space (Wood et al. 2002). This approach assumes 
that an attacker has limited processing resources to solve complex puzzles. 
Consequently, at any given moment in time the number of half-open connections 
any attacker can establish is considerably reduced. Furthermore, in the case of 
resource limited WSNs, where an attacker may have the same resources as the 
victim, the complex puzzle defence may render flooding attacks unfeasible. 
However, the use of complex puzzles requires all nodes in the WSN to have 
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additional hardware to solve complex puzzles. Moreover, each connection attempt 
will incur legitimate hosts additional energy and processing costs. Making complex 
puzzles a prohibitively expensive defence approach for resource limited WSNs, 
where conserving energy is often a primary concern. 
3.3.5 Application Layer DoS Attacks 
Attacks targeted at the application layer of WSNs either focus on 
weaknesses in application software specific to a particular WSN or focus on more 
general inherent weaknesses in the application layer of WSNs. Attacks targeting 
inherent weaknesses are far more common because the potential number of victims 
is far higher for the effort of developing an attack strategy. The most popular forms 
of application layer attacks include “Environmental Stimulus attacks”, “Path-Based 
DoS attacks” and “Node Re-Programming attacks”. 
Environmental stimulus attacks aim to exhaust the power resources of victim 
nodes and overwhelm other network resources. The attack requires the attacker to 
know the environmental characteristic the victim’s WSN is sensing (i.e. carbon 
monoxide levels) and generate stimuli (i.e. carbon monoxide), causing sensing 
nodes to transmit large volumes of sensed data towards a base-station. This results 
in the increased consumption of energy directly at the sensor node and across the 
communication path between the victim node and base-station. Moreover, if a 
sufficient number of nodes are targeted the high volume of sensed data forwarded 
towards the WSN base-station may overwhelm the communication paths and the 
base-station, resulting in a network wide failure of services. However, this form of 
attack is only valid for WSNs designed to transmit data as soon as the data is 
sensed. WSNs designed to transmit data at regular intervals, regardless of stimuli 
are immune to such attacks. Moreover, WSNs that aggregate and remove duplicated 
data before transmission significantly reduce the effectiveness of such attacks.  
During a path-based DoS attack an attacker floods fake or replayed packets 
along a multi-hop, end-to-end routing path. The attack quickly consumes the 
resources of nodes along the communication path and prevents nodes downstream 
from the path under attack from communicating with the base-station. Thus, a path-
based DoS attack can affect a much greater portion of a WSN, than just the path 
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under attack (Deng et al. 2005). There are a number of methods proposed for 
defending against path-based DoS attacks, the primary role of most defence 
approaches is to detect and remove spurious packets along a communication path. 
(Deng et al. 2005) proposes four generic defence approaches against such attacks: 
1) Each node along a communication path shares a secret key with the 
sender. The sender generates authentication and integrity material for 
each key/node and appends it to each packet. Consequently, each packet 
is validated at each hop along the communication path, all the way to the 
destination. This approach requires each node in the network to pre-share 
a secret key with every other node along every potential communication 
path in the whole WSN. The resource-limited nature of WSNs makes the 
storage requirements of this approach infeasible for most WSNs. 
Moreover, the small size of packets in WSNs makes the addition of so 
much authentication information with each packet impractical. 
2) A modified approach, to that discussed in (1), involves a node storing a 
path key for every potential path in a WSN. Although, the storage cost of 
this approach is much lower than the previously discussed approach, the 
storage requirement on each node for large networks is still significant. 
Moreover, if any one of the nodes in the network is subverted an attacker 
can flood a whole communication path. As previously discussed, this 
may affect a much larger region of the WSN than the communication 
path under attack alone. Additionally, in ad hoc WSNs where nodes may 
leave and join the network throughout the lifetime of the WSN, the 
process of updating the path keys of nodes is not a straightforward 
process. 
3) An alternative approach to identifying replayed packets though non-
cryptographic means, involves each node maintaining a history of all 
prior packets and comparing all incoming packets with the historical list 
of packets. This approach although effective is not feasible for resource 
limited WSN nodes with limited storage resources.  
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4) Rate control mechanisms can also be applied to each node, limiting the 
amount of replayed packets accepted from any one node. However, due 
to the nature of WSN, certain nodes such as nodes directly around a 
coordinator or router nodes have different packet rates. Moreover, 
depending on the application of the WSNs, the packet rate may change 
for different time periods. Additionally, the addition of new nodes and 
the removal of old nodes requires packet rate statistics to be periodically 
re-calculated. Thus, rate limits although effective are not necessarily 
feasible for WSNs (Deng et al. 2005). 
In addition to these four categories a number of approaches including (Deng 
et al. 2005) and (Li et al. 2007) have adopted one-way hash chains to protect against 
path-based DoS attacks. In the hash-chain based approaches, a node hashes a 
random number repeatedly storing the value of each hash in a chain so producing a 
hash chain. The last hash value (n) produced is distributed to all nodes in the nodes 
communication path. Each node has access to the hash algorithm employed. 
However, it is not feasible for an attacker to derive the value which when hashed 
forms the shared hash value (n). The next message contains the previous hash value 
in the chain (n-1), from which (n) was derived, only the node which has access to 
the original hash chain can include this value. The recipients apply the pre-shared 
hash function to the hash received (n-1), if the previous hash (n) can be derived the 
message is considered valid and not a replay. Moreover, if an attacker intercepts the 
hash value (n-1) it is different to the next hash value that will be sent from the hash 
chain (n-2). Consequently, hash chains offer a lightweight approach for protecting 
against path based DoS attacks, which involve the replay of legitimate packets. The 
problem with certain hash-chain approaches such as those adopted by (Perrig et al. 
2002) and (Liu et al. 2003) is that they require the time synchronisation of nodes in 
the WSN. However, this is not practical for large scale WSNs, where complicated 
maintenance schemes are required to keep all nodes synchronised. For example, 
complex maintenance schemes are required to deal with situations, such as dropped 
packets where some of the nodes in a path receive a new hash value and some do 
not. In this situation, if a sender replays a dropped message the intermediate nodes, 
which have already received the hash value, will reject the message as a path-based 
DoS attack. If the sender appends the next value in the hash chain to a message, the 
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nodes in the path that did not receive the last hash value, will reject the message as a 
path-based DoS attack.  However, simulations of such schemes (Deng et al. 2005) 
show promise in the feasibility of such approaches for use with WSNs, however 
considerably more research is needed in this area to experimentally test the 
feasibility of such schemes with practical applications of WSNs. 
Once a WSN is deployed, it may be necessary to update the software 
contained on some or all of the associated WSN nodes, due to bugs or technological 
advances. Due to the nature of many WSN applications where nodes are located in 
inaccessible and remote locations it is desirable to remotely and wirelessly update 
node software. The process of updating node software is referred to as code 
dissemination. There are numerous approaches and protocols for disseminating 
software, such as the approach adopted by TinyOS called Deluge. In the Deluge 
approach, nodes periodically send advertisements containing their software version. 
Nodes check the advertisements received from neighbouring nodes. If a 
neighbouring node has a later software version a request is sent to the node for the 
latest software update. In the Deluge approach, an image of a software update is 
split into equally sized pages, and each page is split into equally sized packets. The 
pages are then delivered to the destination nodes in sequential order. Once a node 
receives a complete new page, the node acknowledges the receipt of the page and 
requests the next page. The Deluge and other software dissemination approaches 
normally assume a trusted environment and offer little or no security services. 
Consequently, there is little protection from attackers wishing to subvert the 
software update process. As a result, secure methods for reprogramming nodes have 
emerged, one such scheme is called Seluge (Hyun et al. 2008), a secure extension of 
the Deluge approach. The Seluge approach addresses several weaknesses in the 
Deluge approach. Firstly, in the deluge approach a whole page has to be received 
before it is validated, consuming significant energy resources and offering a 
potential target for attackers. The Seluge approach adopts a hashing mechanism, 
which imprints each packet in a page with a hash code. The hash code is checked on 
arrival at a node allowing forged or corrupted packets to be detected at an early 
stage. Similarly, Seluge adopts cluster key based authentication for software version 
advertisements and software update request messages to overcome DoS attacks 
based on spoofed messages. Moreover, one-way-hash chains are adopted to 
Chapter 3: DoS Attacks in WSNs 
 
-60- 
authenticate pages instead of signatures, overcoming attacks aimed at exhausting the 
energy resources of nodes through the generation of multiple, energy expensive, 
signature authentication requests. 
This section has presented an extensive review of DoS attacks originating 
locally from within WSNs. These attacks can cause a serious disruption to WSN 
communications and to remote users attempting to access WSN services. The next 
section reviews the remote DoS attacks that originate from outside of the WSN, and 
attempt to disrupt communications on the WSN for local and remote users, and DoS 
attacks that target the remote access infrastructure of WSNs to disrupt 
communications for remote users. It should be noted that due to a lack of research 
focused on remote DoS attacks that focus exclusively on WSNs, the following 
section examines the most popular remote DoS attacks that have been perpetrated 
against LAN, however can easily be implemented against any other network, such 
as WSNs. 
3.4 Remote DoS Attacks on WSNs 
It has been suggested that regardless of how well local security mechanisms 
protect potential victims, ultimately the victims susceptibility to DoS attacks 
depends on the effectiveness of security mechanisms across the connected networks, 
including public networks such as the Internet (Mirkovic et al. 2004). Consequently, 
protecting relatively resource poor WSNs from attackers who wield the power of 
large, relatively resource rich, yet DoS vulnerable public access networks poses 
significant research challenges. Attacks, such as these, which originate from outside 
the victim’s network are termed remote DoS attacks (Kumar et al. 2006). This 
section and research outlined in the Thesis focuses on remote DoS attacks 
originating from the Internet. This is due to the worldwide dominance of the 
Internet as the public access network of choice for communicating over large 
distances. 
There are three main objectives of a remote DoS attack. Firstly, a DoS attack 
may disrupt communications across a WSN and prevent local nodes from 
communicating and accessing local services such as trusted third parties. Secondly, 
an attack may attempt to overwhelm the point of ingress between the Internet and 
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WSN, in an attempt to block legitimate users from remotely accessing the WSN. 
Thirdly, an attacker may attempt to disrupt the WSN’s remote access infrastructure 
to prevent remote users from accessing the WSN. In the case of many WSN 
applications, the sole objective of a WSN is to monitor a remote environment and 
report sensed data to a remote destination. Consequently, remote DoS attacks that 
block legitimate users from accessing a WSN, in a timely manner, effectively render 
the WSN ineffective and as such pose a significant research challenge. 
3.4.1 Remote DoS Attacks 
There are numerous approaches for conducting a remote DoS attack over the 
internet and against local networks such as WSNs. A summary of some of the most 
popular remote DoS attacks follows. The attacks are categorised based on those, 
which exploit vulnerabilities in networks such as application software bugs and 
flaws in underlying protocols and those, which adopt a brute force approach in an 
attempt to overwhelm a victim’s resources. 
3.4.1.1 Vulnerability Based DoS Attacks 
As previously discussed, vulnerability based attacks exploit known flaws in 
networks, including flaws in systems hardware, flaws in protocols, and bugs in 
application software. The most widely known and popular vulnerability based DoS 
attacks include TCP SYN, NAPTHA and Teardrop attacks. 
The TCP SYN attack was first identified by Bill Cheswick and Steve 
Bellovin in 1994 (Mahimkar et al. 2007). In a TCP SYN attack, during the three-
way TCP handshake between a client and server, the client requests a connection 
from a server. The server responds by allocating sufficient buffer space, in the 
server’s half-open connection buffer and transmits an acknowledgement and nonce 
(random number) to the client. At this stage of the three way handshake the client 
should increment the received nonce and respond with an acknowledgment and the 
incremented nonce, at which stage the server moves the connection from the 
relatively resource limited half open connection buffer to the, relatively resource 
rich, open connection buffer. In the TCP SYN attack, when the client receives the 
acknowledgment and nonce from the server, the client fails to complete the 
connection with the server. The server continues to reserve the allocated buffer 
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space for a certain period of time. The attacker repeats the aforementioned steps 
numerous times from varying sources until the servers half open connection buffer 
resources are overwhelmed (Wang et al. 2002).  
The TCP SYN attack aims to prevent the server under attack from providing 
services to legitimate clients by exhausting the servers half-open connection buffer 
resources. In the case that the server under attack is a gateway server between a 
WSN and the Internet, the attack aims to prevent the server from providing 
legitimate users with access to the respective WSN. 
To prevent a single host from performing a TCP SYN attack and creating 
multiple half-open connections, the number of TCP connections a single host can 
establish in a given period is limited by many servers. Consequently, for an attacker 
to launch a successful attack and open multiple half-open connections, the attacker 
must either spoof the IP address of different TCP SYN requests to appear as though 
the requests are coming from different sources or the attacker must use a large 
number of hosts to perform the attack. The TCP SYN attack is almost identical to 
the earlier described “flood attack”, which is launched locally from within WSNs 
(See Section 3.3.4). Consequently, the defences against TCP SYN attacks using 
spoofed IP addresses or originating from a large number of hosts are similar to those 
employed against flood attacks. The six most common TCP SYN attack defences 
adopted by many systems are as follows. 
Firstly, “ingress filtering” is used to identify and reject TCP SYN requests 
originating from spoofed IP addresses. There are different methods for performing 
ingress filtering; a review of them all is outside the scope of this thesis, for more 
information please refer to (Baker et al. 2004). However, the underlying principle of 
ingress filtering is to check the source address of incoming packets against a 
predefined list of acceptable addresses. For example, an ISP (Internet Service 
Provider) is aware of the IP addresses used as part of its network. Consequently, 
packets leaving the ISPs network with spoofed addresses that could not have 
originated from within its network can be easily spotted and removed. However, 
packets from subverted hosts within a network or from spoofed packets with 
addresses within the range of the local network are not detected using ingress 
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filtering. Consequently, the closer the ingress filter is to the source of the attack the 
more accurately spoofed addresses can be detected.  
Secondly, the half-open connection buffer resources of victims can be 
increased to handle larger TCP-SYN attacks. However, this approach is limited 
because the size of any potential TCP SYN attack is unknown. Consequently, the 
potential for a large enough TCP SYN attack to overwhelm a victim’s resources 
remains.  
Thirdly, the duration before a half open connection is timed out at the 
victim’s server can be decreased. This leads to half-open connections being 
terminated faster and resources at the half-open connection buffer being released 
faster. Although, this method increases the difficulty of launching a TCP SYN 
attack, the potential for an attacker to increase the rate of an attack to compensate 
for the reduced timeout period remains.  
Fourthly, instead of a server reserving buffer space before the three-way 
handshake has completed, the server can wait until the handshake has been 
completed. One approach to achieve this is for the server to store a hash of secret 
bits received in a TCP request packet and the respective connection’s IP address, in 
a SYN cache, instead of using a half-open connection buffer to maintain the 
connections state. In this approach, the server does not reserve any buffer space 
until the three-way handshake has been completed. Once the three-way handshake 
has been completed, the server uses the appropriate cached connection state to 
establish the connection. Although this approach is effective, a delay is added to the 
connection process. Moreover, an attacker may shift the focus of the attack from the 
server’s half-open connection resources to the server’s hash storage resources.  
Fifthly, another approach involves the use of SYN cookies. The approach 
allows a server to retain no connection state information using its resources, instead 
the information is encoded and passed to the client as part of the nonce and stored 
on the client as a cookie. Once the three-way handshake has been completed, the 
connection is established using the information stored on the client side cookie.  
Finally, one of the latest defences against TCP SYN attacks, involves the 
server requesting that the client completes a complex puzzle before a connection 
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space is reserved (Wood et al. 2002). This form of defence is very effective against 
attackers using spoofed IP addresses and presuming the attacker has limited 
computational resources, reduces the number of simultaneous connection requests 
possible from a single attacking client at any one moment in time. Moreover, the 
maximum size of an attack from a large distributed attack from a number of 
attacking hosts is considerably reduced. However, the use of client puzzles does 
slow down the connection setup process. Furthermore, the server issuing the puzzles 
also has to calculate the answer to the puzzles to verify the answers received from 
connecting hosts. 
All of the defence mechanisms discussed increase the difficulty of carrying 
out TCP SYN based DoS attacks. However, most have drawbacks resulting in 
different mechanisms or hybrid combinations of these mechanisms providing the 
optimal solution for different applications. 
 During a NAPTHA attack, an attacking client opens a legitimate connection 
with a server and immediately closes the connection without sending the FIN/RST 
messages to the server. Resulting in the server maintaining the connection unaware 
the connection has been terminated by the malicious client. The attacker performs 
this attack from numerous Zombie machines, depleting the victim’s resources and 
preventing legitimate clients from forming new connections. As with the TCP SYN 
attack, the objective of this attack is to prevent the victim’s server from providing 
services to legitimate clients. Moreover, if the server is a gateway server between a 
WSN and the Internet the attack aims to prevent the server from providing 
legitimate users with access to the respective WSN. (Mahimkar et al. 2007) 
proposes an approach for tackling NAPTHA attacks called dFence. The approach 
involves a third party between the server and client responsible for monitoring the 
length of time a connection has been idle. If the time a connection has been idle 
exceeds a predefined threshold value, dFence terminates the connection with the 
server on behalf of the client. The disadvantage of the dFence approach is that 
legitimate connections might be incorrectly terminated.  
The Teardrop attack (Microsystems 1998) was prevalent in 1997 and 
targeted computers running Windows 3.1, 95, and NT machines and Linux versions 
prior to 2.0.32. An attacker uses the Teardrop attack tool to send overlapping IP 
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fragments to the victim. A flaw in the software causes the victims TCP/IP 
fragmentation re-assembly code to incorrectly handle the overlapping IP fragments. 
The Teardrop attack causes vulnerable machines to crash or reboot, causing any 
active data in memory to be lost. Although the teardrop attack no longer poses a 
threat to most machines, it highlights how a simple flaw in an application can crash 
vulnerable machines, denying services to legitimate users. As with most 
vulnerability based DoS attacks the teardrop attack requires a significantly smaller 
sized attack to be effective than brute force attacks. However, a software update 
applied to vulnerable machines can prevent the teardrop and other vulnerability 
attacks.  
3.4.1.2 Brute Force Based DoS Attacks 
The underlying objective of all brute force attacks, also known as flooding 
attacks, is to overwhelm the victim’s resources with higher levels of traffic than the 
victim’s system is designed to handle. Thus, consuming the victim’s resources, with 
malicious requests, and denying the service requests of legitimate users. There are 
numerous types of brute force based DoS attacks, however there are two broad 
categories of Brute Force attacks, direct attacks and reflector attacks (Chang 2002). 
This section reviews a selection of the most widely known direct brute force attacks 
such as UDP, and ICMP flooding attacks and reflector attacks such as the Smurf 
attack, and DNS reflector attack. 
In a UDP flooding attack, a stream of UDP packets is transmitted to a victim 
host, exhausting the victims network bandwidth and consequently preventing UDP 
and other packets sent from legitimate users reaching the intended destination. 
Moreover, the UDP protocol is a connectionless protocol; as a result, in an 
intelligent attack where the IP address of each packet is spoofed, each packet must 
be accepted and checked before rejection. As a result, legitimate users are not able 
to effectively communicate with the victim during an effective DoS attack (Chang 
2002). The potential defences for flooding attacks designed to exploit 
connectionless protocols, such as UDP, include statistical analysis approaches 
designed to detect and remove attack traffic. These defences are discussed in detail 
in section 3.4.2. 
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Similarly, in an ICMP flooding attack a stream of ICMP echo request 
packets are transmitted to a victim host, exhausting the victim’s networks 
bandwidth. Moreover, the victim attempts to process the ICMP echo requests, 
consuming the victim’s CPU time. Additionally, once the victim has processed an 
ICMP echo request the appropriate reply is sent, further exhausting the victim’s 
already exhausted network bandwidth (Mirkovic 2003). Thus, legitimate users are 
prevented from effectively communicating with the victim. As with UDP attacks the 
defences for ICMP flooding attacks are discussed in detail in section 3.4.2. 
Both UDP and ICMP flooding DoS attacks highlight two direct attacks. The 
attack traffic received at the victim end originates directly from the attacking 
zombie computers. In the case of reflector attacks, the attacking zombies send 
requests to legitimate servers that require responses from the server. The zombies 
spoof the IP address of the victim node in the request sent to the legitimate servers. 
Consequently, the servers reply to the requests, using the victim’s IP address, and 
inadvertently flood the victim node with replies. Reflector attacks are harder to 
detect than direct attacks as the incoming flood of traffic is from a legitimate source 
(Paxson 2001). Moreover, the zombie machines from which an attack is launched 
are harder to trace because the legitimate servers used to reflect the attack might not 
record the details of the origin of requests they reply to. Two of the most widely 
known examples of flooding attacks that use reflectors are the Smurf and DNS 
reflector attacks. 
During a Smurf attack, a stream of ICMP echo requests is sent to subnet 
broadcast addresses using the victim’s spoofed IP address. Unlike the direct ICMP 
attack, the objective of a Smurf attack is not to exhaust the recipients of the ICMP 
echo requests. Instead, the objective of the attack is to send ICMP echo request to 
all nodes in a subnet, resulting in the respective subnet nodes generating responses 
to the ICMP echo requests targeted at the victim (Paxson 2001). The result of the 
attack is to overwhelm the resources of the victim, including flooding the victim’s 
bandwidth, not only causing disruption to the victim nodes availability but also to 
all those nodes along the path of the DoS attack. The Smurf attack provides a good 
demonstration of reflector attacks. However, the Smurf attack has received much 
attention in research and there are simple steps that can be taken to prevent this 
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attack, such as ignoring requests to broadcast ICMP echo requests. As with direct 
ICMP attacks, other defences are discussed in detail in section 3.4.2. 
During a DNS reflector attack, a stream of DNS look up requests is 
generated using the victim’s IP address as the forged source of the request. The 
DNS lookup server performs the DNS lookup and returns the results of the lookup 
to the victim. The attacker repeats this process repeatedly for the duration of the 
attack, whilst simultaneously using multiple zombies to perform the same action. 
Consequently, the victim is overwhelmed with DNS lookup responses (Cheung 
2006). As before the effect of the attack is to overwhelm the resources of the victim, 
including flooding the victims bandwidth, not only causing disruption to the victim 
nodes availability but also to all those nodes along the path of the DoS attack. The 
DNS reflector attack is particularly difficult to deal with at the DNS for two primary 
reasons. Firstly, unless the attack damages the DNS itself, there are few incentives 
to encourage the operators of the DNS to employ costly defences. Secondly, it is 
difficult to differentiate between legitimate and forged requests.   
This section has reviewed some of the most popular and widely known 
remote DoS attacks. The approaches adopted to mitigate these attacks have been 
highlighted. The following section investigates the systems that have been proposed 
in academics and industry, adopting some of the previously discussed defence 
approaches, to combat the threat of remote DoS attacks.  
3.4.2 Remote DoS Defences 
The previous sections have outlined the most popular and widely known 
remote DoS attacks. There are numerous other known remote DoS attacks and in all 
likelihood, many more remote DoS attacks that will emerge as new vulnerabilities 
in old and new technologies are discovered (Mirkovic 2003). Due to the serious 
threats that arise from remote DoS attacks a significant amount of research has been 
conducted into developing methods for detecting and defending against remote DoS 
attacks. (Mirkovic 2003) introduces a taxonomy for classifying DoS attack defences 
based on the locality of the defence, the classification consists of DoS defences 
located at the victim, attacker source, and hybrid defences distributed at both the 
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victim end and attacker source. Following is a summary of the defences identified 
from the literature, categorised based on the previously discussed taxonomy. 
3.4.2.1 Victim Based DoS Defence 
The most widely employed DoS defences are located at the victim end of 
attacks (Xiang et al. 2006). Following is an updated selection of victim-based 
defences including resource multiplication, honeypots, NetBouncer, Synkill, and 
protocol scrubber as originally identified by (Mirkovic 2003). 
During a brute force DoS attack the attacker attempts to exhaust the 
resources of the victim. To limit the damage of a DoS attack and reduce the impact 
of the attack on legitimate users the victim may increase the level of resources (such 
as adding more memory, increasing the systems processing power and increasing 
the systems bandwidth) to meet the demands of the DoS attacks and provide an 
acceptable level of service for legitimate users. This form of defence is called 
“Resource Multiplication”. Moreover, the system may implement a fair usage 
policy to share the increased level of resources, amongst the systems users, further 
decreasing the impact of an attack on legitimate users. (Chiba et al. 2006) proposes 
such a defence system, which duplicates a server three times. Incoming packets are 
assigned the IP address of one of the servers based on the source domain of the 
packets. Once an association has been created, packets from a domain are routed to 
the same server for the duration of the communication. Packets from non-associated 
domains received at the servers are rejected. The proposed scheme and other 
resource multiplication schemes increase the difficulty of carrying out DoS attacks, 
such as UDP and ICMP flooding attacks. However, the potential for an attacker to 
increase the size of the attack and overwhelm the victims increased resources 
remains. Moreover, it may not be practical to duplicate the resources of low cost 
systems such as WSNs where low cost is a key design characteristic. 
Remote DoS attacks rely on the attacker’s ability to successfully send data 
and disrupt systems, such as web servers, providing services for legitimate clients. 
Honeypots have been proposed as a method for increasing the difficulty for an 
attacker to successfully send data to and disrupt a service providing system. A 
honeypot is a system that mimics the system it is protecting. The objective of a 
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honeypot is to lure attackers into believing they are connected with and attacking a 
real system and not the honeypot (Weiler 2002). The approach requires the 
honeypot to be able to distinguish legitimate network traffic from attack traffic and 
forward legitimate traffic to the real system, whilst responding to suspected attacks 
directly. There are numerous methods employed to authenticate users, (Das 2009) 
proposes a trust based scheme where authorised clients pre-share secret information 
for authentication purposes. To mimic response from the real system the honeypot 
may create a virtual model of the real network to respond to attackers or a parallel 
system may be created for responding to attacks. Additionally, to prevent a single 
honeypot from being overwhelmed and creating a point of failure further down the 
communication path certain approaches such as (Das 2009) incorporate multiple 
roaming honeypots. At any moment in time a number of the honeypots are 
legitimate forwarding clients, which forward data to the end destination. The 
remainder of the honeypots mimic the real network and respond to potential attack 
traffic on the real systems behalf. During the start of communications, the clients 
authenticate to a honeypot and receive a list of the honeypots that can be used for 
communications with the end destination. Consequently, data sent to the legitimate 
honeypots is forwarded to the real system. Whereas, data arriving at other 
honeypots is considered to be attack traffic and dealt with by the honeypots. Over a 
period of time the role of the honeypots is randomly changed to further increase the 
difficulty of the attacker guessing the correct honeypot required to access the real 
system. Honeypots add an additional layer of protection for vulnerable systems. 
However, the cost of adding honeypots may be prohibitive for low cost networks. 
Moreover, the potential for a powerful attacker to overwhelm the honeypots or the 
target systems Internet connection’s bandwidth remains.   
An alternative approach for tackling a brute force attack, where resource 
duplication is not possible is rate limiting. (Keromytis et al. 2002) defines rate 
limiting as a bandwidth restriction on a category of traffic such as ICMP, or UDP. 
During an attack, a rate-limiting algorithm drops packets either randomly or based 
on pre-defined rules. Rate limiting provides an effective defence against the 
exhaustion of a host’s resources. However, due to the difficulties in identifying 
attack traffic from legitimate traffic, both suffer from rate limiting. A number of the 
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following defence approaches incorporate rate limiting in addition to novel DoS 
detection mechanisms.   
As discussed earlier, packets originating from spoofed IP addresses increase 
the difficulty of tracing the source of DoS attacks and help attackers evade IP based 
DoS defences, such as the resource multiplication approach proposed by (Chiba et 
al. 2006). As previously discussed, ingress filtering is the conventional defence 
against IP spoofing. Whereby, the source of packets is verified to filter out 
nonexistent, spoofed IP addresses close to the source of the attack. An alternative 
approach involves sending a message to the source of the packet and waiting for a 
response, to verify that the source exists and that the packet was sent from there. 
(Thomas et al. 2003) proposes NetBouncer, an approach for ascertaining the 
validity of the IP address of incoming packets. NetBouncer intercepts incoming 
packets and sends an ICMP ECHO request, containing a hash value, to the IP 
address of the incoming connections. If an ICMP ECHO message is returned from 
the client containing the correct hash value the client is considered valid and added 
to a list of valid clients. Future connections from IP addresses contained on the 
legitimate list of clients are not validated. The hash value allows attackers spoofing 
the IP address of legitimate machines to be detected. The innocent ECHO responses 
from legitimate hosts will not contain the correct hash code. Additionally, 
NetBouncer incorporates the client puzzle based TCP SYN attack defences, 
discussed earlier. The NetBouncer system primarily provides a low cost and 
scalable solution for providing defences against DoS attacks incorporating spoofed 
IP addresses. However, the system does not provide protection against attacks using 
zombies using legitimate IP addresses.  
As previously discussed, weaknesses in the TCP protocol have given rise to 
DoS attacks designed to exploit TCP weaknesses. One resource duplication based 
approach to defend against the TCP SYN attack is Synkill. The Synkill (Schuba et 
al. 1997) approach performs active monitoring of all packets on a network and has 
the ability to inject new packets into a network. Synkill acts as a gateway between a 
client and server. The attacking client requests a connection with a server. Synkill 
intercepts this request and forms a connection with the server on behalf of the client. 
Synkill then responds to the clients TCP connection request and waits for the client 
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to complete the three-way handshake. Consequently, moving the connection from 
the resource limited half-open connection buffer to the larger resources available for 
established connections. After a period of time, if the three way handshake has not 
been established between the client and Synkill, it sends a reset message to the 
victim server ending the connection and clears the connection from its half open 
connection buffer. This approach protects the victim’s resource-limited half-open 
connection buffer from the TCP SYN attack. However, this approach requires 
Synkill to have more resources available than the victim to handle half-open 
connections. Otherwise, this approach only transfers the location and effect of the 
TCP SYN attack from the victim to the Synkill machine. Moreover, the potential for 
an attacker to exhaust the resources for established connections, at the victim, using 
a large number of attacking machines in a distributed attack remains. 
(Malan et al. 2002) proposed “Protocol Scrubber” a scheme for removing 
DoS threats arising from malformed packets. Attackers may create malformed TCP 
packets to avoid DoS detection mechanisms designed to filter TCP traffic or exploit 
weaknesses in TCP implementations that lead to the victim rebooting or crashing, as 
in the earlier discussed Teardrop attack. The protocol scrubber is designed as a 
“transparent interposition mechanism for explicitly removing network attacks at 
both the transport and application protocol layers”.  The transport scrubber 
identifies malformed TCP packets and packets of varying TCP implementations, 
designed to avoid network-based intrusion detection (NID) systems or cause 
malicious damage. The identified packet ambiguities are removed or packets are 
converted to a standard TCP implementation, allowing for detection by NID 
systems. However, in the case of end-to-end encrypted flows, the transport scrubber 
assumes that the connection is sanctioned, so the protocol scrubber does not check 
the packet integrity. 
This section has reviewed a few of the available victim based DoS defence 
mechanisms available. However, victim-end defences alone cannot provide 
complete protection from DoS attacks because victim based defences can be 
overwhelmed by attack traffic (Mirkovic 2003). Moreover, it is often difficult to 
identify legitimate traffic from attack traffic, which leads to both legitimate and 
attack traffic being affected by defence mechanisms. Consequently, defence 
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mechanisms that operate at or close to the source of the attack have emerged to 
distinguish between legitimate and attack traffic with a greater accuracy. 
3.4.2.2 Source Based DoS Defences 
There are many benefits of deploying DoS defences at or close to the 
sources of attacks. Defences deployed close to or on attacking zombies allow 
attacks to be detected before bandwidth is wasted transmitting the attack traffic 
from the attacker to the victim. Furthermore, dealing with a single or a few attack 
streams at or close to the source of the attack is considerably easier than dealing 
with the sum of an attack of potentially thousands of zombies at the victim end. 
There are few defence mechanisms currently available to defend against DoS 
attacks at the source of attacks. However, from the literature review, an updated list 
of source based defence mechanisms originally identified by (Mirkovic 2003) 
follows, three such defence mechanisms have been identified, Multi-Level Tree for 
Online Packet Statistics (MULTOPS), Reverse Firewall, and DDoS Network Attack 
Recognition and Defence (D-WARD). 
The MULTOPS defence system consists of a tree of nodes, each of which 
monitors and records, incoming and outgoing, packet rate statistics for subnet 
prefixes at different aggregation levels (Thomer et al. 2001). These levels are 
compared with current packet rate statistics. If a variation between the statistical 
models is detected, rate limiting is applied. Consequently, MULTOPS can be 
implemented at the source of an attack or at the victim end of an attack. Although 
MULTOPS provides a valid approach for screening non-spoofed packets, 
MULTOPS cannot handle attack packets incorporating spoofed IP addresses. 
Subsequently, other methods are required to ensure incoming packets have valid IP 
addresses for MULTOPS to be effective. Moreover, the two-way communications 
statistics acted on by MULTOPS are not valid for all communication protocols. For 
example, certain protocols, such as UDP, may have more packets flowing in one 
direction. 
The reverse firewall (CS3 inc 2009) resides on a personal computer or 
network and monitors all outgoing packets. All outgoing packets are initially 
permitted however only those identified to be participants in two-way 
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communications are permitted to transmit at high data rates. All other packets are 
subjected to rate limiting. This approach prevents subverted machines from 
launching high data rate DoS attacks. However, the reverse firewall has to maintain 
information on all communications. This places a large strain on the storage 
resources and processing capabilities of the machine hosting the reverse firewall.   
D-WARD (Mirkovic 2003), operates on a router between a private network 
and the Internet, preventing machines on the private network from sending DoS 
attack packets. D-WARD analyses incoming traffic and detects DoS attacks through 
the detection of “non-responsive hosts” where all packets for a particular IP address 
are outgoing with no associated incoming packets. Additionally, ingress filtering is 
used to ensure all outgoing packets have valid subnet addresses, and prevent IP 
spoofing. Moreover, the number of outgoing connections from all of the hosts is 
monitored. If a significantly large number of packets are detected to originate from 
one particular host, a rate limit is triggered for the respective connection. 
Additionally, packets in a system protected by D-WARD are compared against 
individual models representing normal traffic flow for UDP, ICMP and TCP packet 
flows, increasing detection accuracy, unlike other approaches such as MULTOPS, 
which detect abnormal traffic using a general model for all traffic flow. 
The source based DoS defences summarised in this section show that this 
technology offers certain advantages over more traditional victim based defences. 
However one significant challenge remains. DoS attacks generally affect the victim 
of the attack more than those closer to the source of the attack. Consequently, there 
is little to encourage those closer to the source of attacks to incur expenditure and 
install defences if they do not directly benefit. To increase the effectiveness of DoS 
detection and resolution further hybrid schemes have emerged which incorporate 
victim and source defence mechanisms. 
3.4.2.3 DoS Defence - Hybrid 
A number of hybrid remote DoS defence approaches have been investigated 
for detecting DoS attacks with a greater level of accuracy including MANAnet, 
Distributed Packet Filtering (DPF), Aggregate Congestion Control (ACC), Secure 
Overlay Service (SoS), Dynabone and the Active Security Service (ASSYST).  
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The MANAnet (CS3 inc 2008) approach involves creating a neighbourhood 
of nodes around a host, such as a web server. The neighbouring nodes stamp each 
packet received with a unique identifier. Once the host receives the message, the 
path the incoming packets have traversed from the point of entry into the 
neighbourhood can be identified. A fair usage policy can be implemented at the 
host, to provide packets from each unique path with the same level of service. This 
provides legitimate packets a greater share of the host’s time compared to 
aggressive attack streams. The problem with this approach is twofold. Firstly, a 
fundamental change in TCP is required for the introduction of a path stamp field. 
Moreover, this approach works best with large neighbourhoods of nodes, ranging as 
close to the attacker as possible. 
The DPF (Kihong et al. 2001) approach, involves filtering packets, at 
Internet routers, that have invalid source IP addresses. The approach is similar to 
conventional route-based packet filtering (RPF). However, conventional RPF 
requires all internet routers to install filters to be one hundred percent effective, 
whereas DPF requires eighteen percent coverage across Internet routers to achieve a 
similar effectiveness. RPF monitors the route of incoming packets at Internet 
routers. Using topology information the router can ascertain whether it is possible 
for a packet to have traversed a particular route. If it is not possible, then the packet 
is discarded as an attack packet. However, if an attacking host uses a spoofed IP 
address coming from the same route path, as the spoofed address, then the attack 
goes undetected. The DPF works on the presumption that there are central routers 
on the Internet. Consequently, locating RPFs at these locations can vastly reduce the 
number of nodes required to provide a similar level of defences as RPF. Moreover, 
in the instances where an attacker resides in the same IP neighbourhood as the 
spoofed IP address achieving traceback of the attacking host is simplified. 
(Ratul et al. 2002) states that DoS attacks and flash crowds often overwhelm 
network resources and that it is not the individual packet flows which pose a 
problem for servers, more the aggregated effect of multiple low rate packet flows. 
Consequently (Ratul et al. 2002) proposes the ACC approach to identify aggregate 
flows causing large packet drops. Moreover, once aggregate data flows have been 
identified, a pushback mechanism sends a request to upstream routers to perform 
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rate limiting on these traffic flows. The pushback request is first sent to 
neighbouring routers, responsible for the aggregated traffic flow. To reduce the 
impact of rate limiting on legitimate traffic the routers send the pushback request 
further upstream, closer to the source of the attack. However, legitimate traffic is 
likely to be effected at the router where rate limiting is applied. This is due to the 
difficulty in differentiating between legitimate traffic and attack traffic destined for 
the same source. Moreover, this approach requires changes to routers across the 
Internet, to allow the pushback mechanism to be adopted. As such, it is questionable 
if those responsible, who do not directly benefit, will adopt this approach. 
The majority of DoS defence approaches discussed and most DoS defence 
approaches in general are reactive defence approaches. The reactive defence 
approaches wait for the initiation of an attack before taking the appropriate steps to 
protect the victimised network (Keromytis et al. 2002).  The SOS (Keromytis et al. 
2002) approach, proposes the development of a proactive communication 
architecture more resilient to DoS attacks. The approach assumes that participants in 
a communication have a trusted relationship and pre-shared security material to start 
an authenticated session. Close to the server side of the communication or end host 
in peer-to-peer communications a number of firewall proxy servers, called secret 
servlets, form a secure overlay. The server side dynamically chooses a subset from 
the total number of servlets available, over which packets must travel to be accepted 
at the server side. Packets originating from any non-authorised servlets are 
immediately dropped at non-authorised intermediate secret servlets before reaching 
the server side destination. During a legitimate communication, clients first 
authenticate with a secure overlay access point (SOAP), subsequently the clients 
send the desired messages through the SOAP and via the secret servlets to the 
destination. An attacker will not know the secret servlet or combination of servlets 
that packets must traverse, at any one moment in time. Consequently, only packets 
from authenticated sources, with prior knowledge of the correct route to traverse 
will successfully reach the intended destination. Although an attacker may bypass 
the SOAP, and flood all the potential routes with attack packets, the SOS approach 
duplicates resources and incorporates redundancy with multiple servlets and 
SOAPs, significantly increasing the difficulty of conducting a flooding attack. 
However, the approach is only effective for nodes in a trusted relationship. 
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Additionally, the approach does not discuss how the trusted relationships will first 
be established. Moreover, the approach requires a significant amount of resource 
duplication, which may not be appropriate for resource-limited networks such as 
WSNs.  
(Touch et al. 2003) proposed a variation of the SOS proactive DoS resilient 
communications architecture called DynaBone. The scheme proposed the 
deployment of multiple virtual private networks across the Internet, called layers, 
between trusted participants. Each layer adopts a different protocol and security 
mechanism, and each pair of participants has a number of layers allocated for 
communications. The connection bandwidth is allocated fairly between the layers. 
Routers along the communication path enforce the bandwidth allocation. 
Consequently, to launch a DoS attack an attacker has to compromise multiple layers 
incorporating different defence mechanisms. However, for DynaBone to be 
effective all routers along the communication path, between communicating parties, 
must adopt the DynaBone system and support bandwidth allocation based on layers. 
Moreover, routers adopting the DynaBone approach must enforce all connecting 
clients to use the DynaBone approach, or the routers must reserve a portion of 
bandwidth for the DynaBone system and a portion of bandwidth for normal Internet 
traffic. Otherwise, an attacker may flood a router with normal attack traffic and 
prevent traffic from the DynaBone virtual private network/layers from reaching the 
router. Consequently, the extensive infrastructure changes required by the 
DynaBone approach make such a system impractical. Moreover, although 
DynaBone is deployed across the infrastructure of the Internet, the approach 
requires the end network to support all of the security mechanisms employed by the 
different layers, this makes such a system impractical for low cost, resource limited 
WSNs. 
(Cotroneo et al. 2002) proposes ASSYST, a distributed DoS defence system 
incorporating network routers, and a bespoke Active Security Protocol (ACP). The 
primary role of the ACP protocol is to help nodes share DoS attack information with 
neighbouring nodes. During an attack, any router that first detects an attack sends an 
alert message using ACP, containing information about the attack characteristics to 
neighbouring routers. The neighbouring routers use the information received to 
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detect if the attack exists in their region, if the attack characteristics are detected a 
response message is sent back to the first router to detect the attack. Consequently, 
using the feedback from upstream routers, the initial router to detect the attack 
calculates the path of the attack from source to end. This allows the initial router, at 
the start of an attack path, to pick the optimum response and send an instruction to 
the appropriate routers informing them of the action to take. The novel traceback 
mechanism provides an effective method for identifying the path of attacks. 
However, the approach requires the modification of all routers on the Internet to be 
fully effective. Moreover, for every attack a router detects a flood of messages is 
sent across neighbouring nodes to perform an analysis of DoS activity in their 
respective regions. Consequently, an intelligent attacker may launch a fake DoS 
attack in order to make the routers flood the network with analysis request 
messages.     
Hybrid remote DoS defence approaches allow for the traceback of attacks 
close to the source. Consequently, attack traffic can be more accurately filtered 
close to the source of attacks, leading to less of an impact on legitimate traffic. 
Moreover, mitigation of attacks close to the source of attack traffic requires 
defences with fewer resources, opposed to further upstream where tackling the 
aggregated attack traffic from multiple hosts requires defences with much greater 
resources to prevent being overwhelmed by attack traffic. Conversely, the hybrid 
approaches allow attacks to be detected upstream where the aggregated effect of 
attack traffic is more evident. The greatest difficulty that arises in adopting hybrid 
DoS defences is in creating consensus and enforcing the worldwide implementation 
of a standard for the creation of interoperable source and victim end defences 
(Mirkovic 2003). Although, the Internet has seen the adoption of worldwide 
standards before, it is questionable if users who do not directly benefit from DoS 
defences will or should pay the added cost of adopting such technology. 
3.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has provided a comprehensive review of the threats faced by 
WSNs from DoS threats originating from within WSNs (local attacks) and from 
neighbouring networks (remote attacks). The objective of both local and remote 
attacks is to prevent WSNs from providing services to legitimate users.  
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The local DoS threats that originate from within WSNs have been classified 
based on the layer of the WSN protocol stack targeted by the attack. There is a 
considerable amount of research available on DoS attacks and defences for threats 
that originate from within WSNs (Raymond et al. 2008) and (Wood et al. 2002), see 
Table 3-1. The existing defences overcome most of the attacks identified through a 
combination of resource duplication, and cryptographic techniques used to 
authenticate packets, verify the integrity of packets, and prevent the replay of 
packets (Raymond et al. 2008). However, from the literature reviewed. there is little 
research available on the effects of DoS attacks launched from subverted nodes, 
which have access to cryptographic material used by the existing DoS prevention 
mechanisms. 
The DoS threats that originate from outside WSNs and target the WSN 
directly or target the remote access infrastructure of the WSN have been classified 
based on the approaches that take a brute force approach and those that exploit 
vulnerabilities (Mirkovic et al. 2004). The brute force based attacks attempt to 
overwhelm the resources of a victim used to provide services. Consequently, during 
a DoS attack legitimate users are prevented from accessing service because there are 
insufficient resources available to handle their requests. The vulnerability based 
DoS attacks, target flaws in the software implementation of systems to cause the 
service offered by the victim to be degraded or altogether stopped. There is a great 
deal of research available regarding the effects of remote DoS attacks against 
enterprise servers, however from this review, and as identified by (Kumar et al. 
2006), there is little research regarding the effect of these attacks on WSNs. 
Table 3-2: Comparative analysis of DoS defence tools. 
DoS Defence Percentage of DoS attack packets removed 
D-WARD 99.4% 
Aggregate Congestion Control (ACC) 64.0% 
ASSYST 89.2% 
MULTOPS 93.0% 
 
The DoS defences that attempt to resolve these remote DoS threats have 
been classified based on the location of their implementation, including those 
implemented at the victim-end, source-end, and hybrid schemes located at both the 
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victim-end and source-end of attacks (Mirkovic et al. 2004). The proposed DoS 
defence approaches, targeted at defending against DoS flooding attacks, do not 
consistently provide a statistical summary of the percentage of DoS attack packets 
detected and removed. However, from the literature review, the proposed 
effectiveness of certain DoS defences, where stated or possible to derive is 
summarised in Table 3-2 from (Mirkovic et al. 2004), (Ratul et al. 2002), (Cotroneo 
et al. 2002), and (Thomer et al. 2001). As highlighted in Table 3-2, the D-WARD 
attack tool, is the most effective DoS defence identified from the literature review, 
removing 99.4% of attack traffic. Consequently, it is used as the benchmark 
approach to evaluate the proposed defence approaches, in the following Chapters. 
As with the research on the effectiveness of DoS attacks against WSNs, there is 
little research available on the appropriateness of these defences for protecting 
WSNs, which have significantly fewer resources available than conventional servers 
(Perrig et al. 2004)  & (Kumar et al. 2006). Consequently, in Chapter 7 the D-
WARD approach is used to evaluate the effectiveness of the defence with the 
highest identified effectiveness of combating DoS flooding attacks targeted at 
WSN’s and as a benchmark to evaluate the proposed defence approaches. 
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Chapter 4  
Research Methodology 
4.1  Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the research methodology adopted for 
the research and the rationale behind the adopted methodology, followed by a 
detailed description of the research undertaken at different stages of the research 
methodology. 
4.2 Adopted Research Methodology 
The objectives of this research require the use of both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches. The research project involves the analysis of existing DoS 
attacks on resource limited WSNs and the evaluation of existing defences, both to 
confirm limitation of the existing defences identified from the domain analysis and 
as a benchmark to gauge the relative effectiveness of the new proposed approaches. 
This was accomplished using quantitative strategies such as design, implementation 
and experimental evaluation of the existing and proposed DoS defence approaches. 
The quantitative approaches help to provide statistics such as, the percentage of an 
attack mitigated by an existing DoS attack, for providing a benchmark to contrast 
the improvement of the proposed approaches. However, the effectiveness of a DoS 
defence is largely based on the user’s perceptions of if they are receiving an 
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acceptable level of service during a DoS attack. Consequently, to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the existing and proposed approaches, a qualitative approach is also 
required. Consequently, the systems development methodology was adopted for the 
research, due to its incorporation of both the quantitative and qualitative approaches, 
as required by the research objectives. There are more than twenty different systems 
development methodologies (Avison & Fitzgerald 2003), a review of these 
methodologies is outside the scope of this thesis. However, as identified by 
(Burstein 2002), all of these methodologies recognise three main stages consisting 
of a concept development stage, system building stage, and an evaluation stage. 
Moreover, these stages do not necessarily follow a linear pattern, certain stages can 
be repeated and revisited and other stages can sometimes be omitted, for example, 
the concept development stage may be revisited during the systems building stage 
(Hasan 2004). These stages were adopted as components of the system development 
methodology. A brief summary of these stages is provided in Table 4.1, followed by 
a thorough discussion of the research undertaken at each stage.  
Table 4.1 Systems development methodology stages and research undertaken 
Stage Research Undertaken 
Concept Development Investigation and Domain Analysis 
• Literature Review 
• Identification of potential DoS weaknesses in 
WSN based HASs and the existing DoS defences 
Systems Building Design of a WSN based HAS test-bed 
• Design of a WSN based HAS 
• Development of a WSN based HAS 
• Unit Testing 
• System Testing of WSN based HAS 
 
Development of the dominant remote access approach 
“GHS” (see Chapters 2 & 6 for more information), as a 
benchmark for evaluating the proposed approaches 
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Design of a hybrid communication approach based DoS 
defence against third party DoS attacks 
• Design of third party DoS defence 
• Development of third party DoS defence 
• Unit testing 
• System testing of third party DoS defence, 
against the benchmark GHS approach 
 
Development of the most effective existing DoS defence 
for flooding DoS attacks directly against a network “D-
WARD” (see Chapters 2 &  7 for more information), as 
a benchmark for evaluating the proposed approaches 
 
Design of a hybrid communication approach based DoS 
defence against direct DoS flooding attacks and attacks 
targeted at the home gateway.  
• System design of a DoS defence against flooding 
attacks and home gateway attacks 
• Development of defence against flooding attacks 
and home gateway attacks 
• Unit Testing 
• System Testing of DoS flooding and gateway 
attack defences, against the benchmark D-
WARD approach 
Systems Evaluation Evaluation 
• Home automation test-bed evaluation 
• Evaluation of the proposed DoS defences 
4.2.1 Concept Development Stage  
The concept development stage consisted of an extensive literature review. 
As part of the literature review, the existing WSN based HASs were investigated 
and analysed to assist in the development of a WSN based HAS test-bed. Moreover, 
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a thorough review of the existing DoS attacks and defences was undertaken. The 
review allowed the existing knowledge on DoS attacks and defences to be applied 
to WSN based HASs to identify potential threats from DoS attacks, identify the 
limitations of the current defences for protecting WSN based HASs, and assist in 
the development of research objectives.  
4.2.2 System Building Stage  
The system building stage consisted of three phases. During the first phase a 
WSN based HAS test-bed was designed, developed, and tested. The test-bed was 
developed as part of a much larger industry sponsored project, the project and 
relevant contributions are discussed further in Chapter 5. From the literature review, 
it can be concluded that the majority of research into DoS attack on WSN based 
HASs is based on simulation studies. The test-bed allows for the first experimental 
evaluation of existing DoS attacks and defences on a resource limited WSN based 
HAS. Consequently, contributing to the available knowledge on DoS attacks against 
WSN based HAS from a different perspective. The test-bed was developed in 
parallel to the DoS defences designed and developed during the second and third 
phase. The period during which the WSN based HAS was developed, in relation to 
phase two and three, was specified by the project’s industrial partners. 
Consequently, the timing of the first phase in parallel to the second and third phases 
was not based on the researcher’s criteria. Although, this imposed some limitations 
on the hardware adopted for the DoS defences in phase two and three, this was 
considered an acceptable compromise due to the added benefit of testing the 
proposed approaches with a working WSN based HAS, as discussed earlier.  
During stage two, the existing dominant remote access approach (GHS) 
identified from the literature review, see Chapter 2, was implemented on the WSN 
based HAS test-bed, to provide a benchmark for the proposed approaches. 
Moreover, a hybrid communication approach for increasing the DoS resistance of a 
third party, mediating communications between remote users and a WSN based 
HAS, was proposed. Initially, based on the earlier discussed domain analysis, a 
conceptual model of a hybrid communication approach to defend against DoS 
attacks was proposed (see Chapter 6, Figure 6-2 and 6-3). Based on the conceptual 
model a remote client, remote home server (trusted third party), and home gateway 
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were developed, as a proof of concept, to demonstrate that such a hybrid 
communication approach is viable. The home gateway was developed as part of 
phase one, however was influenced by the conceptual model designed during the 
parallel phase two. Initially, a personal computer functioned as the home gateway, 
as illustrated in (Gill 2008b). Once the conceptual model had been tested on the 
personal computer based home gateway, an embedded home gateway was 
developed and integrated with the WSN based HAS, as introduced in Chapter 6 and 
7. Unit testing of the RHS-1 and RHS-2 communications approaches was conducted 
before the approaches were combined to form the hybrid communications approach. 
Next, the hybrid communications approach was integrated with the WSN based 
HAS test-bed, alongside an existing remote access approach GHS, discussed in 
Chapter 6, to provide a benchmark for the proposed approach. The GHS benchmark 
is dependent on the hardware used. Consequently, the GHS is implemented on the 
test-bed, and a benchmark calculated (see Chapter 6 for more details). The test-bed 
was subjected to a DoS attack and the performance of the proposed approach was 
compared against the benchmark approach. 
During phase three, the most effective existing DoS defences “D-WARD” 
identified from the literature review, see Chapter 3, that claims to prevent 99.4% of 
attack packets was implemented on the WSN based HAS test-bed, to provide a 
benchmark for the proposed approaches. Moreover, a hybrid communication 
approach for increasing the resistance of WSN based HASs to flooding and home 
gateway DoS attacks, was proposed. As before, the initial stage involved the 
creation of a conceptual model of the hybrid communication approach, based on the 
earlier domain analysis. The next stage required the development of a virtual home 
and DDoS Defence Server as part of the hybrid communication approach. 
Moreover, the RHS-1 and RHS-2 communication approaches developed as part of 
phase two, were also adopted for the hybrid communication approach in phase 
three. Alongside the proposed hybrid communication approach, a model of the most 
effective DoS attack identified from the research “D-WARD” was also developed to 
provide a benchmark to both analyse the effectiveness of existing defences and 
provide a relative comparison of the performance of the proposed approach. 
Additionally, a DoS attack tool was developed to launch an application level DoS 
flooding attack against the WSN based HAS and the home gateway. The proposed 
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hybrid communication approach was integrated with the WSN based HAS. For the 
evaluation of the proposed hybrid communication approach a DoS attack was 
launched from the attack tool, against the test-bed with only the existing defences in 
place, to create the benchmark to evaluate the proposed defences. Next, the 
experiment was repeated with the existing defences and the virtual home in place to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the virtual home at protecting WSN based HASs from 
flooding DoS attacks. Then the experiment was repeated with the existing defences, 
virtual home and DDS in place to evaluate the effectiveness of the DDS to work in 
unison with the virtual home and protect WSN based HASs from DoS attacks 
against the home gateway. 
4.2.3 System Evaluation Stage 
During the system evaluation stage, the system is tested as a whole. During 
this stage, the validity of the WSN based HAS as a test-bed was investigated. A 
field trial was conducted where the WSN based HAS was used by a potential user in 
their home for a period of twelve days, after which the homeowner completed a 
questionnaire to identify how the system functioned and highlight any issues. An 
email was sent out to potential homeowners at Loughborough University and 
amongst staff at one of the projects industrial partners. This resulted in one family 
volunteering to take part in the field trial. Due to the limited number of participants 
available for the field trial, a focus group was held where potential homeowners 
were shown the system and asked to complete a questionnaire. Next, the proposed 
hybrid communication approaches, discussed during the system building stage, 
were evaluated to establish the approaches functionality, robustness, and ease of use 
through a focus group session of potential home occupiers at east midlands airport. 
During the focus group, participants were introduced to the WSN based HAS test-
bed and shown the effects of a flooding DoS attack against the third party, WSN 
based HAS and home gateway with only the existing defences in place and the 
effect of the same attack with the proposed defence mechanisms in place. At the end 
of the demonstration, the participants were asked to complete a questionnaire. 
Additionally, a questionnaire was conducted to identify any human computer 
interaction factors that might affect the proposed DoS defence approaches. The 
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questionnaire was conducted amongst the first set of participants which evaluated 
the WSN based HAS, due to their familiarity with WSN based HASs. 
4.3 Summary 
The chapter has introduced the systems development methodology and 
justified the adoption of this methodology. Additionally, the stages of the 
methodology and the respective research undertaken at each stage have been 
discussed and highlighted in Table 4.1. Moreover, the existing approaches (GHS, 
and D-WARD) used as benchmarks to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed 
approaches have been highlighted. 
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Chapter 5  
Design of a Home Automation Test-Bed 
5.1 Background and Motivation 
As identified from the literature review (see Chapter 3) the majority of 
existing research into DoS attacks and the design of defence measures focuses on 
theoretical studies using simulations. Although, simulation oriented research 
provides a valid analysis of proposed ideas, simulations do not take into 
consideration all of the factors associated with implementing approaches in the real 
world, including environmental factors that may inadvertently affect proposed 
approaches. As such, simulation studies alone are not sufficient to evaluate the 
efficiency and effectiveness of DoS defence approaches to meet the requirements of 
specific applications, placed under the strain of normal usage, in a real environment. 
Consequently, the research presented in the following chapters provides the first 
evaluation of DoS vulnerabilities in WSN based HASs and the effectiveness of the 
proposed defence approaches, through a series of experiments on a real home 
automation test-bed. Although as with simulation studies, experimental studies have 
their own limitations (Bausell 1986), they provide a means to analyse the affects of 
DoS attacks on WSN based HASs from a different perspective to the existing 
research. The home automation test-bed design is based on the current trends in 
research identified from the literature review. Moreover, the test-bed 
communications architecture is based on the ZigBee standard, one of the latest 
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standards developed for low cost, wireless home automation (Barontib et al. 2007). 
This chapter presents the development of a ZigBee based HAS test-bed. The test-
bed is used to quantitatively evaluate the vulnerability of such systems to flooding 
DoS threats, in the following chapters. Moreover, the existing dominant approaches 
for remotely communicating with WSN based HASs (Direct and GHS, see Chapter 
6) and the existing DoS defences (D-WARD, see Chapter 7) are integrated with the 
test-bed as benchmarks to evaluate the proposed DoS defence approaches, in the 
following chapters. This chapter provides the details required to reproduce the WSN 
based HAS test-bed, to reproduce the experiments in the following chapters. The 
work presented in this chapter is published in (Gill et al. 2009a), (Gill et al. 2007), 
and (Yao et al. 2007). 
5.2 Analysis of the Existing Systems 
The adoption of home automation technology by consumers has been 
limited. We propose that, from the home automation domain analysis, the problems 
limiting wide spread consumer adoption can be grouped into five general categories. 
Firstly, complex and expensive architecture: the existing systems architectures 
generally incorporate a personal computer for the purposes of network management 
and provision of remote access. This adds additional complexity to the system, 
hence increasing the overall fiscal expense. Secondly, intrusive installation: the 
majority of systems require varying levels of physical wiring in their architectures. 
This, in some cases, is due to the expense of the alternative wireless technologies. 
Hence, these systems require intrusive and expensive installations. Thirdly, lack of 
network interoperability: both home networks and the HASs which utilise them 
have been developed and adopted in an unplanned and ad hoc manner. This has lead 
to a home environment consisting of a complex maze of heterogeneous networks. 
These networks and the systems that utilise them normally offer little 
interoperability; leading to three potential problems 
• duplication of monitoring activities, due to lack of interoperability,  
• the possibility of interference, between coexisting networks, and 
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• the potential for two simultaneous, autonomous actions on coexisting 
networks, interacting and resulting in an undesirable outcome. 
Fourthly, interface inflexibility: the existing systems offer varying 
approaches for users to control and monitor the connected devices. However, this is 
normally limited to a single method of control, which offers users limited flexibility. 
The systems that provide more than one interface device normally provide different 
user interfaces and risk confusing users. Finally, security and safety: the existing 
approaches have not focused on security and safety problems that may arise from 
their implementation. Moreover, the systems that offer some degree of security have 
neglected the problems with sharing information between devices produced by 
multiple vendors for the purposes of establishing security. 
5.3 Features of the Proposed System 
The architecture of the home automation test-bed is designed to reduce the 
system’s complexity and lower fiscal costs. Hence, the system endeavours not to 
incorporate complex and expensive components, such as high-end personal 
computers. The system is flexible and scalable, allowing additional home appliances 
designed by multiple vendors, to be securely and safely added to the home network 
with the minimum amount of effort. The system allows homeowners to monitor and 
control connected devices in the home, through a variety of controls, including a 
ZigBee based remote control, and any Wi-Fi enabled device that supports Java. 
Additionally, users may remotely monitor and control their home devices using any 
Internet enabled device with Java support. Moreover, a home gateway is 
implemented to facilitate interoperability between heterogeneous networks and 
provide a consistent interface, regardless of the accessing device. Furthermore, a 
virtual home pre-processes all communications before they are realised on the real 
HAS, ensuring all communications are checked for security and safety before being 
allowed to continue to their respective destinations. 
5.4 System Architecture 
The home automation test-bed adopts two wireless standards to cater for the 
low and high rate communication needs of users. The low data rate, control and 
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monitoring needs are catered for using Zigbee and the test-bed’s high data rate 
needs, such as multimedia applications, are met by the Wi-Fi (IEEE 802.11g) 
standard. 
 
 
Figure 5-1: Conceptual architecture overview of home automation test-bed (Gill et al. 2009a) 
A home gateway is implemented to provide interoperability between the 
heterogeneous Zigbee and Wi-Fi networks, and facilitate local and remote, control 
and monitoring of the home’s devices. A virtual home is implemented for the 
provision of real-time security and safety for the home and its inhabitants. 
As depicted in Figure 5-1, the proposed system consists primarily of four 
interconnections. Remote user can access the system using the Internet. The remote 
user’s communications traverse the Internet until they reach the home network. 
Communications are then wirelessly transmitted to the Home Gateway using the 
homes Wi-Fi network. The Home Gateway hosts the virtual home, which checks 
and processes all communications, as discussed later. Once checked the 
communications are sent to the real HAS and the respective device. Additionally, a 
local ZigBee based remote control allows direct control over connected devices.  
5.4.1 Residential Networks 
As discussed, the proposed system architecture implements a ZigBee based 
home automation network and a Wi-Fi based multimedia network. Alternative 
standards could have been integrated with the home gateway. However, the use of 
Zigbee and Wi-Fi offers certain advantages. As discussed in Chapter 2, Zigbee 
technology is designed for applications that require low data rate, low-cost, low 
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power consumption, and two-way wireless communications. The Wi-Fi standard is 
designed to provide relatively high data rate communications. Wi-Fi has the 
advantage of an existing and wide spread presence in homes in the United 
Kingdom. The combination of Zigbee and Wi-Fi technologies has the potential to 
provide a comprehensive home automation solution. 
5.4.2 Zigbee technology 
As discussed in Chapter 2, ZigBee is a RF communications standard based 
on IEEE 802.15.4. Figure 5-2 depicts the general architecture of a Zigbee based 
home automation network. The Zigbee coordinator is responsible for creating and 
maintaining the network. Each electronic device (i.e. Washing Machine, Television, 
Lamp etc) in the system is a Zigbee device managed by the coordinator. All 
communication between devices propagates through the coordinator to the 
destination device. The wireless nature of ZigBee helps overcome the intrusive 
installation problem with the existing HASs identified earlier. The ZigBee standard 
theoretically provides a data rate of 250kbps, which is sufficient for controlling 
most home automation devices. The low installation and running cost offered by 
ZigBee helps tackle the expensive and complex architecture problems with existing 
HASs, as identified earlier. 
5.4.3 Wi-Fi Technology 
In the proposed system architecture, Wi-Fi is used for two primary purposes. 
Firstly, it is the chosen communication standard for multimedia applications in the 
home. Secondly, it is used to provide access to the home’s HAS from Wi-Fi enabled 
devices, as an alternative to the Zigbee based local controller. This approach is 
taken because, as discussed in Chapter 2, homes increasingly have Wi-Fi networks 
and Wi-Fi enabled devices such as PDA’s and mobile phones. The additional cost 
of a Zigbee based controller in these situations is unwarranted. Moreover, the high 
data rate nature of Wi-Fi allows for greater flexibility in interface design. Wi-Fi 
implements the IEEE 802.11 standard and offers wireless networking using RF 
communications. There are different versions of the 802.11 protocol. The dominant 
protocol in use today is IEEE 802.11g, which operates in the unlicensed 2.4 GHz 
band and provides a maximum data rate of 54 Mbps. 
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Figure 5-2: A generic Zigbee home automation architecture 
The use of Wi-Fi offers several advantages over alternative technologies. 
The Wi-Fi standard is more established in homes in the UK than alternatives such as 
Bluetooth, as a wireless home networking technology. The result is less equipment 
expense for the consumer, and the use of a familiar technology.  
5.4.4 Network Coexistence 
Heterogeneous and homogenous home networks may coexist with each 
other in the same environment. The problem of interference between these networks 
increases as more and more standards emerge which use the same communication 
medium. Technologies such as Bluetooth, microwave ovens and cordless telephones 
can cause interference with Zigbee. However, Zigbee and Wi-Fi can exist together 
with less interference problems than alternative technologies currently available 
(Shuaib et al. 2006), hence offering the best combination available for the home 
automation test-bed.  
5.4.5 Home Gateway 
The home gateway, as depicted in Figure 5-1, is charged with providing 
interoperability between different connecting networks. The home gateway provides 
two primary functions for the proposed architecture. Firstly, the home gateway 
provides data translation services between the Internet, Wi-Fi, and ZigBee 
networks. Secondly, the home gateway provides a standardised user interface for 
devices connecting to the ZigBee home network, remotely using the Internet or 
locally using the Wi-Fi network. The home gateway does not provide a standardised 
interface for the local ZigBee remote control. This decision was made to allow 
greater freedom for interface design and avoid limitations that have to be taken into 
consideration for the design of the low data rate, low power ZigBee remote control 
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interface. Although, as depicted in Figure 5-1, the close cooperation between the 
home gateway and device database allows for the real-time control and monitoring 
of all home devices, regardless of the access device and network used. The home 
gateway is implemented as part of the proposed HAS’s architecture to overcome the 
problem of insufficient network interoperability, identified in existing home 
automation approaches. Moreover, the proposed approach looks at the existing 
network structure within the home environment and integrates predominantly 
established networks in the existing home environment. Additionally, the home 
gateway reduces the inflexibility in the control modes of existing HASs, through the 
prevision of manual, local and remote control. Furthermore, the interface of the 
controlling devices is standardised across the control modes. 
5.4.6 Virtual Home 
The virtual home, as depicted in Figure 5-1, is responsible for the 
administration of security and safety for the HAS. The virtual home, as the name 
suggests, is a virtual environment where the actions requested by users are checked. 
For the purposes of security, all the messages received by the virtual home are 
checked by authenticating the sender, checking the integrity of the messages to 
prevent tampering, and protecting the confidentiality of messages through the use of 
encryption. The system’s safety is protected by ensuring the commands received are 
appropriate for the respective home network and that all changes requested fall 
within the specified safety limits. The primary objective of the virtual home is to 
prevent any event that may pose a security or safety concern from implementation 
on the home automation test-bed. A virtual home, incorporating a simple encryption 
mechanism for providing protection for communications integrity and 
confidentiality, was introduced during the development of the test-bed. The 
development of the virtual home allows the feasibility of the virtual home concept 
and positioning of the virtual home to be evaluated before the test-bed is used in 
experiments and subjected to DoS attacks with and without the novel DoS defence 
mechanisms developed and discussed in later chapters. 
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5.4.7 Device Engine 
The HAS is designed to be flexible, allowing different devices designed by 
multiple vendors to be connected. Consequently, each device incorporates a 
dedicated engine, responsible for providing the necessary application functionality 
and ZigBee network connectivity. Moreover, each device engine may contain 
dedicated security and safety measures. Furthermore, the device engine has code to 
facilitate the collaboration of the devices with the virtual home. 
5.5 Home Automation Test-Bed Implementation 
The proposed HAS test-bed was developed and implemented as part of a 
much larger TSB (Technology Strategy Board) funded project called “indeedNET” 
(Integration and demonstration of energy efficient dwelling networks) (indeedNET 
2007). The author is a member of the team which designed and developed the HAS 
test-bed. In particular, the authors contributions focused on the design of the HAS 
architecture, initial development of a prototype home gateway, software 
development for the home gateway including development of the virtual home, and 
evaluation of the HAS test-bed. Other members of the indeedNET team are 
responsible for developing the hardware aspects of the HAS test-bed such as the 
creation and evaluation of the end devices discussed in the following section, the 
underlying network infrastructure, and development of the final version of the home 
gateway, as depicted in Figure 5-3. The overall development of the HAS test-bed 
discussed in the remainder of this chapter, consists of the authors and colleagues 
contributions. The overall development is reviewed in order to provide the readers 
with a comprehensive understanding of the HAS test-bed used for the evaluation of 
existing and proposed approaches for enhancing the security of WSN based HASs 
in the remainder of the thesis. The source code of the WSN based HAS test-bed is 
provided in Appendix C. The source code, together with the information provided in 
this chapter, allows for the WSN based HAS test-bed described in this chapter and 
used to evaluate the proposed DoS defences, introduced in the following chapters, 
to be reproduced. It should be noted that the source code is provided for the purpose 
of repeatability of the research included in this Thesis. The code is developed as part 
of the indeedNET project, and as such is the contribution of a team of people, of 
which the author is a member. 
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The implementation of the proposed system is illustrated in Figure 5-3. As 
depicted, a ZigBee based HAS test-bed is implemented for the monitoring and 
control of household devices. To cater for the household’s high data rate needs, 
such as multimedia entertainment, a Wi-Fi network is implemented. A home 
gateway has been developed to provide interoperability between these networks. 
The home gateway presents a unified interface for users to locally and remotely 
access home networks. The security and safety of the home automation network is 
realised through the development of the earlier described virtual home on the Home 
Gateway. To demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed test-bed 
four devices, a light switch, radiator valve, safety sensor and ZigBee remote control 
have been developed and integrated with the test-bed. 
 
Figure 5-3: Home automation Test-Bed implementation 
5.5.1 ZigBee Home Automation Network 
The ZigBee home automation network consists of a coordinator, routers and 
several end devices. The coordinator is responsible for starting the ZigBee network. 
During the network initialisation phase, the coordinator scans the available radio 
channels to find the most suitable one. Normally this will be the channel with the 
least activity, in order to reduce the level of interference. It is possible to limit the 
channels scanned, for example excluding those frequencies ranges used by the Wi-
Fi network included in the proposed architecture. However, our experiments have 
shown that the average time taken (to the nearest second) to scan all the available 
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channels is 9 seconds. This scan time is relatively small and as the home 
coordinator is initialised infrequently this is an acceptable delay when contrasted 
with the performance increase possible through the use of a channel with less 
interference. The coordinator is pre-programmed with the PAN ID (Personal Area 
Network Identifier), although it is possible for the coordinator to dynamically scan 
for existing network PAN IDs in the same frequency and generate a PAN ID that 
does not conflict. All home devices connected to the ZigBee home automation 
network are assigned a fixed 64 bit MAC address. Additionally, each device is 
assigned a dynamic 16 bit short address that is fixed for the lifetime of the network. 
At this stage of the network initialisation, the coordinator assigns itself the short 
address 0x0000. After the coordinator’s initialisation phase the coordinator enters 
“coordinator mode”, during this phase it awaits requests from ZigBee devices to 
join the network. 
The ZigBee devices developed for the home network, as mentioned, 
includes a light switch, radiator valve, safety sensor and ZigBee remote control. A 
ZigBee end node has been integrated with these devices. As the devices are started, 
during their respective initialisation stage, the node scans for available channels to 
identify the network it wishes to join. There may be multiple networks in the same 
channel, these networks are normally distinguished by their PAN ID. The node 
selects which network to join based on the PAN ID. The node sends a request to the 
network coordinator to join the network. The request is sent to the coordinator 
directly or through a neighbouring router on the desired network with which the 
node shares the best signal. On receipt of the request, the coordinator judges 
whether the requesting device is permitted to connect to the home automation 
network. The standard implementation of most ZigBee networks prevents 
unauthorised devices joining the network by providing a short user defined period 
when devices may join. This does not provide sufficient network security. To 
enhance the system’s security the proposed system encrypts all device 
communications including the requests to join the home network with a private key. 
Only those devices that are in possession of the correct private key can successfully 
connect to the home network. The devices that are permitted to join the network are 
recorded in the device database and stored on the network coordinator. A partially 
connected mesh topology was adopted for the ZigBee home automation network. 
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Due to the nature of the home environment where communication interference is 
constantly fluctuating, the advantage of increased communication routes available 
through the adoption of a partially connected mesh topology outweighs the added 
routing complexity. The ZigBee coordinator and end devices are composed of an 
off-the-shelf Jennic 5139 modules (Jennic 2009), the code required in addition to 
the previous architecture and description is available in Appendix C. 
5.5.2 Wi-Fi Network 
The homes Wi-Fi network is implemented through a standard Wireless 
(802.11b and 802.11g) ADSL Modem Router, with a 4 port switch. The modem 
provides two primary functions. Firstly, the modem provides the connection 
between the Internet and local Wi-Fi network; hence extending access to the Wi-Fi 
enabled home gateway to any location with Internet access. Secondly, any local Wi-
Fi enabled device within range of the home’s Wi-Fi network can directly access the 
home gateway. This provides a low cost communication method with the home 
network, and reduced infrastructure costs where Wi-Fi devices are already in use. 
The Wi-Fi network was created using no security and a SSID of “home”. 
5.5.3 Home Gateway  
A thorough review of existing home gateway technologies revealed that no 
off-the-shelf solution exists that provides the functionality specified in the 
requirements for the home gateway. This included the provision of interoperability 
between the Internet, Wi-Fi and ZigBee networks. Consequently, a PC based home 
gateway was initially developed, as discussed in (Gill et al. 2008b). Once the 
concept of the home gateway had been tested, a bespoke home gateway, as shown 
in Figure 5-4 was developed. The home gateway consists of a Wi-Fi module, a 
ZigBee node and a power supply. The Wi-Fi module provides low cost, embedded 
Wi-Fi connectivity. The ZigBee microcontroller provides the connection to the 
ZigBee network. The Wi-Fi module connects to the home’s local Wi-Fi network 
and the ZigBee microcontroller connects to the ZigBee home network as an end 
device.  The home gateway once started enters the configuration stage. During the 
configuration stage the embedded Wi-Fi module establishes a connection with a 
local Wi-Fi network. 
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The parameters for the Wi-Fi connection such as network SSID and security 
parameters are preconfigured. Simultaneously, the ZigBee microcontroller searches 
for a ZigBee home network and, as discussed, establishes a connection. As with the 
Wi-Fi module, the ZigBee microcontroller’s connection parameters are 
preconfigured. This concludes the configuration stage. 
 
Figure 5-4: Home gateway 
Once the home gateway has been initialised, an idle state is entered into until 
input is received.   Input can originate from both the Wi-Fi network for input to the 
ZigBee network, or conversely from the ZigBee network for output to the Wi-Fi 
network. Input from the Wi-Fi network normally takes the form of commands from 
user interface devices. The input from the ZigBee network normally takes the form 
of responses to commands received earlier from user interface devices. The ZigBee 
node was an off-the-shelf Jennic JN5139 node (Jennic 2009), the Wi-Fi module was 
an off-the-shelf Digi Wi-Fi module development kit (Digi 2009). The development 
kit allowed the interconnection of the Jennic JN5139 module with the Digi Wi-Fi 
module using a serial connection. The Digi Wi-Fi module comes preconfigured with 
firmware, the only configuration required was to set the Wi-Fi module SSID to 
“home” to allow the module to connect with the local Wi-Fi connection. The 
software required to make the Jennic JN5139 module operate is included in 
Appendix C. 
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5.5.4 Virtual Home 
 
Figure 5-5: Virtual home flow chart 
The virtual home is a software construct developed in C. The virtual home is 
implemented on the home gateway. All communication and instructions are 
checked, as illustrated in Figure 5-5, for security and safety, in the virtual 
environment, before implementation in the real home environment. The virtual 
home waits for input from an external source. All devices on the ZigBee network 
incorporate the ZigBee microcontroller and a dedicated AES coprocessor. Sensitive 
communications on the home network are encrypted. Hence, the message payload 
of sensitive communications received by the virtual home from legitimate sources 
will be encrypted with a valid symmetric key. Once the authenticity and integrity of 
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messages has been established, the virtual home checks the safety implications of 
the messages. After decryption, the destination device address is extracted from the 
message and checked in the device database for its existence. Once the device’s 
existence on the network has been established, the command and parameters 
included in the message are extracted. The existence of the command for the 
respective device is checked to ensure the real device offers the requested 
functionality. The extracted parameters are compared against predefined safe ranges 
for the respective device and command. Only after the message has been processed 
by the virtual home algorithm for security and safety and declared safe is the 
message re-encrypted and forwarded to the real home network device. The virtual 
home is modified in the following chapters, before the evaluation of existing and 
proposed DoS defences with the WSN based HAS test-bed. Consequently, the 
pseudo code of the virtual home is given after modifications in Chapter 7.   
5.5.5 User Interface Devices 
To evaluate the effectiveness of the system architecture for the provision of 
easy to implement, and flexible modes of control; three control modes were 
developed. 
ZigBee Remote Control: A low cost, simple-to-use remote controller, for the 
local monitoring and control of devices was developed. The controller board 
consists of a ZigBee JN5139 node with an LCD display, and four push button 
switches and is powered by four AA batteries (Jennic 2009). Instructions from the 
remote control traverse the home network until received by the destination device.   
Remote Access Device and Wi-Fi Remote Control: A standard mobile phone 
(Nokia N95) with built in support for Wi-Fi and J2ME is used to access and control 
the system. While locally accessing the system the mobile uses Wi-Fi to freely 
access and control the system. When a Wi-Fi connection is not available, the mobile 
establishes an Internet connection to access and control the system. In both 
scenarios, the instructions sent from the mobile phone are received by the home 
gateway, which translates the communication and forwards it to the virtual home, as 
discussed, before being sent to the destination device. The development  of the 
Chapter 5: Design of a Home Automation Test-Bed 
 
-101- 
software for the mobile phone is discussed in Chapter 6, and the software code is 
provided in Appendix D. 
5.5.6 Home Automation Devices 
To demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed test-bed 
three devices; a light switch, radiator valve, and safety sensor, are developed. These 
devices are depicted in Figures 5-6 (a), (b), and (c) respectively.  
 
           
       a.                              b.                             c. 
Figure 5-6: (a) ZigBee operated light bulb in the off state; (b) ZigBee based automatic radiator 
valve; (c) ZigBee safety sensor  
Light Switch: A conventional light switch is integrated with a ZigBee 
microcontroller, as shown in Figure 5-6 (a). In this prototype the user accesses the 
light switch, detect the lights current state (“On” or “Off”), and adjust the state 
accordingly. 
Radiator Valve: A prototype automatic radiator valve is developed and 
integrated with a ZigBee microcontroller, as shown in Figure 5-6 (b). The valve can 
be manually controlled, as are conventional valves, and remotely monitored and 
controlled.    
Safety Sensor: The safety sensor has special characteristics of interest. For 
instance, unlike most devices, the safety sensor has to continuously monitor its 
environment and provide feedback. This reduces the time the device can operate in 
sleep mode, hence considerably reducing the battery life. A safety sensor is 
developed (see Figure 5-6 (c)) to investigate the potential viability of the HAS test-
bed with a mass-market end device that places a large demand on system resources. 
The safety sensor incorporates temperature, carbon monoxide, flame, and smoke 
sensors. 
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5.5.7 System Configuration 
The previous sections have described in detail, the individual elements that 
combine to implement the proposed system architecture. On the combined system, a 
user can login to monitor and control the HAS’s end devices, using one of three user 
interface devices (ZigBee remote control, Wi-Fi remote control, and Remote access 
device). All the messages from remote users, using the Internet for communications, 
are sent to the home’s IP address. The received messages are forwarded to the home 
gateway’s IP address on the local Wi-Fi network, through a Wi-Fi enabled ADSL 
modem. Similarly, messages from the local users, using devices connected to the 
Wi-Fi network for communications, are forwarded to the home gateway’s IP 
address. Once the home gateway has received the messages, they are forwarded to 
the virtual home. Messages from the ZigBee controller are sent directly to the end 
devices, over the ZigBee network. The virtual home checks the security and safety 
of all received messages. The messages that fail to validate are rejected and the 
validated messages are forwarded to the destination device on the real home 
network. All responses from the device (i.e. acknowledgments, device status 
notifications, sensor readings) are relayed from the device, through the ZigBee 
network to the virtual home, through the home gateway, across the Wi-Fi network 
and, where appropriate, across the Internet to remote users. 
5.6 Evaluation 
The implemented system is evaluated both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
To demonstrate the feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed system, four 
devices, a light switch, radiator valve, safety sensor and ZigBee remote control are 
developed and integrated with the HAS. The system is subjected to a cycle of 
strenuous operations to simulate a high level of everyday usage. The light state is 
changed 20 times using the ZigBee remote control and 20 times using the Wi-Fi 
controller. Similarly, the radiator valve state is changed 20 times using the ZigBee 
controller and 20 times using the Wi-Fi controller. The experiments show that the 
devices functioned correctly 100% of the time. Table 5-1 provides a summary of the 
average delay between request and implementation of the requested change using 
the Zigbee and Wi-Fi controllers. 
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Table 5-1: ZigBee and WI-FI controller access delay 
 
  Light Switch Radiator Valve 
ZigBee Controller 
access delay in ms 670 *N/A 
Wi-Fi Controller  
access delay in ms 1337 613 
 
*N/A indicates that the time delay was too short to be recorded by the test equipment. 
As Table 5-1 indicates, the average access delay is greater for the Wi-Fi 
controller than for the ZigBee controller. The ZigBee controller has an average 
access delay of 670ms (minimum 429ms, and a maximum of 745ms)  while 
controlling the light switch, whereas the access delay incurred for controlling the 
radiator valve is small and cannot be measured with the available equipment. This 
implies that the majority of the access delay for controlling the light switch lies in 
the actuation of the light switch and subsequent bulb state change and is not 
attributable to the method of control. This is shown with a N/A in Table 5-1. Taking 
this into account the access delay for the light bulb (1337 ms) can be adjusted by 
removing the 670 ms average access delay attributed to the switch actuation to 
provide a more realistic access time for the Wi-Fi controller of 667ms. The average 
adjusted access delay for the light switch, using the Wi-Fi controller, is supported 
by the access delay recorded for the radiator valve of an average 613ms (a minimum 
of 478ms and a maximum of 678ms). 
The viability of the home automation test-bed is evaluated through the real 
world testing of the proposed system with the developed radiator valve. The radiator 
valve, as depicted in Figure 5-6 (b), is tested in a real test house. The radiator valve 
is located in the test house’s living room, on the ground floor as depicted in Figure 
5-7. The radiators existing thermostatic radiator valve (TRV) is replaced with the 
prototype automatic radiator valve. The local controller is put on a desk 2m away 
from the radiator and connected to a laptop. This configuration allows test software 
running on the local controller to print out the desired temperature set by the user, 
current temperature around the radiator and time taken to reach the desired 
temperature by the automatic radiator valve. Figure 5-8 shows the experimental 
environment. 
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Figure 5-7: Automated radiator valve experiment 
 
Figure 5-8: The experimental environment 
The results of the experiments are summarised in Figure 5-9. The graph 
shows the desired temperature set by the user (Set Point) against the actual 
temperature (Measured Value) of the radiator at a regular interval of 15 minutes. As 
depicted, the actual temperature of the radiator quickly adjusts to the desired 
temperature set by the user, and this holds true for most temperature ranges set by 
the user. However, the actual temperature cannot reach 25 Co , it is surmised that the 
radiator is too small to heat such a large room to this temperature. The evaluation of 
the radiator valve shows the applicability of the proposed test-bed with a real world 
product. The experimentation highlights that a radiator valve can successfully be 
implemented using the ZigBee communication standard and monitored and 
controlled using the proposed system. This successful evaluation supports and 
demonstrates the potential of the proposed system to be easily adaptable from the 
lab environment to the commercial market. Thus, providing an ideal test-bed for the 
evaluation of the existing security approaches and those proposed and presented in 
the following chapters. 
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For the qualitative analysis of the proposed system, a focus group, held on 
the 4th of March 2008, is used to evaluate the end user’s perspective of the proposed 
architecture and obtain feedback as to areas for further development of the test-bed. 
The focus group consisted of ten members from a UK Housing Association (HA) 
who were chosen to reflect the views of the end customers.  From the comments 
made, the majority of participants feel, that the proposed system’s ability to 
remotely diagnose and check potential errors with systems such as communal 
lighting provides an attractive feature. 
 
Figure 5-9: Set temperature and measured temperature 
Currently the HA spends approximately £100k on monitoring and maintaining 
communal lighting. The ability to detect when lighting has malfunctioned without 
physical human monitoring would help the HA make significant savings and 
incentivise the investment and adoption of such a system. Additionally, the flexible 
and extensive range of interfaces offered for the control and monitoring of devices 
connected to the home automation network is felt to be an attractive feature. It is felt 
that this feature benefits people with mobility problems the most. 
5.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has identified and discussed five areas that have hindered 
consumer adoption of home automation technology. Briefly, the areas include the 
complexity and expense of the architectures adopted by existing systems, the 
intrusiveness of the system installations, the lack of interoperability between 
different home automation technologies, poor inconsistent approaches to security 
and safety, interface inflexibility, and the lack of interoperability between systems 
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developed by different manufacturers that utilise the same technology. The analysis 
of the latest home automation research and consideration of the five hindrances 
have lead to the design and development of a ZigBee-based home automation test-
bed. The home automation test-bed was developed as part of a TSB funded home 
automation project (indeedNET 2007). The ZigBee based HAS’s architecture and 
home gateway, see Figure 5-1, were designed and implemented. The development 
of the home automation network involved collaboration between colleagues. 
Moreover, colleagues developed the automated devices, such as the automated light 
and local controller to test the correct functionality of the home automation 
network. The extensive evaluation of the developed HAS, including the potential of 
the HAS as a test-bed for the evaluation of DoS attacks and defences, were 
conducted. The participation in a TSB funded project allowed for the creation of a 
fully comprehensive test-bed that otherwise would have been outside the scope of 
the thesis.   
The feasibility and appropriateness of the proposed test-bed architecture and 
technology has been successfully evaluated both through experimentation and user 
trials. The ZigBee based local controller and remote control have been shown to 
successfully send user commands to the respective device and receive 
acknowledgments of commands in 100% of the experiments conducted. Moreover, 
the experimentation have highlighted the stability of the architecture adopted, 
including the minimal impact of the inclusion of the virtual home on the system’s 
performance. The ZigBee access delay while controlling the radiator valve is too 
small to be recorded with the available equipment. Moreover, the access delay while 
controlling the radiator valve using the Wi-Fi based controller is on average 613ms 
(a minimum of 478ms and a maximum of 678ms). The potential for successful 
coexistence and interoperability of Wi-Fi and ZigBee has been practically proven 
through the implementation of the technologies as part of the HAS test-bed. 
Moreover, focus group sessions have shown a positive attitude towards the 
developed system and significant support for the diverse modes of control, 
monitoring, and integration with existing home networks such as Wi-Fi. Hence, 
supporting the viability of the home automation test-bed for evaluating existing 
security vulnerabilities in the design of WSN based HASs and the proposed security 
approaches suggested in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 6  
Increasing Third-Party Resistance to 
DoS Attacks 
6.1 Background and Motivation 
The literature review (see Chapter 3) has highlighted that the existing 
approaches for remotely accessing HASs take a very simplistic view. The 
approaches assume that an Internet connection with a static IP address is available 
in the HAS’s local environment. In the UK, this is not the case, most Internet 
service providers (ISPs) provide homes with a dynamic IP address, which changes 
at regular intervals or when the home’s Internet connection is disrupted (Bergstrom 
et al. 2001). Consequently, remote users may not have access to the current IP 
address associated with their HAS, preventing them from establishing a remote 
connection. As a result, third-party based approaches have emerged for mediating 
the connection between remote users and their respective HAS. However, third 
party based approaches provide a single point of failure. Moreover, third party 
based approaches neglect the privacy of communications at the third party, allowing 
communications to be monitored and manipulated by malicious users with access to 
the third party (Kara 2001). 
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The objective of this chapter is to present an analysis of existing remote 
access approaches and the design and implementation of an improved hybrid 
scheme for providing secure remote access to HASs. The improved approach takes 
into consideration special characteristics associated with providing remote access 
for HASs, such as dynamic IP addresses. Moreover, the approach is designed to 
offer a robust remote access architecture capable of sustaining greater levels of DoS 
attacks targeted at the third party, whist providing an improved level of service 
availability for remote users. Additionally, the approach is designed to overcome 
privacy issues associated with the existing approaches. The proposed scheme is 
implemented and evaluated on the home automation test-bed introduced in Chapter 
5, further illustrating the effectiveness and practicality of the proposed approach. 
The following section provides a summary of the different types of remote access 
approaches, as discussed in Chapter 2, and identifies the weaknesses for accessing 
WSN based HASs using these approaches. The work presented in this chapter is 
published in (Gill & Yang 2008a) and (Gill & Yang 2008b). 
6.2 Analysis of Existing Remote Access Approaches 
There are two primary types of remote access approaches, direct access 
approaches and third party based approaches. The direct access approaches 
reviewed are designed for high end, resource rich systems and offer varying levels 
of acceptable protection. However WSN based HASs have special characteristics, 
arising from their relatively resource limited nature which culminate in these direct 
access approaches being inappropriate for use. Following is a summary of the 
characteristics identified from the research. 
• Dynamic IP Address: Homes in the United Kingdom predominantly have 
Internet connections with dynamic IP addresses. This is true for both broadband 
and dial up connections, although the IP address may change less frequently for 
broadband connections that are always on. As such, it is not possible for a 
remote user to know their home’s current IP address. Hence, remote users 
cannot make a remote connection to their home using the existing direct access 
approaches. Moreover, to achieve true end-to-end security each local device 
requires a static public IP address. With the limitation on the number of 
addresses available under IPv4 (Internet Protocol Version 4), it may not be 
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possible to assign each device with a static IP address. Although with the advent 
of IPv6 (Internet Protocol Version 6) this problem may be addressed in the 
future, it is still questionable how a mobile client will know the IP address of 
multiple devices. Additionally, the use of a static IP address opens up the home 
to additional security vulnerabilities, providing attackers with a fixed point on 
the Internet to exploit. For example, in the case of DoS attacks the use of a 
dynamic IP address increases the difficulty for attackers, distributed across large 
geographic areas, to identify specific homes to attack. Consequently, even if 
possible, it may not be desirable to adopt a static IP based approach for HASs.  
• Limited Resources: Direct access approaches are generally aimed at high-end 
resource rich devices. Consequently, it is unlikely that WSNs have sufficient 
resources to adopt the comprehensive set of security mechanisms supported by 
high-end resource rich devices. For example, some of the reviewed direct access 
approaches use SSL to provide secure communications and authentication 
services. However, in general resource limited WSNs, such as ZigBee based 
WSNs, do not inherently support the security mechanisms required by SSL.  
• Technical Ability: Direct access approaches place the responsibility for 
establishing and maintaining security on the owners of the system. In terms of 
homeowners, it is unlikely the average user’s technical ability is sufficient to 
manage such a system. Moreover, it is questionable if the users of the system 
alone should be relied upon to effectively maintain the security of potentially 
critical systems. 
Third party based approaches help overcome some of the problems 
identified with direct access approaches. Homes facilitating third party based remote 
access approaches can have a dynamic IP address, due to the use of an outgoing 
persistent connection between the HAS and the third party. Moreover, the emphasis 
on providing security for the system is placed on the third party. This lowers the 
amount of technical ability required by the homeowners and reduces the impact of 
resource limitations, associated with WSN based HASs, on the provision of security 
by distributing security tasks between the HAS and the third party. 
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However, there are two primary drawbacks of third party based approaches. 
Firstly, the centralised third party approach provides a fixed entity on the WWW, 
providing an easy target for attackers seeking to launch DoS attacks. The 
consequences of a successful attack include the potential for thousands of 
homeowners to be prevented from remotely accessing their HAS. Moreover, in the 
case of telehealth systems, where health providers are prevented from remotely 
accessing and monitoring patient information, fatalities may occur. Consequently, 
the vulnerability of existing third-party based approaches to DoS attacks poses a 
significant challenge for researchers. Furthermore, third-party based approaches 
require the HAS to be connected to the third party at all times, making it available 
to the remote user when required. This places a large strain on the third party, 
wastes significant bandwidth, has the potential to cause communications bottlenecks 
around the trusted third party, and reduces the resources available for the third party 
to handle DoS attacks. 
Secondly, the third party based remote access approaches currently adopted 
for accessing HASs, identified from the literature, have a serious security gap at the 
trusted third party. For true end-to-end security, the third party should not be able to 
view messages in transit between remote users and HASs. However, in the reviewed 
approaches the messages between remote users and the respective HAS’s are 
decrypted at the third party to authenticate the sender, validate the integrity of 
messages, and to identify the intended destination of messages for rerouting to the 
correct HAS. Although the third party may be a trusted entity with measures in 
place to protect homeowner’s privacy, it cannot be guaranteed that these measures 
are sufficient. This can be illustrated in several cases in the UK where large 
organisations have had significant breaches in their security procedures and have 
lost large amounts of personal information. For example, Virgin lost a computer 
disk with the details of 3000 customers (ICO 2008), the UK child benefits agency 
lost two hard drives containing personal information including names, addresses, 
dates of birth, National Insurance numbers and bank details of 25 million people 
(Poynter 2008), and the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) lost information on 600 
000 potential recruits (Burton 2008). These examples highlight that even the 
security procedures of large organisations and governments can fail. Furthermore, 
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even where the procedures are adequate, employees of organisations cannot always 
be trusted or relied upon to follow these procedures.  
Consequently, an improved remote access approach is required that provides 
a greater degree of robustness to DoS attacks targeted at the third party and reduces 
the effect of a successful DoS attack on remote users. Moreover, the approach is 
required to provide remote access in a way that protects the privacy of homeowners. 
The following sections introduce the design, implementation and evaluation of such 
an approach. 
6.3 Proposed Remote Access Approach 
The development of the proposed remote access approach consisted of three 
stages. Firstly, during stage-one the existing dominant approach for providing 
remote access to HAS (GHS), introduced in Chapter 2, is modified to create the 
Remote Home Server One (RHS-1) approach. The RHS-1 approach overcomes the 
privacy shortfalls discussed earlier. Secondly, during stage-two a novel approach for 
providing remote access to HASs called the Remote Home Server Two (RHS-2) 
approach is proposed. The RHS-2 approach provides a lightweight approach for 
providing secure remote access to HASs. Moreover, the RHS-2 approach drastically 
reduces the strain placed on the third parties resources. Freeing resources to better 
withstand DoS attacks. Thirdly, during stage three the RHS-1 and RHS-2 
approaches are combined to provide a new and novel hybrid approach robust 
enough to provide the optimal level of remote services for homeowners, whilst the 
third party’s services are under a sustained DoS attack. 
6.3.1 Remote Home Server Approach – Stage One 
The RHS-1 approach consists of the remote client, Remote Home Server 
(third party server) and the home automation test-bed. The RHS-1 approach consists 
of three phases, the initialisation phase, secure session establishment phase and the 
communication phase. 
6.3.1.1  Initialisation Phase 
The RHS-1 approach requires the pre-distribution of two keys. Firstly a 
server master key (KM) is distributed to the HAS, RHS and mobile client. Secondly 
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a client master key (KC
Cryptographic Key and Initialisation Vector Generation Pseudo Code 
) is distributed to the HAS and mobile client. There are a 
number of methods for generating and distributing secret keys. A discussion of 
these methods is outside the scope of this thesis. For the proposed approach, a 
secure random key generator application is used to generate the master keys. The 
keys are then manually distributed by the homeowner to the respective entities. The 
master keys are generated and distributed depending on how often the homeowners 
wish to change the master keys. The more often the master keys are changed and 
distributed the more secure the system will remain. However, as with the renewal of 
keys for existing wireless technologies available in homes, such as Wi-Fi, a 
relatively infrequent distribution of keys is sufficient for HASs. Consequently, the 
manual distribution method offers a relatively cheap and efficient method for key 
distribution. The pseudo code for the secure cryptographic key generation algorithm 
is depicted in Figure 6-1. 
Step 1. Call the function to securely generate a 16 byte AES cryptographic key 
Function GenerateKey () 
{ 
Step 2. Generate a secure random value longer than 16 bytes 
SecureRandom sr = new SecureRandom();  
Step 3. Initialise the master key and initialisation vector with data from the secure random  
             value 
masterKey = new byte[16];                            
sr.nextBytes(masterKey); 
initilisationVector = new byte[13]; 
sr.nextBytes(initilisationVector); 
} 
Figure 6-1: The pseudo code for generating the cryptographic keys and initialisation vectors 
 
6.3.1.2 Secure Session Establishment Phase 
To increase the security of the system, the previously distributed master keys 
are used to distribute randomly generated session keys. This reduces the amount of 
cipher text sent across the Internet encrypted with the master keys, which can be 
analysed to derive the master keys. Consequently, the master keys need to be 
changed less frequently. The general procedure for securely distributing two session 
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keys between two participants, participant A acting as the client and participant B 
acting as the server, is as follows: 
Participant A generates a random number called a Nonce and encrypts it 
with KM. The encrypted message is sent to Participant B. Participant B decrypts the 
incoming message and increments the extracted Nonce and randomly generates a 
session key (KSA). Both the Nonce and session key are encrypted with the 
previously distributed KM and sent to participant A. Participant A decrypts the 
incoming message and increments the Nonce and encrypts it with the received 
session key KSA, before returning the message to participant B. Once participant B 
has successfully decrypted the message and established that the nonce has been 
successfully incremented, session keys have been successfully exchanged and a 
secure session between participant A and B has been established. All future 
communications between participant A and B will be encrypted with KSA, providing 
message confidentiality. Only entities with the KM 
 
can communicate with each 
other, helping authenticate participants. Moreover, the use of the Nonce when  
Figure 6-2: Remote home server conceptual diagram 
combined with a unique session key helps stop a potential attacker from 
masquerading as the trusted third party or remote user and replaying messages. 
Each session key is used for “SKx” number of messages, where “SKx” is a 
previously defined number of messages. The system administrator must choose 
“SKx” by weighing up the decrease in performance due to renegotiating a session 
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key with the potential risk an attacker may be able to decipher a session key, if too 
much cipher text becomes available. 
In the RHS-1 approach, the HAS (A) uses the previously described method 
for creating a secure communications session with the RHS (C) (KSA, NA) these are 
encrypted to make message A (MA). When a mobile user (B) wishes to 
communicate with the HAS, it similarly establishes a secure session with the RHS 
(KSB, NB) these are encrypted to make message B (MB
The mobile user creates a direct secure session with the HAS, by tunnelling 
messages through the RHS, see Figure 6-2. As described in the method for securely 
establishing sessions, the mobile client generates a random session key (K
).  
SC) and a 
random nonce (NC), which are encrypted with the previously distributed KC (It 
should be noted that only the mobile client and HAS possess this key) to form a new 
message MC. The message MC is combined with NB, properly incremented, and 
information required by the RHS to successfully redirect the message to the HAS, 
such as a Home ID. This is further encrypted with KSB to form MB 
The RHS decrypts M
and sent to the 
RHS.  
B and obtains MC, NB and the Home ID. The RHS 
looks up the associated connection with this Home ID in the Homes database. The 
MC is then combined with the appropriate NA and encrypted with KSA, to form MA, 
and sent to the HAS. It should be noted that at no time has the RHS been able to see 
the plaintext message between the mobile client and HAS (MC) containing KSC.  
The HAS first decrypts MA using KSA to obtain MC and NA. Once the NA has been 
verified, MC is decrypted using KC to obtain KSC. At this stage both the mobile 
client and the HAS have KSC, the HAS increments NC and returns it encrypted with 
KSC, as before through the established secure sessions, through the RHS to the 
remote client for verification that the HAS is in possession of the session key (KSC
6.3.1.3 Communication Phase 
) 
and ready to begin the communications phase. 
     Once the mobile client and HAS have exchanged a session key this is 
used to encrypt messages, and tunnel them through the existing secure sessions 
between the mobile client and RHS and the RHS and HAS, as shown in Figure 6-2. 
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The secure distribution of sessions keys through the pre-existing secure sessions 
between the client and HAS overcomes the previously identified security gap at the 
third party. In essence a secure tunnel between the client and HAS has been 
established through the pre-existing secure tunnels between the client and RHS, and 
the HAS and the RHS. Unlike the existing approaches, at no point in the 
communication stage is the RHS aware of the session key used to encrypt personal 
information or the information necessary to derive the session key, providing an 
increased level of privacy for homeowners. 
6.3.2 Remote Home Server Approach – Stage Two 
The RHS-2 approach consists of a remote user, RHS and HAS. The RHS-2 
approach consists of five phases, the initialisation phase, secure session 
establishment phase, IP address update phase, IP address check phase and the 
communication phase. 
6.3.2.1  Initialisation Phase 
The RHS-2 approach requires the pre-distribution of two keys. Firstly, a 
server master key (KM
Figure 6-3: Remote home server framework 
) is distributed to the HAS, RHS and mobile client. Secondly,  
a client master key (KC) is distributed to the HAS and the mobile client. The master 
keys are generated and distributed in the same manner as for the previous approach. 
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6.3.2.2 Secure Session Establishment Phase 
The secure session establishment phase for the RHS-2 approach is the same 
for the RHS-1 approach (see Section 6.3.1.2). For the RHS-2 approach the “secure 
session establishment phase” is implemented during the “IP Address Update 
Phase”, “IP Address Check Phase”, and the “Communications Phase”. 
6.3.2.3  IP Address Update Phase 
The HAS establishes a secure session using the previously described method 
with the RHS, using the previously distributed KM
6.3.2.4  IP Address Check Phase 
. The homes current public IP 
address is then sent to the RHS for storage in the RHS homes database. The RHS 
identifies which homes IP address field in the homes database should be updated by 
contrasting the login details of the connection with those stored in the homes 
database. The update period for the home database is “IPx” seconds, this period is 
chosen to minimize the amount of bandwidth used while minimizing the time where 
the homes IP address may be out of date, and preventing a remote user from 
connecting. Once the IP address has been successfully updated by the RHS, an 
acknowledgment is sent to the HAS. This allows any failures in the RHS to be 
detected. This is depicted as stage (1) and (2) in Figure 6-3. 
The remote user establishes the IP address of the HAS through two stages. 
Firstly, the remote user checks to see if a stored IP address, from a previous 
connection is still valid. This is done by attempting to successfully establish a 
secure connection with the HAS at the previously stored IP address. If the device at 
this IP address is not capable of successfully decrypting the message, correctly 
incrementing the nonce and re-encrypting the data the previously stored IP address 
is considered invalid.  In most cases in the UK where a broadband connection is 
available, the IP address will change infrequently and as such in most cases a 
previously stored address will be valid. Secondly, if the previously stored IP address 
is found not to be valid the remote user will establish a secure connection with the 
RHS, as previously described, using KM. The remote user then requests the IP 
address of the home associated with the login credentials used for the current 
connection, from the RHS. The corresponding IP address is returned to the remote 
client from the RHS. At this point, the remote user has a high probability of 
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possessing the correct IP address. However, if the connection cannot be successfully 
established, or the connection is lost the RHS is re-queried until the correct IP 
address is obtained. This is depicted in stages (3) and (4) in Figure 6-3. 
6.3.2.5 Communication Phase 
Once the remote client has successfully obtained the correct IP address, a 
secure connection is established directly with the HAS, as previously discussed. 
However, KC is used as the master key, hence only the remote client and HAS are 
capable of establishing secure communications because no other parties share KC
6.3.3 Hybrid Remote Access Approach – Stage Three 
. 
Once a secure connection has been established the remote client sends the desired 
commands to the HAS and correspondingly the HAS responds by sending the 
appropriate acknowledgements and data to the remote client. This is depicted in 
stages (5) and (6) in Figure 6-3. If at any point the connection is lost, the “IP 
Address Check Phase is re-entered” in an attempt to re-establish communications. 
This approach significantly reduces the strain placed on the RHS, compared to the 
RHS-1 approach and the popular remote access approaches for HASs, which require 
all of the supported HASs to maintain a permanent connection with the third party. 
In the RHS-2 approach, the remote users are only required to connect to the RHS 
when the HASs IP address has changed, since the previous access. This allows the 
RHS to provide services for significantly more HASs and frees up resources to deal 
more effectively with DoS attacks. Additionally, during an effective DoS attack 
against the RHS, all of the remote clients that have previously connected to their 
HAS, whose homes IP address has not changed since the last connection, remain 
unaffected by the DoS attack until the IP address of the respective HAS changes.  
During the third stage, the previously introduced RHS-1 and RHS-2 
communications approaches were integrated to produce a hybrid communications 
approach. The RHS-1 and RHS-2 approaches operate separately as described in the 
previous stages. However, a switching mechanism is introduced at the mobile client 
interface, see Figure 6-4, 6-5, and 6-6, at the home server, see Figure 6-7, and 6-8 
for switching from third party mediated communications using the RHS-1 
communications approach, which offers the greatest security to the RHS-2 
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communications approach, during periods where the RHS is not available due to 
DoS attacks. 
 
Figure 6-4: High level mobile client communications flow chart 
 
 
Figure 6-5: Low-level mobile client and home server connection approach selection flow chart  
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Figure 6-6: Low-level mobile client connection approach switching decision flow chart 
 
 
Figure 6-7: High level home server communications flow chart 
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Figure 6-8: Low-level home server connection approach switching decision flow chart 
The switching mechanism at the mobile client starts with the mobile client 
creating a connection to the HAS, using the RHS-1 communication approach to 
create a mediated connection. After each message is sent to the HAS through the 
RHS a check is conducted to ensure the connection has not been dropped. If the 
connection has not been dropped, communications continue until the 
communication session has ended. If the connection is dropped, the mobile client 
attempts to re-establish communications for a user-defined period of time (tmc1). If 
the connection cannot be successfully re-established, the switching mechanism 
changes the communications approach from the RHS-1 to the RHS-2 
communications approach, for N messages or until a user-defined period of time 
(tmc2) expires. For tmc2 the mobile client continues to communicate using the RHS-2 
communications approach. After this period has expired, the switching mechanism 
returns to using the RHS-1 communications approach to check if communications 
can be re-established with the RHS. If the switch is successfully made, the mobile 
client switches back to the RHS-2 communications approach, sends a message to 
the Home Server to change approaches, and then returns to using the RHS-1 
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communications approach. This checking and switching procedure is repeated until 
the end of communications. 
For the mobile client to form a successful connection with the HAS, the 
home server must be in RHS-2 communications mode before the onset of 
communications. Figure 6-7 and 6-8 illustrates the switching mechanism used by 
the home server. The switching mechanism adopted at the home server is similar to 
that adopted by the mobile client. Initially the home server establishes a connection 
with the RHS. At regular intervals (ths1), amongst normal mediated 
communications, the home server sends the homes current IP address to the server 
for storage. After each IP address update cycle, a check is conducted to ensure the 
connection has not been dropped. If the connection has not been dropped, 
communications continue until the communication session has ended. If the 
connection has been dropped, the mobile client attempts to re-establish 
communications for a user-defined period of time (ths2). If the connection cannot be 
successfully re-established, the switching mechanism changes the communications 
approach from the RHS-1 to the RHS-2 communications approach. The home 
server remains in the RHS-2 communication mode until the mobile client sends the 
home server a message to switch back to the RHS-1 communication approach or 
until a user defined timeout (ths3
The next section introduces the implementation of the proposed RHS-1 and 
RHS-2 hybrid communications approach. Followed by the analysis of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the proposed and existing access approaches, and the evaluation 
of the proposed hybrid remote access approach as a means to overcome these 
weaknesses and provide a remote access approach more resilient to DoS attacks.  
) is triggered after a period of inactivity. 
6.4 Remote Access Approach Implementation 
As depicted in Figure 6-9 the hybrid RHS-1 and RHS-2 approach consists of 
five components. There is the RHS client that resides on the remote user’s mobile 
device. There is the RHS and RHS Database Sever that reside on the high-end 
servers of a trusted third party. Finally, there is the Local Home Client and Local 
Home Server that reside on a home gateway, discussed later, that forms the 
connection between the RHS and the home automation test-bed, which resides in  
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Figure 6-9: Remote home server system architecture 
the home environment. This section reviews the detailed hardware and software 
implementation of the conceptual design of the hybrid RHS-1 and RHS-2 approach 
described in the previous section. For more information regarding the design and 
implementation of the home automation test-bed, please refer to Chapter 5. 
6.4.1 RHS Client 
The RHS client is implemented on a standard mobile phone as a J2ME 
MIDlet, as depicted in Figure 6-10. The MIDlet is used to provide the TCP 
connectivity with the RHS during RHS-1 communications and with the RHS and 
HAS during RHS-2 communications. Moreover, the MIDlet provides the remote 
user interface for the HAS. The security functions are implemented by integrating 
the free source Bouncy Castle API with the MIDlet. The use of the Bouncy Castle 
(Bouncycastle 2009) API allows for the use of a well-established and tested security 
API. In addition, the previously discussed mobile client switching mechanism is 
implemented as part of the Java MIDlet. The pseudo code for the mobile client is 
depicted in Figure 6-11 (a) and (b).   
 
Figure 6-10 RHS client interface on mobile phone 
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6.4.2 Remote Home Server 
The RHS is implemented on a standard laptop. The RHS is coded in C# 
using the .NET Framework 2.0. Although the .NET Framework provides its own 
security libraries, resource limitations posed by the home automation test-bed, as 
discussed later, mean that the .NET framework libraries do not provide the 
encryption algorithms required.  As a result, the C # implementation of the Bouncy 
Castle API is used to provide the required security functionality. A crucial 
component of the RHS is the RHS database server. The database maintains 
information on all the connected homes. The database is implemented using 
Microsoft SQL server 2005. The RHS mediates communications between the 
remote client and HAS during RHS-1 communications and provides the remote 
client with an IP look up service during RHS-2 communications. 
 
Mobile Client Switching Pseudo Code 
 
Class Mobile Client{ 
 
long timerStart; 
long  RHS-2 connection time limit = 60000; 
int messageCounter = 0; 
 
Function startRHS(){ 
 
while (user input) { 
 
Step 1: Select and establish a connection approach (RHS-1 or RHS-2) with the WSN based 
HAS. Repat this step for the duration of the communication.  
 
string status = “”; 
status = startConnection(); 
  Send (Messages); 
   
  if(Continue using RHS-2 Approach){ 
messageCounter++; 
} 
 
if(status = Connection cannot be established){ 
 alert(status); 
break; 
} 
} 
} 
 
 
Figure 6-11: (a) Mobile client pseudo code 
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Mobile Client Switching Pseudo Code 
 
Function startConnection(){ 
 
Step 2: Check if there is an existing connection, or if a new connection is needed.  
 
 if(Existing Connection){ 
  String decision = “”; 
decision = switchDecision(); 
 
if(decision == Switch to RHS-1){ 
 disconnect.RHS-2 approach;} 
if(decision == Continue using RHS-1 Approach){ 
return(decision);} 
if(decision == Continue using RHS-2 Approach){ 
return(decision);} 
if(decision == Connection cannot be established){ 
return(decision);} 
} 
 
Open connection RHS-1 (IP Address, Port); 
 
if(RHS-1 Connection Established){ 
 return(RHS-1 communication approach started); 
}else if(RHS-1 communication approach failed){ 
 Open connection RHS-2 (IP Address, Port); 
messageCounter = 0; 
timerStart = System.currentTimeMillis();} 
if(RHS-2 Connection Established){ 
 return(RHS-2 communication approach started); 
}else if(RHS-2 communication approach failed){ 
 return(Connection cannot be established);} 
} 
 
Function switchDecision(){ 
 
Step 3: If an existing connection is present check to see of it is a RHS-2 connection and if it 
needs to be switched back to a RHS-1 connection to see if the flooding DoS attack against the 
RHS has stopped.  
 
 if(RHS-1 Connection Approach in Use){ 
 return(Continue using RHS-1 Approach); 
} 
 
if(RHS-2 Connection Approach in Use){ 
 
 if(timerStart  > RHS-2 Connection time limit){ 
 return(Switch to RHS-1); 
}else if(messageCounter > RHS-2 maximum message limit){ 
return(Switch to RHS-1); 
}else{ 
 return(Continue using RHS-2 Approach); 
} 
}else{ 
 return(Connection cannot be established); 
} 
} 
} 
Figure 6-11: (b) Mobile client pseudo code  
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6.4.3 Home Gateway 
The home gateway (See Figure 6-12) connects the HAS with the Internet. 
The home gateway forms part of the home automation test-bed described in detail in 
Chapter 5. In brief, the home gateway provides a mains powered, low cost, and 
standalone bridge between the Internet and the local home automation network. The 
low cost nature of the home gateway and the integration of the home gateway with 
the ZigBee based home automation network provides a good opportunity to test the 
existing, RHS-1, RHS-2 and hybrid approaches with a real resource limited WSN 
based HAS. The resource limitations of the home gateway are listed in Table 6-1. 
 
Figure 6-12: Home gateway 
The home gateway hosts a local home client and home server. The home 
client and server applications are implemented on a single ZigBee micro-controller. 
The micro-controller uses the ZigBee AHI_AES.h library to provide the required  
Table 6-1: Home gateway resource limitations 
Constraint Description 
Memory 192 KB ROM 
96 KB RAM 
Processing power 32-bit RISC processor, capable of 16 MIPS 
Supported encryption 
algorithms and modes of 
operation. 
AES ECB 
AES CCM* 
AES IEEE CTR 
security functionality. Due to the resource limitations, listed in Table 6-1, the choice 
of encryption algorithms and mode of operation are limited. From the available 
selection, the AES encryption algorithm is chosen, operating in CCM mode. CCM 
is a block cipher mode and as such provides both message confidentiality and 
integrity. Due to memory constraints, it is not possible to implement a separate 
encryption and integrity-checking algorithm. Moreover, AES CCM is supported by 
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the Bouncy Castle API for J2ME and C# used on the mobile client and RHS 
respectively. The local home client is responsible for establishing the secure 
connection with the RHS and updating the homes IP address stored on the RHS 
homes database during RHS-2 communications. During RHS-1 communications, 
the home client is responsible for establishing an outgoing connection to the RHS. 
The local home server is responsible for accepting and dealing with requests from 
authorised remote clients for the creation of secure two way communications during 
RHS-2 communications. The pseudo code for the home gateway is depicted in 
Figure 6-13. 
6.5 Remote Access Approach Evaluation 
The evaluation of the remote access approaches consists of three stages. 
Firstly, a quantitative analysis of the performance of the existing and proposed 
remote access approaches, including the direct, GHS, RHS-1, and RHS-2 
communications approaches, are presented. Secondly, to evaluate the remote access 
approaches from a different perspective, the findings from a qualitative study 
examining the strengths and weaknesses of the different approaches are presented. 
Thirdly, the potential of the proposed hybrid approach, designed to overcome some 
of the identified weaknesses, for providing increased resistance to DoS attacks is 
evaluated. 
Home Server Switching Pseudo Code 
 
Class Home Server{ 
long timerStart = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
long  RHS-2 connection time limit = 300000; 
Function startRHS(){ 
 
while (End Message Received = false) { 
Step 1: Select and establish a connection approach (RHS-1 or RHS-2) with the WSN based HAS. 
Repat this step for the duration of the communication.  
 
                                 string status = “”; 
                                 status = startConnection(); 
                             Redirect(Redirect messages received from RHS to WSN based HAS); 
 if(RHS-1 communication approach started  or Continue using RHS-1 Approach){ 
if(Timer != Active or Expired){ 
Timer(60000ms, SendIP address); } 
} 
Figure 6-13: (a) Home server pseudo code 
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Home Server Switching Pseudo Code 
 
if(status = Connection cannot be established){ 
 alert(status); 
break;} 
} 
} 
 
Function startConnection(){ 
 
Step 2: Check if there is an existing connection, or if a new connection is needed.  
 
 if(Existing Connection){ 
  String decision = “”; 
decision = switchDecision(); 
 
if(decision == Switch to RHS-1){ 
 disconnect.RHS-2 approach;} 
if(decision == Continue using RHS-1 Approach){ 
return(decision);} 
if(decision == Continue using RHS-2 Approach){ 
return(decision);} 
if(decision == Connection cannot be established){ 
return(decision);} 
} 
 
Open connection RHS-1 (IP Address, Port); 
if(RHS-1 Connection Established){ 
 return(RHS-1 communication approach started); 
}else if(RHS-1 communication approach failed){ 
 Open connection RHS-2 (IP Address, Port); 
timerStart = System.currentTimeMillis();} 
if(RHS-2 Connection Established){ 
 return(RHS-2 communication approach started); 
}else if(RHS-2 communication approach failed){ 
 return(Connection cannot be established);} 
} 
 
Function switchDecision(){ 
 
Step 3: If an existing connection is present check to see of it is a RHS-2 connection and if a 
switch message has been received or RHS-2 timeout has occurred then switch to RHS-1 to see 
if the flooding DoS attack against the RHS has stopped.  
 
 if(RHS-1 Connection Approach in Use){ 
 return(Continue using RHS-1 Approach);} 
if(RHS-2 Connection Approach in Use){ 
 if(timerStart  > RHS-2 Connection time limit){ 
 return(Switch to RHS-1); 
}else if(messageCounter > Switch Message Received){ 
return(Switch to RHS-1); 
}else{ 
 return(Continue using RHS-2 Approach);} 
}else{ 
 return(Connection cannot be established);}}} 
Figure 6-13: (b) Home server pseudo code 
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6.5.1 Performance Analysis of Remote Access Approaches 
 
Figure 6-14: Comparative analysis of time delay associated with different remote access 
approaches 
For the performance analysis of the remote access approaches, the existing 
direct access and GHS approaches are implemented alongside the proposed RHS-1 
and RHS-2 approaches and integrated with the home automation test-bed. The 
approaches are used to control devices on the home automation test-bed. The time 
taken for a user to login, establish secure communications, and subsequently send 
and receive acknowledgments for three consecutive commands is recorded. This 
exercise is further repeated 10 times. The average results of these experiments are 
depicted in Figure 6-14. As can be seen, the direct access approach is the fastest of 
the four approaches analysed to login, share secure parameters and send three 
consecutive commands in all of the 10 trials, taking on average 2661ms (a minimum 
of 2604ms and a maximum of 2793ms). The proposed RHS-2 approach provides 
the second fastest performance in all of the 10 trials, a minimum of 19,8% (3189ms) 
slower, on average 20.59% (3209ms) slower, and a maximum of 20.80% (3215ms) 
slower. The GHS approach is the third slowest in all of the trials, being a minimum 
of 39.23% (3705ms) slower, on average 45.81% (3880ms) slower, and a maximum 
of 46.60% (3901ms) slower. The RHS-1 approach is by far the slowest in all of the 
10 trials, being a minimum of 86.85% (4972ms) slower, on average 92.78% 
(5130ms) slower, and a maximum of 95.60% (5205ms) slower. From this analysis, 
and based solely on performance, the direct access approach seems to offer the best 
performance. However, due to the characteristics of HASs, where the homes IP 
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address is dynamic and subsequently cannot be known in advance by remote users, 
the direct access approach is not viable for HAS. Moreover, the RHS-2 approach is 
only on average 20.59% slower than the direct access approach on the first login, 
after a home’s IP address has changed. On subsequent accesses, the RHS approach 
uses a previously stored IP address and offers the same performance as the direct 
access approach. Subsequently, it can be surmised that the RHS-2 approach offers a 
good level of performance, whilst also providing an improved level of 
communication privacy for homeowners. Additionally from the performance 
analysis, the GHS and RHS-2 approaches seem to offer a relatively poor 
performance. However, this is only a relative conclusion. In reality, the performance 
of all the remote access approaches may offer an acceptable level of performance 
for users. The acceptability of the different performance offered by different access 
approaches to users is investigated further in Chapter 8.  
6.5.2 Qualitative Analysis of Remote Access Approaches 
Following is a qualitative analysis, where the strengths and weaknesses of 
the access approaches are contrasted in order to evaluate the approaches from a 
different perspective and add to the conclusions from the previous quantitative 
analysis. The strengths of the approaches are conversely the weaknesses of other 
approaches. Consequently, the strengths and weaknesses are categorised as those, 
which during the study were expressed in a positive way (Strengths) and those, 
which were expressed in a negative way (weaknesses). 
6.5.2.1 Strengths of Different Remote Access Approaches 
• Improved Service Availability: The RHS-2 approach stores the IP address of 
previous connections. Due to the nature of broadband connections in the UK the 
IP address of most connections will change infrequently. Subsequently, if the 
RHS is successfully targeted by a DoS attack, and blocked from providing 
remote services to legitimate clients, there is still a significant possibility that a 
successful connection can be established using the RHS-2 approach. Whereas, 
both the GHS and RHS-1 approaches will not function. 
• Distribution of Internet Traffic: The RHS-2 approach does not channel all 
traffic through a trusted third party. Consequently, the risks of communication 
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bottle necks around a trusted third party, such as the RHS, arising from floods of 
legitimate traffic or DoS attacks is reduced.  
• End-to-End Security: In both the RHS-1 and RHS-2 approach, only the remote 
client and HAS share the secret key used to encrypt sensitive data. As such, only 
the remote client and HAS can decipher messages. Unlike existing approaches, 
such as the GHS approach, the third party is not able to decipher 
communications between the remote client and home server. Moreover, while 
the Home Server’s IP address does not change the RHS in the RHS-2 approach 
does not know when and how long remote users connect to their respective 
home server. Thus providing end-to-end security and increasing the user’s 
privacy.   
• Reduced Ciphertext Availability: In the RHS-2 approach, the RHS provides 
users with the home’s IP address. After which the communications between the 
remote user and HAS are direct. Hence, the amount of ciphertext available at the 
RHS for any attacker to decipher is vastly decreased. 
• Reduced Connection Time: The initial connection with the HAS is slightly 
longer using the RHS-2 approach than the direct access approach, see Figure 6-
14. However, subsequent connections are direct until the homes IP address 
changes, the average connection speed is significantly reduced compared to 
other third party based approaches such as the GHS and RHS-1 approaches. 
6.5.2.2 Weaknesses of Different Remote Access Approaches 
• Modem Configuration: Systems adopting the direct access or RHS-2 
approaches require any modem based firewall to be configured to allow TCP/IP 
connections on a certain port. Moreover, NAT must be configured to redirect 
traffic on this port to the home server, which must be located at a fixed local 
private IP address. Although, this configuration is only required once during the 
system’s installation, the third party based approaches (RHS-1 and GHS) do not 
require any such configuration due to the nature of most firewalls and NATs, 
which generally do not apply rules to outgoing connections. 
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• Traffic Analysis: In the direct and RHS-2 approaches, communications are not 
routed through a third party, they are direct with the HAS. This can allow an 
attacker to detect which HAS is linked with a particular user and when a user is 
remotely communicating.   
• Initial Connection Phase Delay: During the initial connection, the remote user 
will try connecting to the HAS using a previously used IP address. If this is 
found to have changed, the system will then perform an IP address lookup. This 
adds an access delay for the connection compared to other approaches. 
However, the IP address of broadband connections changes infrequently, 
therefore the decrease in the average connection times compared to existing 
approaches is unlikely to have a significant impact on the remote access 
performance. 
• Home Server Security Resource Constraints: The home server is considerably 
more resource constrained than the RHS. As a result, the security mechanisms 
employed on the home server do not provide the same level of security as those 
employed on the RHS. Consequently, the lightweight RHS-2 access approach 
and other direct access approaches are not suitable for home automation 
applications where security is of greater importance than the speed of 
operations. In such situations, the third party based approaches (RHS-1 and 
GHS) offer remote access approaches that provide more advanced security 
mechanisms. 
• Home Server Security Expertise Constraints: In the direct access and RHS-2 
approaches, the third party (RHS) either plays no role or provides simple 
services not related to the security of communications. The responsibility for 
maintaining the security of the home gateway and consequently the remote 
access approach is that of the system’s owner. In the case of homeowners, it is 
unlikely they have the knowledge to maintain the security of such systems. The 
third party based schemes such as GHS and RHS-1 approach place a greater 
percentage of the responsibility for maintaining security on security experts at 
the third party. Consequently, for critical applications or the protection of 
homeowner privacy the RHS-1 and GHS approaches offer far greater security.  
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• Content Modification Services: There are numerous applications where a 
homeowner may actively wish a service provider to have access to certain 
communications. For example, a homeowner may wish to provide access to 
communications relating to the homes energy usage to third parties that may 
process the data, contrast it with other collected data, and return information that 
is more meaningful to the remote users. However, such content modification 
services are only possible using third party mediated communications such as 
the GHS and RHS-1 communications approaches. Moreover, the dual 
encryption nature of the RHS-1 approach allows information to be made 
selectively available to a third party, unlike the GHS approach.    
The qualitative analysis shows that although the performance analysis 
indicates that the RHS-2 is the optimal approach, from a qualitative perspective the 
third party based approaches ranked at the bottom of the performance analysis, offer 
other benefits such as added security and provision of content modification services. 
It can be concluded that the proposed hybrid communications approach provides a 
more comprehensive solution than the approaches alone. Thus, during a critical 
session, such as controlling a telehealth or security system, where communications 
security and anti-traffic analysis measures are of greater importance than the speed 
of communications, the RHS-1 approach offers the most effective option. 
Moreover, in systems where content modification services are required from a third 
party, the RHS-1 approach offers the only solution. Conversely, during non-critical 
operations, such as controlling a home’s lighting, or where the RHS server is not 
available due to a DoS attack the RHS-2 approach, which offers less security 
however a 48.13% performance increase in the speed of operations, provides the 
most efficient and effective communications approach. 
6.5.3 Analysis of the Hybrid Remote Access Approach 
The analysis of the hybrid remote access approach consists of two stages. 
Firstly, the performance of the different remote access approaches during a scenario 
involving a DoS attack targeted at the third party is contrasted. Secondly, for the 
same scenario the performance of the hybrid remote access approach for dealing 
with the DoS attack is contrasted. 
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Firstly, for the comparison of the performance of different approaches while 
under a DoS attack a scenario is presented, where health professionals remotely 
control a telehealth system. The home automation test-bed plays the part of the 
telehealth system. The remote users use the direct access approach for monitoring 
and controlling the telehealth system. During operations, an unknown attacker 
performs a flooding DoS attack on the RHS, which prevents remote users from 
accessing the RHS server. The attacker ends the attack after a duration of 5000ms. 
The experiment is then repeated 10 times for each of the communications 
approaches, including the GHS, RHS-1 and RHS-2 approaches in place of the direct 
access approach. Figure 6-15 shows the averaged results of the 10 trials, for each 
communication approach. 
As the qualitative analysis predicts, the third party based remote access 
approaches (GHS and RHS-1) fail to provide remote access for the duration of the 
DoS attack during which the RHS is inaccessible, in the case of all of the 10 trials. 
However assuming the home’s IP address is known, using the direct access and 
RHS-2 approaches the remote users effectively communicate with the telehealth 
system, in all of the 10 trials. As previously discussed, the direct access approach is 
not practical for HASs, where the IP address of the home is generally dynamic and 
as such unknown. Consequently, it can be concluded that the RHS-2 approach 
provides a satisfactory communication approach for non-critical communications, 
whilst remaining unaffected by DoS attacks targeted at the third party as long as the 
homes IP address has not changed since a prior communication.  
Secondly, the same scenario is repeated with the hybrid approach in place. 
The hybrid approach adopts the securer RHS-1 approach at the start of 
communications. An attacker launches an effective DoS attack against the RHS. 
Once communications are lost between the remote user and RHS the hybrid 
approach adopts the RHS-2 communications approach. Once the DoS attack has 
ended and the remote user is able to communicate with the RHS, the hybrid 
approach switches back to the RHS-1 communication approach. During non-critical 
communications, the hybrid approach operates in RHS-2 mode. Figure 6-15 shows 
the averaged effectiveness of the hybrid remote access approach during the 
discussed attack scenario, from the 10 trials. 
Chapter 6: Increasing Third-Party Resistance to DoS Attacks 
 
-134- 
During the experiment, the hybrid approach functioned as expected. 
Communications were interrupted, in all of the 10 trials, however the hybrid 
approach automatically adjusted from the RHS-1 approach to the RHS-2 approach 
in all of the 10 trials, taking a minimum of 1648ms, an average of 1770 
milliseconds, and a maximum of 1890ms. In the experiments, the hybrid approach 
retries to connect to the RHS, once the connection is lost. Connection attempts are 
made in the 10 trials for the average time taken to send a command and receive the 
response from the RHS (1533 milliseconds in the experiments). To decrease the 
response time required to react to an attack the time-period a service interruption is 
analysed may be decreased. Alternatively, to increase the accuracy of DoS or 
service failure detection the time-period an attack is analysed may be increased.  
Once the hybrid approach has detected the DoS attack, the hybrid approach 
remains in the RHS-2 communication’s mode for 5 communication attempts or if no 
communications attempts are made until the predefined timeout (60000ms) expires. 
Subsequently, the hybrid approach attempts to detect if the DoS attack against the 
RHS has ended by attempting to reconnect to the RHS using the RHS-1 approach. If 
the attack has not ended the hybrid approach remains in the RHS-2 mode for a 
further 5 communication attempts then repeats the previous steps. The duration the 
hybrid approach remains in RHS-2 mode and the frequency with which the status of 
the DoS attack against the RHS is checked, depends on the respective system 
administrator. A low check rate means the hybrid approach remains in the less 
secure RHS-2 mode for longer, even when the attack has ended. On the contrary, a 
high check rate wastes significant resources and adds an average delay of 1770 
milliseconds in the experiments to each check phase (The delay consists of login 
attempt duration (1533ms), RHS-2 login (237ms)).  
In the first 23 seconds of the scenario using the hybrid approach 14 
commands were sent and acknowledged by the telehealth system, for all 10 of the 
trials. Whereas, in the first 23 seconds of the scenario using the RHS-1 and GHS 
approaches 10 and 13 commands were received and acknowledged, approximately 
28.6% and 7.14% less than the hybrid approach, for all of the 10 trials. Moreover, 
the HAS services were unavailable to the remote users, during the attack, whilst 
using the hybrid approach for a minimum of 2947ms, an average of 3069ms, and a  
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Figure 6-15: Comparative analysis of average time delay of different remote access approaches 
whilst the RHS is subjected to a DoS attack 
maximum of 3189ms, for the 10 trials. During the same duration of attack using the 
RHS-1 and GHS approaches, the HAS services were unavailable for the 10 trials, an 
average of 8467ms (a minimum of 8117ms and a maximum of 8668ms) and an 
average of 7644ms (a minimum of 7549ms and a maximum of 7776ms) 
respectively. The experiments show over a relatively short duration of time and for 
a relatively short DoS attack the proposed hybrid approach decreases the time the 
HAS services were unavailable compared to the RHS-1 approach, in all of the 10 
trials by a minimum of 62.34%, on average 63.75%, and a maximum of 65.19%. 
Moreover, compared to the GHS approach the proposed hybrid approach decreases 
the time the HAS services were unavailable, for all of the 10 trials, by a minimum 
of 58.28%, on average by 59.85%, and a maximum of 61.45%. 
6.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have proposed a novel hybrid remote access scheme, 
which incorporates an adapted direct access approach (RHS-2) for the provision of 
quick communications for low security communications and a third party based 
approach (RHS-1) which provides the securest level of communications for critical 
applications and an increased level of information privacy for homeowners. The 
RHS-2 approach serves to provide communications for critical applications during 
DoS attacks, which disable the third party or prevent remote users from accessing 
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the third party. This proposed new hybrid remote access approach aims to increase 
the robustness of remote communications with HASs to withstand the effects of 
DoS attacks against third parties. Moreover, the proposed approach endeavours to 
provide the optimal combination of security and speed at all times.  
The evaluation of the existing and proposed remote access approaches 
consists of three stages. Firstly, the existing direct, GHS, and proposed hybrid 
remote access approaches are tested and compared on the home automation test-
bed, detailed in Chapter 5. The first research based performance analysis of the 
different remote access approaches identifies that the efficiency (speed of 
communications) differs for the different approaches. The direct access approach is 
the fastest of the four approaches analysed to login, share secure parameters and 
send three consecutive commands in all of the 10 trials, taking on average 2661ms 
(a minimum of 2604ms and a maximum of 2793ms). The proposed RHS-2 
approach provides the second fastest performance in all of the 10 trials, a minimum 
of 19,8% (3189ms) slower, on average 20.59% (3209ms) slower, and a maximum 
of 20.80% (3215ms) slower. The GHS approach is the third slowest in all of the 
trials, being a minimum of 39.23% (3705ms) slower, on average 45.81% (3880ms) 
slower, and a maximum of 46.60% (3901ms) slower. The RHS-1 approach is by far 
the slowest in all of the 10 trials, being a minimum of 86.85% (4972ms) slower, on 
average 92.78% (5130ms) slower, and a maximum of 95.60% (5205ms) slower. 
Secondly, a qualitative study shows that although the direct access 
approaches offer the best performance for homeowners, they provide the least 
security. Thirdly, an investigation of the vulnerability of remote access approaches 
to DoS attacks highlights the high vulnerability of third party based remote access 
approaches to DoS attacks. Hence, the evaluation results support the need for a 
hybrid remote access approach for a comprehensive remote access solution.  
In all of the trials conducted, the third party based GHS and RHS-1 
approaches allowed 0% of messages to reach their destination during an effective 
DoS flooding attack against the third party. The proposed hybrid approach is 
implemented on the same test-bed and shown to detect DoS attacks against the third 
party and switch communications from the securer RHS-1 approach to the RHS-2 
approach allowing communications to continue, in all of the trials conducted. The 
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experiments show that the proposed hybrid approach decreases the time the HAS 
services were unavailable compared to the RHS-1 approach, in all of the 10 trials by 
a minimum of 62.34%, on average 63.75%, and a maximum of 65.19%. Moreover, 
compared to the GHS approach the proposed hybrid approach decreases the time the 
HAS services were unavailable, for all of the 10 trials, by a minimum of 58.28%, on 
average by 59.85%, and a maximum of 61.45%. 
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Chapter 7  
Increasing WSN Resistance to Remote 
DoS Attacks 
7.1 Background and Motivation 
There are numerous approaches for protecting resource rich servers from 
DoS attacks, as discussed in Chapter 3. However, most DoS defence approaches 
perform two abstract functions (Mirkovic 2003). Firstly, DoS defences detect the 
onset of DoS attacks and attempt to distinguish between legitimate network traffic 
and network traffic arising from a DoS attack. Secondly, the defences attempt to 
mitigate any detected DoS attacks. The primary difficulty in dealing with DoS 
attacks arises from the difficulty in distinguishing between legitimate network 
traffic and network traffic from DoS attacks (Mirkovic 2003). Due to this difficulty, 
a percentage of attack traffic is misclassified by the existing defence approaches as 
legitimate traffic and allowed to reach the victim. Conversely, a percentage of 
legitimate traffic is misclassified as attack traffic and subjected to DoS attack 
countermeasures. As a result, to prevent defence measures from completely 
disrupting misclassified legitimate traffic, most defence measures perform rate 
limiting on suspected attack traffic, as discussed in Chapter 3. Rate limiting 
prevents the majority of traffic identified as attack traffic from reaching the victim, 
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however allows a small stream of suspected attack traffic to reach the victim, thus 
reducing the negative impact on misclassified legitimate traffic. Consequently, DoS 
defences do not effectively filter out all attack traffic during a DoS attack. A low-
level stream of misclassified attack traffic and rate limited attack traffic reaches the 
victim. For example, as discussed in Chapter 3, one of the most effective DoS 
defence approaches identified from the research “D-WARD” claims to detect 99.4% 
of attack traffic (Mirkovic 2003), thus allowing 0.6% of attack traffic to reach the 
victim.  
In terms of DoS defence for relatively resource rich computers, the existing 
defence approaches provide a satisfactory level of protection. The small amount of 
attack traffic reaching the victim is insufficient to cause a disruption to services for 
legitimate users. However, in terms of WSN based HASs where resources are 
intentionally limited to achieve the lowest cost possible, the low-level attack traffic 
reaching the home automation network poses a significant threat (Kumar et al. 
2006). The low-level DoS attack traffic reaching the victim is sufficient to flood the 
home automation network’s limited bandwidth resources and quickly exhaust the 
scarce, non-renewable, power sources of intermediate nodes. Moreover, low-level 
DoS attacks targeting the resources at the point of ingress between the home 
automation network and the Internet (Home Gateway) are sufficient to prevent 
remote users from communicating with the HAS, as identified from the literature 
review (see Chapter 3) and experimentally evaluated and confirmed later in this 
chapter. 
 
Figure 7-1: Existing DoS defence measure protecting a WSN 
For example, Figure 7-1 depicts a user and attacker remotely communicating 
with a WSN. The WSN supports a maximum data rate of 16 KB/s. Let us assume 
that in this example the previously discussed D-WARD defence mechanism, which 
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is claimed to detect 99.4% of attack traffic, is employed.  To exhaust the 16 KB/s of 
bandwidth provided by the WSN, the attacker needs to launch an attack of 
approximately 2.6MB/s. This level of an attack allows 16 KB/s of misclassified 
attack traffic to reach and disrupt the WSN, preventing local users from accessing 
the WSN in a timely manner. Moreover, such an attack overwhelms the home 
gateway and prevents remote users from accessing the WSN for the duration of the 
attack. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the home automation test-bed adopts the ZigBee 
WSN standard based on the IEEE 802.15.4 low data rate WSN standard. Table 7-1 
summarises the different data rates supported by the IEEE 802.15.4 standard and the 
respective theoretical attack size required to exhaust the available bandwidth of an 
unprotected IEEE 802.15.4 based WSN, and an IEEE 802.15.4 WSN protected by 
D-WARD, which filters 99.4% of attack traffic. 
Table 7-1: Attack size required to exhaust the available bandwidth of an unprotected and 
protected ZigBee based WSN   
IEEE 802.15.4  
Frequency 
Band 
Available Bandwidth 
(Maximum Data Rate - 
KB/Sec) 
Theoretical Size of Attack Required to Exhaust 
the Available Bandwidth (KB/Sec) 
No Defences D-Ward DoS Defences 
868 – 870 MHz 2.4 2.4 406.9 
902 – 928 MHz 4.9 4.9 813.8 
2.4 GHz 30.5 30.5 5086.3 
 
Table 7-2: Available broadband speeds in the 2009 UK market 
Broadband Speed (Mb/s) Broadband Speed (KB/s) 
2 256 
4 512 
8 1024 
12 1536 
20 2560 
50 6400 
Table 7-2 highlights the broadband speeds available in the UK during 2009. 
Most ISP’s provide an 8Mb/s broadband service, which implies that a sufficiently 
large DoS attack can be launched against a significant number of homes in the UK 
to exhaust the available bandwidth of all unprotected ZigBee networks. Moreover, 
an attack against a significant number home in the UK with DoS defences in place 
can exhaust the available bandwidth of all connected ZigBee networks, except those 
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adopting the 2.4 GHz frequency. Furthermore, in countries where broadband speeds 
are more developed than the UK and in the near future, when 50Mb/s broadband 
connection speed is widely adopted in the UK, all ZigBee WSNs will be vulnerable 
to remote low-level DoS attacks, even if the existing DoS defence approaches are 
adopted. Additionally, for low data rate WSNs, such as those based on the IEEE 
802.15.4 standard, low cost and low energy consumption are fundamental design 
principles. Consequently, future developments leading to the increase in the data 
rate of WSNs cannot be relied on to provide protection for WSN based HASs 
(Raymond et al. 2008) from more aggressive low level DoS attacks as broadband 
speed increases further. 
The objective of this chapter is to introduce the design, implementation and 
evaluation of a novel third party based approach for mitigating low-level DoS 
attacks targeted at WSN based HASs and the respective remote access 
infrastructure. The evaluation includes assessing the effectiveness of existing DoS 
defence approaches for protecting WSN based HASs and identifying the effects of 
low-level attack traffic, which existing defence mechanisms allow to reach the 
victim, on WSN based HASs. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the proposed 
defence approach in unison with the existing defence approaches for combating 
low-level DoS attacks is investigated. The work presented in this chapter is 
published in (Gill & Yang 2009b). 
7.2 Proposed Defence Approach 
 
Figure 7-2: Low level DoS defence approach for protecting WSN based HASs 
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This section introduces the design of a novel defence approach for 
supplementing the existing DoS defence approaches and providing improved 
protection for resource limited WSN based HASs from low-level DoS attacks.  
The proposed DoS defence approach consists of three entities, the “Virtual 
Home” (VH), “Remote Home Server” (RHS), and “DoS Defence Server” (DDS), as 
depicted in Figure 7-2. The VH is designed to filter out all attack traffic including 
attack traffic misclassified as legitimate traffic and rate limited attack traffic allowed 
through by existing DoS defences, consequently preventing the attack traffic from 
reaching the WSN based HAS. Hence, resolving the threats to the WSN from low-
level attack traffic flooding the WSN. Furthermore, the VH is responsible for 
detecting low-level DoS attacks and providing an appropriate response. The VH 
incorporates a DoS attack detection mechanism and a DoS attack response 
mechanism to achieve this objective. The virtual home’s attack detection 
mechanism works in unison with the RHS’s DDS to selectively deal with DoS 
attacks. The RHS and the DDS help overcome the threat of low-level DoS attacks 
targeted at the point of ingress between the Internet and HAS (Home Gateway). 
These elements and their placement in the home automation architecture are 
described in more detail in the remainder of this chapter. 
7.2.1 Virtual Home - DoS Attack Detection Mechanism 
The remote communications architecture employed in the proposed system 
encrypts all communications between the remote user and the HAS. End-to-end 
encryption is employed to protect the homeowner’s privacy from malicious users, 
see Chapter 6 for more details. This has the advantage, in terms of DoS prevention, 
that all incoming attacks can be detected with 100% accuracy, unless the attacker 
has access to the secret key used for encryption. This allows the VH to filter out all 
non-legitimate traffic at the point of ingress between the HAS and Internet before 
the attack traffic reaches the WSN based HAS. Consequently, preventing the earlier 
discussed threats faced by the HAS from low-level DoS attacks such as exhaustion 
of WSN bandwidth and energy resources. Existing DoS defences do not employ 
encryption for the detection of DoS attacks because the overheads associated with 
encrypting all communications even within a home network are excessive. 
However, the relatively low data rate home automation communications can use the 
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encryption approach with little impact on performance. This is due to the 
positioning of the VH, which allows for communications destined for the HAS to be 
selectively filtered, this is discussed further in Section 7.2.4.  
The DoS attack detection mechanism monitors the following conditions to 
detect potential DoS attacks: 
• Unencrypted incoming attack packets generate decryption errors.  
• Encrypted packets encoded with an incorrect encryption key fail to decrypt 
successfully.  
• Replayed packets, after a session has expired, fail to decrypt successfully. 
• Replayed packets, before a session has expired, generate message freshness 
errors.   
The DoS attack detection algorithm monitors to see if any of the conditions 
arises. The DoS attack detection algorithm repeatedly cycles through the rule below, 
which is based on the previously identified attack characteristics. If any of the 
characteristics are detected and the rule is satisfied, a DoS attack is assumed to have 
started. 
If (DE + DF + RM) > 0 : FLAG 
Table 7-3: Key system parameters 
Parameter Definition Default Value 
DE Number of decryption 
errors in a given minute. 
0 
DF Number of decryption 
failures in a given minute. 
0 
RM Number of replayed 
messages in a given minute. 
0 
Once the rule is satisfied, a flag is set. Table 7-3 provides a summary of the DoS 
attack detection mechanism parameters. Once the flag has been set no immediate 
action is taken to mitigate the potential attack. Instead, a message is sent to the RHS 
to initiate an analysis of the home gateway to identify with greater certainty if there 
is a DoS attack underway. If on receipt of the analysis results from the RHS, the 
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analysis indicates an attack is underway and is significantly effecting the 
communication of legitimate users the DoS attack response mechanism is activated 
to mitigate the attack. If the analysis indicates that no attack is underway or that an 
attack is underway, however the average connection latency for the HAS is within 
acceptable limits the DoS detection mechanism continues to monitor the situation. If 
the RHS fails to respond to an analysis request this may indicate that there is an 
active DoS attack of sufficient strength to block the RHS from communicating with 
the home gateway. Alternatively, the RHS may be offline due to a technical fault. In 
either case, the DoS Attack Response Mechanism is activated. The objective of the 
activation of the DoS attack response mechanism is to resolve the earlier identified 
threats to the home gateway from low-level DoS attack traffic that may prevent 
remote users from accessing the home automation network and maintain effective 
remote communications. The pseudo code for the virtual home is depicted in Figure 
7-3 (a) and (b). 
7.2.2 RHS - DoS Defence server 
The DoS analysis requests received by the RHS are routed to a dedicated 
DDS. A dedicated DDS is employed to prevent any service impact on legitimate 
users using the RHS for communication purposes. The role of the DDS is to 
emulate a legitimate home automation user wishing to remotely access a HAS and 
calculate the average connection latency. The DDS calculates the latency, as a value 
of service degradation, of the relevant home gateway through repeatedly connecting 
to the HAS from a simulated mobile device. An average latency value is calculated 
for all the connection attempts, and if the service degradation exceeds a predefined 
threshold value set by the respective homeowners a message is sent to the respective 
VH to respond to the attack. Otherwise, a message is sent to the VH to take no 
action and continue to monitor the situation.  
7.2.3 Virtual Home - DoS Attack Response Mechanism 
The purpose of the DoS attack response mechanism is to act on the 
connection latency analysis performed by the DDS to mitigate detected DoS attacks 
and maintain effective communications between remote users and the HAS, 
overcoming any low-rate DoS attacks against the home gateway. The proposed DoS 
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attack response mechanism makes use of the RHS-1 and RHS-2 connection 
approaches discussed in Chapter 6. Firstly, under normal conditions, where 
performance is of a greater concern than security the RHS-2 approach is adopted, 
allowing remote users to directly form a secure connection with the HAS, as 
depicted in Figure 7-2 interconnection (3).   
Secondly, under DoS attack conditions the DoS attack response mechanism 
switches from the RHS-2 connection approach to RHS-1 connection approach. A 
message from the DDS triggers the VH to disable all support for incoming 
connections to the HAS and create an outgoing connection to a third party. The 
remote users connect to the third party and create a secure tunnel between 
themselves and the HAS (See Figure 7-2, interconnection (1) and (2)). Experiments 
have shown that the RHS-1 approach is 48.13% slower than the RHS-2 approach 
(See Chapter 6). However, during a DoS attack the effect of the DoS attack 
response mechanism disabling support for all incoming connections is to terminate 
all incoming DoS attack connections. Only legitimate users will be able to switch to 
the RHS-1 connection approach, authenticate with the third party and establish a 
mediated secure connection with the HAS. During a DoS attacks, the switch over 
from the RHS-2 approach to the RHS-1 approach will also disconnect previously 
authenticated connections, requiring legitimate users to reconnect using the RHS-1 
connection approach. However, during a DoS attack the service quality for 
previously authenticated connections will also be degraded, so this solution offers 
an acceptable compromise. All communications to the home automation network 
must traverse the outgoing connection from the HAS to the third party. Direct 
connection requests from an attacker to the HAS are immediately dropped at the 
local network, shifting the focus and bottleneck of the attack away from the WSN 
based HAS. Therefore, the attacker has to launch a considerably larger DoS attack 
against the relatively resource rich local area network to be effective.  
The DoS attack response mechanism switches back to the RHS-2 approach, 
after a user-defined period and executes the DoS attack detection mechanism. If the 
DoS attack is over, the DoS attack response mechanism returns to using the RHS-2 
communications approach. If the DoS attack has not ended the system returns to the 
RHS-1 communication approach. This check is performed periodically to ascertain 
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when the DoS attack has ended and the RHS-1 approach can be resumed. The user-
defined period between checking if a DoS attack has ended, is a compromise 
between a shorter delay, which generates more interruptions for the active users, 
and a longer delay, which will lead to users using the slower connection approach 
(RHS-1) for longer than is required. If the home gateway cannot establish a 
connection to the RHS (RHS-1 mode), a technical fault with the RHS is assumed 
and RHS-2 mode of communications is resumed. The approach helps provide users 
with the optimal security and service combination at all times. The pseudo code for 
the virtual home is depicted in Figure 7-3 (a) and (b). 
7.2.4  Virtual Home Placement 
As discussed in Chapter 3, existing systems designed to handle DoS attacks 
are predominantly located at the edges of victim networks. Recently new systems 
have been proposed that reside at distributed locations across the Internet or at the 
edge of victim networks. These approaches take a cart-blanche approach to filtering 
network traffic. Existing approaches are designed to filter all Internet traffic passing 
between two points. The proposed VH is positioned at the edge of the WSN based 
HAS. As depicted in Figure 7-2, the VH is installed on a home gateway, which is 
located between the edge of the home automation network and the homes local 
network used to provide access to the Internet. This point is the crucial bridge 
between other networks and home automation network. All the inbound or 
outbound home automation data traverses this connection. Hence, the location of 
the VH allows for the precise monitoring and filtering of home automation data, 
whilst allowing data destined for other networks to be monitored by existing DoS 
defence approaches or go unmonitored. This is depicted in Figure 7-2, a laptop user 
can directly connect to the Internet and be sufficiently protected by existing DoS 
defences without being affected by the virtual home.  
This approach allows for the selective encryption of all home automation 
communications and provides total protection for the HAS. Unless the home’s 
secret key is known by an attacker, no attack traffic is sent across the resource 
constrained WSN. In the worst-case scenario the resources of the VH may be 
exhausted, rendering the remote users without access to the HAS, however local 
users and home automation devices will be unaffected.  
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Virtual Home Pseudo Code 
Step 1. Call the function to analyse the decryption results every minute for the whole time the 
application is active. 
 
Timer(60000); 
 
Function Timer(Delay){ 
 
analysis(); 
Timer(60000); 
} 
 
Step 2. The decryption function is called whenever there is data in the systems input buffer. All 
replayed messages, decryption failures and decryption errors will be recorded during this 
process.  
 
Function decrypt(){ 
 
rawMessage = (inputBuffer); 
message = decrypt(rawMessage); 
 
if(message.nonce not correctly incremented){ 
nonceReplay = nonceReplay + 1; 
} else if(message.decryption = fail){ 
decryptionFailure = decryptionFailure + 1; 
}else if(message.decryption = error){ 
decryptionError = decryptionError  + 1; 
}else if(message.DDSAnalysisResult){ 
switch(message.DDSAnalysisResult); 
} 
} 
 
Step 3. This function is executed every 60000ms, if a potential DoS attack is detected a message 
is sent to the DDS to perform an analysis of the WSN based HAS connection latency. 
 
Function analysis(){ 
 
int Flag = 0; 
 
if(nonceReplay > 0){ 
Flag = 1; 
nonceReplay = 0; 
}if(decryptionFailure > 0){ 
Flag = 1; 
decryptionFailure = 0; 
}if(decryptionError > 0){ 
Flag = 1; 
decryptionError=0; 
}if(Flag == 1){ 
Send(WSN based HAS analysis request to DDS); 
} 
} 
 
 
 
Figure 7-3: (a) Virtual home pseudo code  
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Virtual Home Pseudo Code 
 
Step 4. This function chooses which communication approach the WSN based HAS is 
currently using. 
 
Function Switch(message.DDSAnalysisResult){ 
if(message.DDSAnalysisResult equals “switch”){ 
Switch to using the third party RHS-1 Approach();   //Stop support for incoming 
connections 
}else if (message.DDSAnalysisResult equals “do not switch”){ 
Do not switch communications approach();               //Continue using direct 
RHS-2 approach 
} 
} 
Figure 7-3: (b) Virtual home pseudo code 
 
 
7.3 Implementation of the Proposed Defence Approach 
This section describes in detail the implementation of the proposed low-level 
DoS attack defence approach, discussed in the previous section, and the 
development of an attack tool designed to launch low-level DoS attacks and test the 
proposed defence approach. Figure 7-4 provides an overview of the implementation 
architecture of the proposed defence and attack tool. Due to the close integration of 
the proposed defence approach and the previously discussed remote access 
approaches (RHS-1 and RHS-2), a number of the implemented components of the  
 
Figure 7-4: Low level DoS defence approach system architecture 
proposed defence strategy overlap with those developed for other approaches and 
are  consequently described in greater detail in Chapters 5 and 6. 
As depicted in Figure 7-4, the DoS defence strategy consists of four 
components. Firstly, the RHS client is installed on the user’s mobile phone, which 
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provides a graphical interface and allows users to initiate a RHS-1 or RHS-2 
connection with the HAS. Secondly, the RHS is installed on the resource rich 
servers of a trusted third party and takes part in the RHS-1 and RHS-2 
communication approaches. Thirdly, the DDS is hosted alongside the RHS and is 
responsible for calculating the average connection latency for a HAS, to help 
identify HASs under a DoS attack. Fourthly, there is the home gateway, which hosts 
the VH and provides the DoS detection and resolution mechanisms. Additionally, 
an attack tool has been developed to launch low-level DoS attacks against the home 
automation test-bed to validate the effectiveness of such attacks against WSNs and 
to evaluate the implemented defence approach. 
This section presents the implementation of the proposed components new 
to the low-level DoS defence approach or those modified from previous approaches 
including the DDS and attack tool. For information regarding the implementation of 
the RHS Client, Remote Home Server, and Home Gateway please refer to Chapter 
6. Moreover, for more information regarding the implementation of the home 
automation test-bed please refer to Chapter 5. 
7.3.1 DoS Defence Server 
A standard laptop hosts the DDS. The DDS consists of a Java midlet and a 
simulated mobile phone. The NetBeans mobility pack 5.5 is used to simulate a 
mobile phone on which the midlet runs. The midlet attempts to initiate a predefined 
number of connections to the home gateway and calculate the average connection 
latency. Moreover, the DDS is pre-programmed by users with a predefined latency 
threshold. Once the connection latency threshold is passed, the midlet creates a TCP 
connection to the RHS and advises the respective HAS to change communication 
approaches from RHS-2 to RHS-1. Otherwise, the DDS informs the respective HAS 
to continue using the RHS-2 communications approach. The pseudo code for the 
DDS is depicted in Figure 7-5.  
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Distributed Denial of attack Defence Server (DDS) Pseudo Code 
Step 1. Call the function to analyse the respective homes connection latency 
 
Function latencyCheck(){ 
 
long averagelatency = 0; 
long sumLatency = 0;  
int NumberofChecks = 50; 
int counter = 0; 
 
Step 2. Emulate a mobile user by connecting to the respective WSN based HAS and summing 
the connection latency. 
while(counter < NumberofChecks){ 
Thread.sleep(1000);  //adds a 1000 ms delay between connection attempts 
long startTest = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
long endTest = send(message);  //The send message returns the system time when 
the    
                                                 //send completes, including connection times. 
sumLatency = sumLatency + (endTest-startTest); 
counter++ 
 
} 
 
Step 3. Calculate the average connection latency and compare the result with the predefined 
latency threshold value and inform the WSN based HAS of the findings.  
averageLatency = (sumLatecy/NumberofChecks); 
If(averageLatency >= 3000){ 
Send(switch message to WSN based HAS); 
}else{ 
Send(latency below threshold message to WSN based HAS); 
} 
 
} 
Figure 7-5: Distributed denial of attack defence server pseudo code 
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7.3.2 Attack Tool 
A Java based attack tool was developed to evaluate the effectiveness of low-
level DoS attacks against WSNs protected with, existing DoS defences, and WSNs 
protected with existing defences and the proposed defence approach.  
Attacker Pseudo Code 
Step 1. Call the attack function to begin the attack 
Function Attack (String attackType) 
{ 
Step 2. Based on the attack type requested, generate and initialise the attack data 
String attackMessage = “”; 
If(attackType == “UnencryptedDataAttack”){ 
attackMessage = UnencryptedDATA; 
} 
If(attackType == “IncorrectlyEncryptedDataAttack”){ 
attackMessage = IncorrectlyEncryptedData; 
} 
If(attackType == “CapturedDataReplayAttack”){ 
attackMessage = ReplayedEncryptedData; 
} 
Step 3. Commence the attack until the attacker decides to halt the attack 
Boolean attackStatus = true; 
while (attackStatus) { 
Open connection to victim (IP Address, Port) 
Send(attackMessage); 
Close connection to victim(IP Address, Port) 
If(stopAttack){ 
attackStatus = false; 
} 
} 
} 
Figure 7-6: Attack node pseudo code 
To test the effectiveness of low-level attacks targeted at the WSN based 
HAS with the existing DoS defence approaches, the attack tool sends unencrypted 
data to the home gateway, which is subsequently forwarded across the WSN to the 
victim device. Additionally, to test the effectiveness of the proposed defence 
approaches for protecting the WSN based HAS from attacks targeting the home 
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gateway in an attempt to prevent remote users from effectively accessing the 
system, the attack tool launches an application level TCP attack against the WSN. 
The attack tool relies on the fact that the home gateway allows a temporary TCP 
connection to be formed to receive authentication data. If the connection remains 
idle after the initial connection and no authentication data is received the connection 
is rejected. However, the attack tool attempts to exhaust the home gateways TCP 
connection authorisation mechanism, by initiating TCP connections and sending 
message replays of legitimate data, data encrypted with a random key and 
unencrypted data. The home gateway has to validate this authentication information 
before the active connection is dropped. Due to the resource limited nature of the 
home gateway legitimate users may not be able to connect while the home gateway 
is authenticating a large number of connections. The Bouncy Castle API provides 
the attack tool with the necessary encryption functionality to launch the attacks. The 
pseudo code for the attack tool is depicted in Figure 7-6. 
A simple simulation of the D-WARD defence tool is implemented alongside 
the attack tool. The simulation rate limits the attack traffic generated and stops 
99.4% of the attack traffic from being transmitted. 
7.4 Evaluation 
The evaluation of the proposed low-level DoS defence approach consisted of 
two stages. Firstly, the effectiveness of low-level DoS attacks, that existing defence 
mechanisms allow to reach the victim, on WSN based HASs was investigated. 
Moreover, the effectiveness of the proposed approach for protecting the WSN based 
HAS test-bed from disruptions, due to low-level DoS attacks was investigated. 
Secondly, the effectiveness of the proposed approach for protecting the Home 
Gateway from low-level DoS threats, seeking to disrupt the communications of 
remote users, was investigated. 
7.4.1 Analysis of low level DoS attacks on WSN based HASs 
The WSN based HAS test-bed was converted into a star topology configuration. 
The attack tool was used to send attack data to the WSN based HAS from across the 
local network, through the home gateway to the victim. A simulation of the D-
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WARD attack tool removed 99.4% of received attack traffic before reaching the 
WSN at the source network. Ten trials of the experiment were conducted. As 
depicted in Figure 7-7, at the start of the experiment no attack data was sent to the 
WSN. The average packet loss rate for all of the 10 trials during normal 
communications between a local device and the victim device was measured as a 
2.5% average packet loss rate, with a minimum packet loss rate of 0%, and a 
maximum packet loss rate of 3.12%. The attack rate was then increased. For each 
attack rate, the experiment was repeated 10 times and the average packet loss-rate 
calculated. The attack rate stated in Figure 7-7 and 7-8 refers to the effective attack 
rate that reaches the WSN after the existing defence approaches have removed 
99.4% of attack traffic. It was found that for an attack rate of less than 32 packets 
per minute (ppm) the average ppm loss rate was 3.1%, with a minimum ppm loss 
rate of 0% and a maximum ppm loss rate of 3.12%. However, when the attack rate 
was increased to 50ppm, on average 26.9% (a minimum of 18.75% and a maximum 
of 34.38%) of packets between users on the WSN and victim were lost. As the 
attack rate was further increased, the ppm loss rate also increased, for all of the 10 
trials. At an attack rate of 128ppm, an average of 73.5% (a minimum of 68.75% and 
a maximum of 81.25%) of packets were lost, rising to an average packet loss rate of 
86.25% (a minimum of 84.38% and a maximum of 93.75%) for an attack rate of 
256ppm. It should be noted that for all of the 10 trials, as the attack rate was 
increased, the percentage ppm loss rate also increased. The packet size during the 
attack was 133 bytes. Consequently, the experiment suggest that an effective attack 
of approximately 567 (256/60 * 133) bytes per second is sufficient to seriously 
disrupt communications on the WSN based HAS, with an average packet loss rate 
of 86.25%. The attack size required to allow 567 bytes per second to bypass the 
existing defences and reach the WSN at the attacker end is 92KB/s. This implies 
that a far smaller low-level DoS attack can have a far greater effect on the WSN 
than the earlier calculated theoretical attack size required to exhaust the WSN 
communication bandwidth. In the case of the experiments, the WSN based HAS 
test-bed adopted the 2.4 GHz frequency range. As discussed earlier, the theoretical 
effective attack size required to exhaust the available bandwidth is 30.5 KB/s with 
an initial attack size of 5086 KB/s at the attacker end, before the existing DoS 
defences rate limit the attack traffic. This implies that the actual maximum 
bandwidth available is less than the theoretical value stated, or/and that other 
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underlying factors are affected by the low level DoS attack at other levels of the 
WSN stack. It can be surmised that the utilisation of the theoretically available 
bandwidth is considerably lower, when multiple nodes compete for access to the 
communications channel. Moreover, the input buffer size of the WSN nodes may be 
insufficient to handle such large data rates leading to packets being dropped. 
Unfortunately, the lower levels of the ZigBee and IEEE 802.15.4 stack are not 
accessible for testing with the available equipment. Consequently, the underlying 
factors affected by the low-level DoS attack cannot be investigated further. 
 
 
Figure 7-7: Average percentage packet loss under different levels of DoS attacks in a ZigBee 
network using a star topology 
 
The experiment was repeated with the addition of the proposed defence 
approach integrated with the WSN based HAS. Figure 7-7 shows that the VH 
effectively prevented the attack data from reaching and disturbing the WSN. Figure 
7-7 shows during the remote low-level DoS attacks, the average packet-loss rate 
remained at a minimum of 1.9%, on average 4.11%, and at a maximum of 6.9%. 
The addition of the proposed defences, alongside the existing defences, in this 
experiment reduced the percentage packet loss on the WSN, caused by the DoS 
flooding attack for all of the trials. The minimum reduction recorded was of 84.70% 
for all of the 10 trials, with an average reduction of 91.13% and a maximum 
reduction of 95.6% compared to the same trials, with only the existing D-WARD 
defence in place. 
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The WSN based HAS test-bed was then configured using a partially 
connected mesh topology. In such a topology, the end devices have one parent node 
as in the star topology. However, the partially connected mesh topology contains 
routers that can be used to send communication through multiple routes across the 
WSN. Figure 7-8 illustrates the findings from the experiments. 
 
 
Figure 7-8: Average percentage packet loss under different levels of DoS attacks in a ZigBee 
network using a partially connected mesh topology  
As depicted in Figure 7-8, at the start of the experiment no attack data was 
sent to the WSN. The average packet loss rate for all of the 10 trials during normal 
communications between a local device and the victim device was measured as a 
1.25% average packet loss rate, with a minimum packet loss rate of 0%, and a 
maximum packet loss rate of 3.12%. The attack rate was then increased. For each 
attack rate, the experiment was repeated 10 times and the average packet loss-rate 
calculated. It was found that for an attack rate of less than 32 packets per minute 
(ppm) the average ppm loss rate was 3.1%, with a minimum ppm loss rate of 0% 
and a maximum ppm loss rate of 6.25%. However, when the attack rate was 
increased to 50ppm, on average 27.5% (a minimum of 19.25% and a maximum of 
35.00%) of packets between users on the WSN and victim were lost. As the attack 
rate was further increased, the ppm loss rate also increased, for all of the 10 trials. 
At an attack rate of 128ppm, an average of 74.38% (a minimum of 70.75% and a 
maximum of 83.75%) of packets were lost, rising to an average packet loss rate of 
91.25% (a minimum of 85.75% and a maximum of 94.75%) for an attack rate of 
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256ppm. It should be noted that for all of the 10 trials, as the attack rate was 
increased, the percentage ppm loss rate also increased.  
As depicted and analysed, the results of the 10 trials for both the star and 
partial mesh configuration of the WSN based HAS, indicate that the findings are 
consistent. This implies that the limiting factors, which are affected by the low level 
DoS threat resides on the victim nodes parent or at the victim node itself. Although 
the mesh network vastly increases the routes to the victim node, the bottleneck at 
the victim’s parent node or at the victim, results in no improvement in the WSNs 
resilience to low level DoS attacks. The addition of the VH, as in the star topology 
configuration of the WSN based HAS, provides effective protection for the network 
and prevents any attack data from reaching the WSN, during all of the 10 trials. 
This results in no noticeable abnormal loss of packets during the remote low-level 
DoS attack, with the average packet-loss rate remaining at a minimum of 1.9%, on 
average 4.17%, and at a maximum of 7.5%. The addition of the proposed defence, 
alongside the existing defences, in this experiment reduced the percentage packet 
loss on the WSN caused by the DoS flooding attack, for all of the trials. The 
minimum reduction recorded was of 78.34% for all of the 10 trials, with an average 
reduction of 91.20% and a maximum reduction of 95.60% compared to the same 
trials, with only the existing D-WARD defence in place. 
7.4.2 Analysis of low level DoS attacks on the home gateway 
The previously discussed attack tool was used to generate TCP attack 
packets (115 bytes per connection attempt), targeted at the home gateway. The 
attack tool targeted an unprotected home gateway at varying rates between 0 and 
1200 attacks per minute. Each attack rate was trialled 10 times. The results showed 
a minimum latency of 513ms, an average latency of 530ms, and a maximum latency 
of 581ms for the successful creation of a TCP connection during the presence of no 
attack traffic, as depicted in Figure 7-9. A noticeable change in average latency can 
be seen at an attack rate of 429 attacks per minute reaching a minimum latency of 
1679ms, an average latency of 1802ms and a maximum latency of 1870ms. Figure 
7-9 shows that as the attack rate is increased the average latency goes up 
correspondingly. At 1090 attacks per minute, a relatively small attack rate, there is a 
minimum latency of 7130ms, an average latency of 7431ms and a maximum latency 
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of 7942ms. This level of attack, although relatively low, would lead to a substantial 
degradation in service for a system using the RHS-2 communications approach. 
Figure 7-9: Connection latency during differing rates of attack 
Figure 7-10 shows the number of connection failures before a successful 
connection could be established, for different attack rates. As depicted, no failed 
connection attempts were detected during normal operations when no attack was 
underway, during any of the trials. As in the previous experiments, at 429 attacks 
per minute a minimum of 21 connection attempts, an average of 37 connection 
attempts, and a maximum of 38 connection attempts were recorded before a 
successful connection. During a 1090 attacks per minute period a minimum of 78 
connection attempts, an average of 101 connection attempts, and a maximum of 106 
connection attempts were necessary to form a successful TCP connection. 
From the analysis of connection latency during the attacks against an 
unprotected home gateway, 3 seconds was chosen as the threshold value an attack 
would have to reach before the DDS should trigger a response. The proposed virtual 
home and DDS were integrated into the previous experiment setup. Next, the 
proposed approach was subjected to 799 attacks per minute (the lowest attack rate 
which is shown to cause a disruption on the WSN based HAS, from the previous 
experiments) to the highest attack rate that could be generated of 2300 attacks per 
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minute. The attacks were repeated ten times as part of ten trials. The average results 
from which are illustrated in Figure 7-11 and 7-12 respectively.  
Figure 7-10: Failed connection attempts before a successful TCP connection is established 
Figure 7-11 shows that from the onset of an attack (13:33) the average latency 
escalates quickly from 680ms to 3500ms (the minimum latency escalates from 
510ms to 3316ms and the maximum latency escalates from 863ms to 3605ms). At 
this point, the virtual home detects encryption errors and message replays indicating 
a potential attack and requests the DDS to perform a check. The DDS performs a 
check and requests the Virtual Home to switch from RHS-2 to RHS-1. This all 
occurs within a three-minute interval (13:33-13:35 inclusive), in the case of all of 
the trials. Once the switch from mode RHS-2 to RHS-1 has occurred (13:36) the 
protected HAS average connection latency falls to 1515ms (the protected HAS 
connection latency for the ten trials falls to a minimum of 1478ms and a maximum 
latency recorded of 1536ms). The average latency for communications is higher for 
approach RHS-1 than for RHS-2. Hence, the higher latency after the attack starts 
and the RHS-1 mode is adopted, compared to before the onset of the attack, when 
using RHS-2 mode. After a period of 5 minutes (13:36 – 13:40 inclusive) in RHS-1 
mode the attack was stopped. For the experiment 5 minutes was chosen as the user 
defined period the VH would switch back approaches (RHS-1 to RHS-2) and check 
if the DoS has ended. Consequently, as depicted, after 5 minutes the VH switches 
the connection from RHS-1 to RHS-2 mode and requests the DDS to perform a 
check to see if the DoS attack has ended. In the experiment, the attack had ended so 
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the VH continues to operate using the RHS-2 communication approach. The 
average latency after the attack returns to levels detected before the attack (a 
minimum of 498ms, an average of 617ms, and a maximum of 722ms). 
The experiment was repeated (see Figure 7-12) and the home gateway was 
subjected to the largest attack rate that could be produced using the apparatus of 
2300 attacks per minute. Again the experiments were repeated ten times, to form ten 
trials. Before the attack (14:30) the average latency recorded was 819ms (the 
minimum latency was 587ms and the maximum latency was 894ms). The attack 
was started (14:32) and the average latency quickly increased to 17361ms (the 
minimum latency for the ten trials was 16453ms and the maximum latency was 
18020ms). As in the previous experment the attack detection and response 
mechanism took approximatly three minutes to operate, in the case of all of the ten 
trials. The comunication latency for the protected home gateway dropped quickly 
afterwards to an average 1580ms (a minimum latency of 1409ms and a maximum of 
1716ms) consistent with operating in RHS-1 mode. The non protected home 
gateway continued to incur an average latency of 17361ms (a minimum latency of 
13459ms and a maximum latency of 18471ms) until the end of the attack.  
Figure 7-11: Virtual home in operation during 799 attacks per minute DoS attack 
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Figure 7-12: Virtual home in operation during 2300 attacks per minute DoS attack 
Although  at this level of attack the latency rate was not as stable as experiments 
under lower levels of attack, the attack was stopped after 5 minutes of operation in 
RHS-1 mode. As with the previous experiment, 5 minutes was chosen as the user-
defined period the VH would use for switching back approaches (RHS-1 to RHS-2) 
and checking to see if the DoS attack has ended. Consequently, as depicted, after 5 
minutes the VH switches the connection from the RHS-1 to RHS-2 communication 
mode and requests the DDS check if the DoS attack has ended. The average latency 
measured after the attack returned to levels detected before the attack (a minimum 
of 545ms, an average of 620ms, and a maximum of 714ms). 
It should be noted that in the case of all of the ten trials, the proposed 
approach always resulted in a lower connection latency for both sets of experiments. 
In the experiment with a 799 attacks per minute rate, the proposed approach resulted 
in a minimum reduction in connection latency of 56.11%, an average reduction of 
56.71%, and a maximum reduction of 57.77%. In the experiment with a 2300 
attacks per minute rate, the proposed approach resulted in a minimum reduction of 
90.14%, an average reduction of 90.90%, and a maximum reduction of 91.88%. 
This suggests that the proposed approach provides a greater reduction in the 
connection latency experienced by remote users during larger DoS flooding attacks, 
although more experimentation is required in future work to confirm this using 
apparatus capable of generating larger DoS flooding attacks. 
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7.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has identified a new type of low-level DoS attack against WSN 
based HASs. It has been shown that existing DoS defence approaches do not 
provide sufficient protection for WSNs against low-level DoS attacks that originate 
from relatively resource rich coexisting networks, at the point of ingress between 
the WSN and local network. It has been shown that a large DoS attack can be 
executed that will allow a sufficient amount of attack traffic to penetrate existing 
DoS defences to cause a serious disruption to communications on the WSN. 
Moreover, low-level DoS attacks that target the home gateway of WSN based HASs 
have been shown to disrupt the communications of remote users attempting to 
remotely access the WSN based HAS. A new approach, incorporating a virtual 
home and DoS Defence Server has been proposed to tackle low-level DoS attacks 
and experimentally shown to help increase the difficulty of launching a low-level 
DoS attack against WSNs.  
The analysis of the threat faced from low-level DoS attacks and the analysis 
of the existing and proposed DoS defences are conducted on the home automation 
test-bed introduced in Chapter 3. Although the test-bed adopts the ZigBee WSN 
standard, the results are equally applicable to other WSNs. One of the reasons why 
the home automation test-bed is based on the ZigBee standard is because it is a 
relatively high data rate WSN standard with a higher level of resources compared to 
the alternative WSN standards. Consequently, although the low-level DoS threat is 
only evaluated against the ZigBee standard in this thesis, the lessons learned can be 
applied to the majority of other WSNs based on the IEEE 802.15.4 standard and 
those that have fewer resources than the ZigBee standard. Similarly, the 
experiments base the effectiveness of the simulation of existing DoS defence 
approaches on the D-WARD defence approach. However, from the literature review 
the D-WARD defence approach has been identified as one of the most effective 
approaches for detecting and filtering out suspected attack traffic. Consequently, the 
approach is representative of other DoS defence approaches that are reported to be 
less effective. 
The experiments have shown that, as theorised, it is practically possible to 
launch a sufficiently large DoS attack that will permit a low-level of DoS attack 
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traffic to reach the intended victim and cause a serious disruption to communication 
between the entities on the WSN and remote users wishing to access the WSN. In 
the case of the experiments, ten trials were conducted involving a flooding DoS 
attack on a WSN based HAS in a star and partial mesh configuration, with only the 
existing D-WARD DoS defences in place. The experiment highlighted that in the 
star configuration, at the highest attack rate investigated of 256ppm, an average 
packet loss rate of 86.25% (a minimum of 84.38% and a maximum of 93.75%) was 
recorded. In the partial mesh configuration, the 256ppm attack rate resulted in an 
average packet loss rate of 91.25% (a minimum of 85.75% and a maximum of 
94.75%). 
Moreover, the experiments have shown that using the proposed defence 
approach alongside the existing defences, an attack can be effectively detected and 
appropriate resolution measures taken. In the case of the WSN based HAS in the 
star topology, the proposed defence approach has been shown to reduce the 
percentage packet loss on the WSN, during a flooding DoS attack, by a minimum of 
84.70% for all of the 10 trials, with an average reduction of 91.13% and a maximum 
reduction of 95.6%. In the case of the WSN based HAS in the partial mesh 
topology, the proposed defence approach has been shown to reduce the percentage 
packet loss on the WSN, during a flooding DoS attack, by a minimum of 78.34% 
for all of the 10 trials, with an average reduction of 91.20% and a maximum 
reduction of 95.60%. 
Additionally, the proposed approach has reduced the average connection 
latency experienced by remote users connecting to a WSN based HAS during an 
effective DoS attack against the gateway sensor node in all of the trials conducted. 
In an experiment with a 799 attacks per minute rate, the proposed approach resulted 
in a minimum reduction in connection latency of 56.11%, an average reduction of 
56.71%, and a maximum reduction of 57.77%. In the experiment with a 2300 
attacks per minute rate, the proposed approach resulted in a minimum reduction of 
connection latency of 90.14%, an average reduction of 90.90%, and a maximum 
reduction of 91.88%. 
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Chapter 8  
Findings and Evaluations from  
Field-Trials 
8.1 Background and Motivation 
This chapter presents the key findings from the user evaluation of the 
research project. The user feedback extends the black box testing, integration 
testing, and the performance evaluation of the proposed DoS mitigation approaches 
presented earlier, alongside the respective DoS mitigation approaches in Chapters 5 
– 7. This chapter presents the findings from a study to establish the validity of the 
home automation test-bed as an effective HAS. Furthermore, the results from a case 
study to evaluate the performance of the proposed DoS mitigation schemes to 
establish the practical applicability of the approaches is presented. Additionally, the 
first study to examine the potential human computer interaction challenges to arise 
from the adoption of home automation, the addition of remote connectivity to home 
automation, and different DoS mitigation approaches is presented.    
8.2 Home Automation Test-Bed Validation 
A twelve-day field trial was conducted, as part of a larger study into home 
automation, where the system was installed into the home of a potential user. As 
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part of the field trial, the users were given a questionnaire (See Appendix A) after 
the twelve-day trial period had ended to establish if the home automation test-bed 
functioned correctly and if in the opinion of the users the home automation test-bed 
represented a practical, viable implementation of a HAS. Due to the difficulty in 
obtaining participants for the field trial, the system was only trialled in the home of 
one potential user. To extend the study a separate focus group was held, where 
individuals were invited to attend a demonstration of the home automation test-bed 
and complete the same questionnaire as the field trial participants. From the analysis 
of the questionnaires, there was no discernable difference between the views of the 
field trial participants and those of the focus group participants. Consequently, the 
findings from the field trial and focus group studies are grouped together, as 
follows. 
The study consisted of 12 participants. From which, 50% were homeowners 
and 50% lived in rented accommodation. The years the participants had resided at 
their current property ranged from 0-5 Years (58%) to more than 12 years (42%). 
There was a varied range of computer expertise amongst the participants, 42% had 
no or little experience operating computers, and 58% considered themselves 
advanced or expert users. Most of the users had little prior experience with 
advanced home automation technology; the most advanced systems commonly 
included in participant’s homes included Smoke Alarms (67%), Central Heating 
System (75%), Burglar Alarms (58%), and Surveillance System (8%). 
The home automation test-bed endeavours to incorporate existing 
technologies that users are familiar with, happy to use, and has the potential to 
lower systems cost. Consequently, the participants were asked which networking 
technologies were already available in their homes. The findings showed that Wi-Fi 
(IEEE 802.11b/g/n) was the most wide spread networking standard, available in 
75% of participants homes. The Bluetooth standard was the second most widely 
adopted standard available in 58% of participants’ homes. The only other 
networking standard identified to be available in 8% of participants’ homes was 
Ethernet. This supports the incorporation of the Wi-Fi standard as part of the home 
automation test-bed, for use as the point of ingress between the HAS’s, local 
network and the Internet. 
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Additionally, to verify the home automation test-beds focus on achieving a 
low cost approach, the participants were asked the maximum they would be willing 
to spend on a generic home automation infrastructure, excluding any high-end, 
consumer, network-enabled devices such as televisions. Most participants (58%) 
said less than £500, (92%) said less than £800, and only 8% stated they would be 
willing to pay more than £800. This indicates the low-cost concept adopted for the 
design of the home automation test-bed is in-line with the fiscal constraints of 
participants.  
The participants were also asked how willing they were to purchase such a 
system as the home automation test-bed. The majority of participants (58%) said 
they would be likely to very likely to purchase such a system, 9% did not state an 
opinion and 33% said they were unlikely to very unlikely to purchase such a 
system.  
It can be concluded, that the home automation test-bed’s low-cost emphasis 
and integration with existing technologies, which are available in the vast majority 
of participant’s homes, is in-line with the low price most participants are willing to 
pay for such systems. Moreover, the high acceptance of the home automation test-
bed as a potential product that participants would strongly consider purchasing 
suggests the appropriateness of the test-bed for the evaluation of the security 
mechanisms proposed as part of the research.   
8.3 Case Study Based System Evaluation 
The evaluation of the proposed approach for securely communicating with 
WSN based HASs was based on a case study, where users were taken through a 
scenario. The evaluation was conducted in four stages. Firstly, the performance of 
the RHS-1 and RHS-2 communication approaches, introduced in Chapter 6, as a 
means for communicating with a WSN based HAS were evaluated. Secondly, the 
effectiveness of the hybrid communications approach, discussed in Chapter 6, for 
mitigating DoS attacks against a third party (RHS) was evaluated. Thirdly, the 
effectiveness of the hybrid communications approach, discussed in Chapter 7, for 
mitigating low-level DoS attacks targeted directly at the WSN based HAS was 
evaluated. Finally, the users perspectives of the integrated communication system as 
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an effective and secure solution for communicating with WSN based HASs were 
captured.    
8.3.1 Scenario 
The scenario consisted of the HAS test-bed and a mobile phone for remotely 
communicating with the HAS. Before the evaluation the participants were given a 
demonstration of the HAS to familiarise themselves with the system and introduced 
to the RHS-1 and RHS-2 communications approaches. The study consisted of ten 
participants. At the start of the study, the participants were asked to complete two 
demographic questions from a questionnaire (See Appendix B). 
Once, the evaluation was started the HAS was run and participants were 
asked to control the system from a mobile phone. Additionally, the participants 
were informed that the system was currently using the RHS-2 method of 
communications. It was explained to the participants that the RHS-2 communication 
approach retrieves the IP address of the HAS from a third party and then directly 
communicates with the HAS for everyday communications tasks where security is 
not a critical requirement. The users were asked to keep viewing the status of 
devices and modifying devices connected to the HAS. The users were informed that 
a DoS attack would be launched against the HAS and that the system would 
automatically switch from the RHS-2 communications approach to the RHS-1 
communications approach. The attack was conducted for a period of 5 minutes, 
after which the users were informed that the communication approach would switch 
back from the RHS-1 approach to the RHS-2 communications approach. The 
participants were asked to complete questions 3 to 8 of the questionnaire.  
The exercise was repeated, however participants were informed that in the 
second instance the participants should assume that they are acting as a health 
professional accessing highly confidential and critical patient information. 
Consequently, the RHS-1 approach would be used as the securer communications 
approach for communications from the start. As before, the participants were 
informed when a DoS attack was started on the third party (RHS) and that the 
system would switch to using RHS-2 communications. The participants were asked 
to continue using the system until the attack had ended and the system returned to 
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using the RHS-1 communications approach. The participants were asked to 
complete questions 9 to 13 of the questionnaire. 
In addition to the validation of the remote communications approaches the 
participants were asked to validate the effectiveness of the virtual home as a means 
for protecting the HAS from low-level DoS attacks. The participants were asked to 
use the HAS using a local controller to monitor and control devices. The 
participants were informed that the virtual home had been turned off and that the 
system was only protected using an existing DoS defence mechanism. The exercise 
was repeated with the virtual home turned on alongside existing DoS defence 
mechanisms. The participants were then asked to consider the different defence 
approaches and communication methods as part of a system for providing 
homeowners with everyday, high security, remote access communications and the 
potential for the system for protecting WSN based HASs from low-level DoS 
attacks. The Participants were then asked to complete the remainder of the 
questionnaire. 
8.3.2 Case Study Findings 
The case study consisted of 10 participants, of which 40% were male and 
60% female. The participants ranged in age with 10% under 25 years, 50% aged 25- 
34 years, 10% aged 35-44 years, 20% aged 45 – 54 years and 10% aged 55 or over. 
After the study had started and the HAS test-bed and RHS communication 
approaches (RHS-1 and RHS-2) had been discussed and demonstrated, the 
participants were asked how likely they were to adopt home automation technology 
in the future. The majority of participants agreed (20% Strongly Agree, and 40% 
Agree) that they felt they would adopt home automation technology in the future. 
Only 10% of participants felt they would not adopt any home automation 
technology in the future, with the remaining 30% adopting a neutral stance. 
Additionally, participants were asked if they would want remote access to their 
home automation devices, 70% agreed that they would want remote access (40% 
Strongly Agree, and 30% Agree). 10% of the participants stated they would not 
want remote access, and 20% took a neutral stance. This suggests that there is a 
significant demand for home automation technology. Moreover, that there is a 
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demand for people to be able to remotely access, monitor and control home 
automation devices. 
After the participants had used the system for non-critical tasks using the 
RHS-2 approach and experienced an attack on the home gateway and the defence 
mechanism, responding to the attack. The participants were asked if the delay in 
accessing the HAS using the RHS-2 communication approach was acceptable. All 
of the participants agreed that the delay is acceptable (70% Strongly Agree, and 
30% Agree). Moreover, the majority of participants agreed (40% Strongly Agree, 
and 40% agree) that they would be happy using the RHS-2 approach, which offers 
less security and increased performance for everyday non-critical communication 
tasks. Additionally, the participants were asked if they agreed that once the DoS 
attack started against the HAS, that the defence mechanism quickly recovered and 
that the delay in detecting the DoS attack and switching from the RHS-2 approach 
to the RHS-1 approach was acceptable. The majority of participants agreed (10% 
Strongly Agree, and 50% Agree) that the delay was acceptable. However, 30% of 
the participants disagreed that the delay was acceptable and 10% took a neutral 
stance. This suggests, the defence approach offers an acceptable level of service. 
Moreover, the delay experienced by the participants was purposely chosen to 
represent the maximum delay possible with the defence approach. Consequently, 
the delay a user will typically experience may be significantly less. Moreover, in a 
real situation the DoS attack and consequently the defence approach may operate 
during a period of inactivity, where users are not actively using the system, resulting 
in users experiencing no delay. 
The participants were asked if they agreed that the defence approach dealt 
with their requests in an efficient and effective manner. The majority of the 
participants agreed (30% Strongly Agree, and 60% agree) that the system did. 
However, 10% of the participants did not agree that the system provided them with 
a satisfactory level of service. Although it should be noted that 10% represents the 
views of one of the participants. This suggests that the defence approach has real 
potential for further research and the development of a commercial defence 
approach based on the prototype defence approach.  
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The next stage of the study involved the users assuming that they are 
accessing highly personal information and critical service. The users were asked to 
use the RHS-1 approach and asked to evaluate this communication approach as 
before with the RHS-2 approach. 
The participants were asked if they agreed that for accessing critical 
information and services they preferred to use the RHS-1 communications 
approach. All of the participants stated that they agreed (70% Strongly Agree, and 
30% Agree). Furthermore when asked if they would be willing to use the RHS-2 
approach in emergencies, 70% participants agreed (40% Strongly Agree, and 30% 
Agree) they would be willing to access critical services and information using the 
RHS-2 approach in emergencies, 20% Disagreed and 10% took a neutral stance. 
This suggests that although participants prefer using the security approach for 
critical tasks and for accessing personal information, they do not strongly object to 
using the RHS-2 approach infrequently during emergencies.  
The majority of participants agreed (10% Strongly Agree, and 60% Agree) 
that the RHS-1 approach offers an acceptable delay for accessing the HAS. 20% 
took a neutral stance and 10% disagreed. This shows that the RHS-1 approach 
offers an acceptable level of delay for accessing HASs, where security is of greater 
importance than the speed of operations. However, the strength of this feeling was 
less than that expressed for the RHS-2 approach. However, this is not surprising as 
the RHS-1 communications approach is slower than the RHS-2 communications 
approach. However the time taken to detect and respond to a DoS attack is faster for 
the defence approach targeted at protecting the third party, than the previous 
defence approach for protecting the HAS. This resulted in all of the participants 
agreeing (40% Strongly Agree, and 60% Agree) that the delay in detecting and 
switching access approaches (RHS-1 to RHS-2) was acceptable. Moreover, 80% of 
the participants agreed that the defence approach for protecting the third party 
(RHS) from DoS attacks, dealt with all the users requests in an efficient and 
effective manner. This supports the potential for the third party defence approach 
for further research and for the development of the prototype defence approach into 
a commercial solution.  
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The effectiveness of the defence approaches for preventing DoS attacks 
reaching and affecting local communications on the WSN based HAS was 
investigated. The HAS test-bed was subjected to attack traffic without any defences. 
The participants were asked if they agreed that the HAS provided an acceptable 
level of performance. All of the participants disagreed (80% Strongly Disagree, 
20% Disagree) with the statement. The exercise was repeated, however with a 
simulator representing existing DoS defence approaches removing the majority of 
the attack traffic, and only allowing a low-level of attack traffic to reach the HAS. 
All the participants (80% Strongly Disagree, 20% Disagree) disagreed that the HAS 
provides a satisfactory level of performance, whilst protected by existing defences. 
This is not surprising as even with the existing defences in place, the low-level 
attack traffic reaching the HAS is sufficient to degrade the systems performance, as 
discussed in Chapter 7. The exercise was repeated with the existing defences and 
the proposed defence approaches in place to prevent the low-level DoS attack traffic 
from reaching the HAS. All of the participants now agreed (70% Strongly Agree, 
and 30% Agree) that the HAS provided a satisfactory level of performance. This 
shows that the proposed defence approaches offer a valid defence against low-level 
DoS attack traffic.  
The participants were then asked to comment on the general usability of the 
system as a whole, including the different defence mechanisms against DoS attacks 
and the underlying communication approaches. From the participants experience 
with the system most agreed that it is easy to use (10% Strongly Agree, and 70% 
Agree). The majority of the participants agreed (10% Strongly Agree, and 60% 
Agree) that they were comfortable using the different access approaches. Moreover, 
none of the participants disagreed that they were comfortable using the different 
communication approaches. Additionally, the participants were asked if they were 
happy to use a third party, as proposed in the RHS-1 and RHS-2 defence 
approaches. The majority of the participants agreed (20% Strongly Agree, and 50% 
Agree) that they were happy to use such a third party. This supports the conclusion 
that although users are not willing to use a third party, if it reduces their privacy, 
users are willing to use a third party if the communication approach provides 
sufficient protection against eavesdroppers at the third party. Furthermore, the 
majority of the participants agreed that they could effectively (20% Strongly Agree, 
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70% Agree, and 10% Disagree), efficiently (20% Strongly Agree, 60% Agree, 10% 
Neutral, and 10% Disagree), and happily use the proposed approaches for their HAS 
communication needs (20% Strongly Agree, 70% Agree, and 10% Disagree). This 
shows that the proposed approaches were well received by the participants and 
functioned correctly for the vast majority of participants. 
8.4 Human Computer Interaction Challenges 
During the first questionnaire (See Appendix A), directed at establishing the 
viability of the home automation test-bed, a section was included to identify human 
computer interaction issues arising from the provision of security for WSN based 
HASs. The study is the first to identify the issues that users adopting HASs have in 
regards to security. 
The participants were asked to identify the features of a HAS that they find 
most desirable. The majority of participants (67%) ranked security of the HAS and 
their personal information as the number one consideration. The safety of the HAS 
was the second most desirable characteristic, with 50% of participants selecting it as 
their number two consideration. Likewise, energy saving was selected by 50% of 
the participant as the third most important feature. The features participates placed 
the least importance on were Multimedia and Tele-health system, being the 
participants fourth (42%) and fifth (50%) most important features of a HAS. This 
analysis shows that participants place a considerable importance on the level of 
security a system offers. Surprisingly, Tele-health systems ranked last in the 
features participants placed a greater importance on. The consistent reason given for 
this decision was that a Tele-health system would not benefit them directly until old 
age. Moreover, the participants aged 55 and over indicated they preferred going to 
see a doctor or other health care professional. 
There are four primary security threats introduced by the adoption of a HAS. 
The participants were shown a list of these threats, with a description of each, and 
asked to select the threats they had previously heard about. From the participants 
responses 67% were aware that there was a risk of someone illegally accessing their 
HAS. 50% of participants were aware of the risk that a third party might monitor 
their communications between remote users and the HAS. 67% of participants were 
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aware that there was a potential risk to their personal information stored on the 
HAS. Moreover, 42% of the participants were concerned that they might not be able 
to access their HAS because an attacker may launch a DoS attack against their HAS. 
It should be noted that participants were not generally aware of the term DoS. 
However, the participants identified with media stories of attackers launching 
similar attacks against organisations.  
The participants were asked to state which of these issues most concerned 
them. All of the participants (100%) stated that they were most worried about 
attackers gaining access to their HAS and controlling HAS devices. 58% of 
participants chose the privacy threat to information stored on the HAS as the second 
threat they were most concerned about and 58% of participants chose the threat to 
privacy of information passed between remote users and the HAS as the third issue 
they were most concerned about.   
Additionally, the participants were asked if one of the previously discussed 
issues was to arise, how they would like the HAS to address the situation. Most of 
the participants (75%) stated they would like the HAS to address the problem and 
inform them of the problem and any action the system had taken to resolve the 
threat. Moreover, 25% of the participants stated they would like the system to 
inform them of the problem and provide them with a list of possible solutions from 
which they would instruct the system on how best to solve the problem. It should be 
noted that none of the participants wanted the system to resolve the threat without 
informing them or take no action. 
This shows that there is a general awareness amongst participants of a wide 
range of security issues. Moreover, even though the participants don’t have a full 
understanding of all the security issues associated with HASs, they place a great 
deal of importance on a HAS that provides sufficient security measures to address 
these issues. Additionally, participants want to maintain a certain degree of control 
over the security situations that arise. The participants do not simply want to hand 
over complete control to an entirely automated system for dealing with security, 
they want to be informed of threats as they occur, and in the case of 25% of 
participants, select the action the system takes to resolve any potential threats. 
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The participants were asked questions regarding how intrusive they felt a 
HAS might be, and how comfortable they would be having their home environment 
monitored by such a system. The consensus was that the participants would be 
comfortable (17% extremely comfortable, and 75% comfortable), with only 8% of 
the participants choosing a neutral viewpoint. The participants were then asked how 
comfortable they would feel if the information the HAS monitors is stored locally 
within the home environment. Generally, the participants were still comfortable 
(25% extremely comfortable, 58% comfortable and 17% neutral) with this situation. 
However, when asked how comfortable the participants would feel if the 
information was stored or accessible by a third party, the situation changed 
drastically. The consensus was that participants were not comfortable (25% 
extremely uncomfortable, 50% uncomfortable) having their information stored or 
accessible on a third party. Only 17% of users were comfortable with a third party 
having access to, or storing their personal information, with 8% taking a neutral 
stance. Moreover, when asked how concerned participants were about the threat to 
privacy from HASs, the majority indicated that they were concerned (17% 
extremely concerned, and 75% Concerned).  
This analysis shows that although homeowners are happy with their personal 
information being monitored, transmitted, and stored locally, most participants do 
not sufficiently trust third parties to monitor, transmit, and store their personal 
information. Consequently, this finding supports the privacy aspects of the RHS 
communication approaches used as part of the DoS defence mechanisms, which 
although incorporate a third party, do not make the homeowners personal 
information available to anyone except the homeowners.  
The participants were asked how comfortable they were handing control 
over to a HAS. The majority of the participants were uncomfortable (41%) with 
handing over control to a HAS, if they could not change settings the system made. 
25% of the participants preferred to take a neutral stance, and 34% said they were 
comfortable handing over complete control to a HAS. If the HAS gives the 
homeowners greater control to change settings made by the HAS, all of the 
participants (100%) said they would be comfortable (33% extremely comfortable, 
and 67% comfortable) handing control over to a HAS. This indicates that users want 
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a system that makes autonomous decisions in regards to everyday activities, 
however gives ultimate control over decisions to users. This supports the 
applicability of the HAS test-bed design which automates devices, however offers 
users a diverse range of methods to manually adjust settings. This further supports 
the home automation test-bed as a valid means of evaluating the security 
enhancements to the remote control architecture and WSN based HASs, conducted 
as part of the research.  
8.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has focused on the user evaluation of the proposed defence 
system, including the defence mechanisms incorporating the RHS-1 and RHS-2 
communication approaches. It can be concluded that there is a demand for home 
automation technology, and that users desire to be able to control their devices from 
remote locations, such as work or while on holiday. The study has shown that there 
is a general understanding of security issues that might arise from the adoption of 
such systems. Even in instances where this awareness of security issues does not 
exist, users show the greatest concern over security issues and desire systems that 
will provide them with a high level of security. In this endeavour, homeowners are 
willing to accept the need for a third party, as part of a defence system, to provide 
them with added protection against security issues. However, the research has 
shown that there are significant human computer interaction factors that have to be 
overcome for HAS and third-party based communications approaches to be 
successfully adopted, primarily concerned with the confidentiality of homeowners 
personal information. Moreover, the user evaluation has demonstrated the weakness 
of existing DoS defence mechanisms for protecting WSN based HASs and the 
effectiveness of low-level DoS attacks against WSNs. Additionally, the user 
evaluation has shown that the defence system, proposed for securely and remotely 
communicating with WSN based HASs, meets the user’s needs. Moreover, the 
approach provides a system that offers a secure communication approach, more 
resistance to low-level DoS attacks for WSNs, whilst incorporating communications 
approaches that provides an increased level of privacy for homeowner’s personal 
information and which users find easy to use. 
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Chapter 9  
Conclusions and Future Work 
9.1 Summary 
The concept of a home is something that most people share in common. 
Consequently, home automation has the potential to improve the quality of life of 
people throughout society. However, home automation must be adopted in a way 
that provides homeowners with the maximum improvement in quality of life, 
without sacrificing their personal privacy or right to control their home environment 
as they desire. The recent trend in academia and industry to design HASs based on 
low-cost, resource limited WSNs further adds to the difficulty of providing 
sufficient security. Through the analysis of existing HASs, communication 
approaches, and security mechanisms several weaknesses have been identified in 
providing sufficient security, primarily associated with the remote access, 
monitoring and control of WSN based HASs. Through the design and 
implementation of a third-party based secure remote access approach for WSN 
based HASs, it has been demonstrated that it is possible to overcome such flaws. 
Although, the proposed approach has been tested and implemented on a resource 
limited WSN based HAS, the approach is in principle extendible to other WSN 
applications. It can be surmised that the research represents a practical approach for 
the design and implementation of a securer automated home environment. 
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9.2 Contributions and Future Work 
This thesis has contributed in enhancing the security of WSN based HASs. 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the suitability of existing security 
approaches for protecting resource limited WSN based HASs and the associated 
remote access approaches from privacy and availability threats. Moreover, where 
appropriate to develop approaches for enhancing the privacy and availability of 
WSN based HASs and the associated remote access approaches. The main 
contributions and findings from the research are listed below: 
1. The design of a WSN based HAS test-bed for the practical 
evaluation of security approaches. The thesis presents the design of a 
WSN based HAS, with the underlying infrastructure for security 
mechanisms to be added and practically evaluated. The majority of 
existing security mechanisms are theoretically evaluated or tested with 
simulators. The design of a HAS test-bed allows for the existing security 
approaches and proposed security approaches to be evaluated on a real 
HAS, adding to knowledge from a different perspective. Moreover, the 
test-bed allows for the creation of benchmarks from existing approaches 
(GHS and D-WARD) to contrast with the proposed approaches (RHS-1, 
RHS-2, and Hybrid). A summary of the quantitative analysis derived 
from the use of the WSN based HAS test-bed are presented in the 
following contributions. 
2. A comprehensive analysis of remote access approaches and the 
related privacy and availability threats for WSN based HASs. This 
thesis presents the first study to summarise the existing methods for 
remotely accessing, monitoring, and controlling HASs. Namely, the 
Direct and GHS communications approach. The approaches have been 
qualitatively evaluated to highlight the direct access approach is not 
suitable for monitoring and controlling WSN based HASs, due to the 
dynamic nature of the IP addresses in the UK, where the IP address of a 
HAS cannot be known before a direct connection attempt. Moreover, the 
approaches have been quantitatively evaluated to show that the direct 
access approach is the fastest of the existing remote access approaches 
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analysed to login, share secure parameters and send three consecutive 
commands, taking on average 2661ms (a minimum of 2604ms and a 
maximum of 2793ms). For the same experiments, the GHS approach is 
shown to be a minimum of 39.23% slower, on average 45.81% slower, 
and a maximum of 46.60% slower. 
 
3. Identification and resolution of a vulnerability, in communications 
privacy for third party mediated remote communications. A 
vulnerability in the communications privacy of remote users 
communicating with HASs using existing third party mediated 
communications approaches has been identified, at the third party. The 
vulnerability allows users at the third party to view homeowner’s 
confidential information, when it is decrypted at the third party for 
rerouting. Consequently, a secure tunnelling approach for protecting the 
communications privacy of remote users communicating with WSN 
based HASs (called the RHS-1 approach) has been designed and 
implemented. The dual tunnelling method adopted in the RHS-1 
approach removes 100% of the confidential information that is visible 
using the current GHS communications approach.  
 
4. Design of a hybrid communications approach for mitigating DoS 
attacks against a third party during third party based 
communications. During an effective DoS attack against a third party, it 
has been shown that effective communications between a remote user 
and a WSN based HAS can be disrupted or completely blocked. A 
hybrid communications approach is designed and implemented, that 
incorporates the RHS-1 communication approach for critical 
communications. The RHS-1 approach has been quantitatively analysed 
in terms of performance and shown to be the slowest approach analysed 
in the research being a minimum of 86.85% slower, on average 92.78% 
(5130ms) slower, and a maximum of 95.60% slower than the direct 
access approach. The hybrid communications approach uses a direct 
approach to connect to the HAS for non-critical communications (called 
the RHS-2 approach), using the third party as a DNS to retrieve the IP 
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address of the respective HAS only when an old IP address has expired. 
The RHS-2 approach has been quantitatively analysed in terms of 
performance and shown to be a minimum of 19,8% slower, on average 
20.59% slower, and a maximum of 20.80% slower than the direct access 
approach. Moreover, the hybrid communications approach has been 
quantitatively analysed in terms of the improvement of DoS resistance 
compared to the benchmark GHS approach. The results shows that 
compared to the GHS approach the proposed hybrid approach decreases 
the time the HAS services are unavailable by a minimum of 58.28%, on 
average by 59.85%, and a maximum of 61.45%.   
 
5. Identification of low-level DoS attack and the design of a hybrid 
approach for mitigating low-level DoS attacks targeted at WSN 
based HASs. This thesis presents an analysis and experimental 
evaluation of a generic model representing existing DoS defences. The 
model represents the most effective DoS mitigation tool identified from 
the domain analysis D-WARD. The evaluation shows that this approach 
and the vast majority of existing approaches, that are less effective than 
the defence modelled, are ineffective for protecting resource limited 
WSN based HASs. The evaluation highlighted that a flooding DoS 
attack directly targeting a WSN based HAS in a star configuration, at a 
256ppm attack rate, results in a sufficient amount of attack data 
penetrating the existing D-WARD DoS defences to result in an average 
packet loss rate of 86.25% (a minimum of 84.38% and a maximum of 
93.75%). In the partial mesh configuration, the 256ppm attack rate 
results in an average packet loss rate of 91.25% (a minimum of 85.75% 
and a maximum of 94.75%). Moreover, a flooding DoS attack targeting 
the home gateway at 1090 attacks per minute, results in a minimum 
connection latency of 7130ms, an average latency of 7431ms and a 
maximum latency of 7942ms. A defence called the “virtual home” is 
implemented at the edge of the WSN, alongside existing defences, to 
filter all incoming traffic, using a cryptographic approach to remove all 
attack traffic, preventing it from reaching and disrupting the WSN.  
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The virtual home has been experimentally shown to reduce the 
percentage packet loss on the WSN during an effective DoS attack. 
In the case of the WSN based HAS in the star topology, the proposed 
defence approach has been shown to reduce the percentage packet loss 
on the WSN, during a flooding DoS attack, by a minimum of 84.70%, 
with an average reduction of 91.13% and a maximum reduction of 
95.6%. In the case of the WSN based HAS in the partial mesh topology, 
the proposed defence approach has been shown to reduce the percentage 
packet loss by a minimum of 78.34%, with an average reduction of 
91.20% and a maximum reduction of 95.60%. 
 
Additionally, the proposed approach has reduced the average connection 
latency experienced by remote users connecting to a WSN based HAS 
during an effective DoS attack against the gateway sensor node in all of 
the trials conducted. In an experiment with a 799 attacks per minute rate, 
the proposed approach resulted in a minimum reduction in connection 
latency of 56.11%, an average reduction of 56.71%, and a maximum 
reduction of 57.77%. In the experiment with a 2300 attacks per minute 
rate, the proposed approach resulted in a minimum reduction of 
connection latency of 90.14%, an average reduction of 90.90%, and a 
maximum reduction of 91.88%. 
Finally, this thesis has achieved all of the proposed objectives described in 
Chapter 1. Future work in enhancing the security of WSN based HASs should focus 
on enhancing the detection accuracy, and reducing the time delay in detecting DoS 
threats. Moreover, the speed of the response mechanisms once an attack is detected 
can be optimised. Additionally, we hope that the research presented in this thesis 
helps to stimulate research into secure and reliable remote access approaches for 
WSN based HASs. Especially, relating to the threats WSNs face from connected 
resource rich networks, such as the Internet. 
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Appendix A: Home Automation: Questionnaire 
Dear Respondent, 
 Please complete the questionnaire as honestly and descriptively as possible. The 
answers you provide will be vital in the successful development of home automation 
technology that meets users’ needs. Thank you in advance for your time and effort. 
Please answer all questions by ticking the appropriate box(s) unless otherwise stated. 
Section 1: Personal Information 
 
1.  Gender 
  Male  Female  
2. Age group 
  Under 25 
 25 – 34  
 35 – 44 
 45 – 54 
 55 and over 
3. Is the property you reside in owner occupied or rented? 
  Owner Occupied   Rented   
4. How many years have you been residing in your current home? 
  0 – 2  
 3 – 5   
 6 – 8   
 9 – 11 
 12+    
5. How would you rate your level of computer experience? 
  No experience  
 Novice 
 Intermediate  
 Advanced                           
 Expert 
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Section 2: Home Automation 
  
6. Which of the following automation systems are installed in your home? 
  Fire Alarm 
 Burglar Alarm    
 Other   
 Central Heating 
 Health Care  
 None 
 Multimedia 
 Surveillance  
 If ‘Other’, please specify below: 
.......................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................... 
7. Which of the following networks are available in your home? 
  Wi-Fi 
 ZigBee 
 X10 
 Other   
 Bluetooth 
 None 
 If ‘Other’, please specify below: 
.......................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................... 
8. During the home automation trial Period did any of the devices have to be restarted?  
   Yes  No  
 If ‘Yes’, please clarify below, including approximately how many times devices 
were restarted: 
.......................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................... 
9. During the trial period did any of the home automation devices not function 
correctly? 
  Yes  No  
 If ‘Yes’, please clarify below: 
.......................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................. 
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10. During the trial period did any of the home automation devices require a battery 
change? 
  Yes  No  
 If ‘Yes’, please state the device and approximate day of the respective battery 
change: 
.......................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................... 
 
11. Do you feel that the automatic radiator valve helped control the temperature in your 
home more accurately than your existing radiator valve?   
  Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
  
 Please clarify below: 
.......................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................... 
 
12. Do you feel that the radiator valve would help you save energy by providing greater 
control over heating? 
  Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Please clarify below: 
.......................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................... 
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13. Do you feel the information provided by the power meter helped you better 
understand how energy is used within your home? 
  Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
  
 Please clarify below: 
.......................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................... 
14. Do you feel that the information provided by the power meter would help you save 
energy? 
  Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
  
 Please clarify below: 
.......................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................... 
15. Do you feel the delay in using the local controller to access devices is acceptable? 
  Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 Please clarify below: 
.......................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................. 
Appendix A: Home Automation Questionnaire 
 
-196- 
 
16. Do you feel the delay in using the remote controller to access devices is acceptable? 
 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neutral 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
Please clarify below: 
.......................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................... 
17. Please rank the following home automation features from 1 (most attractive) to 5 
(least attractive). ( Please see below for definition of phrases) 
  Security 
 Tele-Health 
 Multimedia 
 Energy saving 
 Safety 
 
 
 Please clarify: 
.......................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................... 
 Security:  Protects the home from hackers controlling home automation devices 
and keeps home occupiers private information safe. 
Safety: Protects the home occupiers by preventing dangerous events from 
happening. 
Tele-Health: Monitors the occupier’s health and may sound an alarm if the 
occupier’s health diminishes. 
Multimedia: Streams multimedia across the home to different rooms, this may 
include music or video. 
Energy Saving: Monitors and aims to reduce the energy used in the home. 
18. In terms of an energy saving home automations system, what is the maximum 
number of years you would find acceptable to get a full return on your investment? 
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19. In terms of an energy saving home automation systems, what is the minimum 
percentage reduction in the total annual energy used by your home that you would 
find acceptable? 
 
 
20 Based on the trial and your understanding of home automation how likely are you to 
consider investing in such a system in the future? 
  Very Likely  Likely  Neutral  Unlikely  Very 
Unlikely 
21.  How much would you feel comfortable paying for a home automation system? 
  £0 - £199 
 £200 - £399 
 £400 - £599 
 £600 - £799 
 £800+ 
  
Section 3: Home Automation Security 
  
22. Please select, if any, the security issues you are aware of, 
 Unauthorised access to the home automation system. 
 Monitoring of communications between a remote device such as a mobile phone   
     and the home automation system. 
 Privacy threats to the personal information stored by the home automation  
     system. 
 Other     
If ‘Other’, please specify below: 
.......................................................................................................................................
.......................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................... 
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23. Please number the importance you place on the following security issues from 1 
(most important) to 3 (least important). 
 Unauthorised access to the home automation system. 
 Monitoring of communications between a remote device such as a mobile  
       phone and the home automation system. 
 Privacy threats to the personal information stored by the home automation  
      system. 
 
24. If a security situation such as “an unauthorised user gaining access to the system” 
was to arise, what would you like the home automation system to do? (Please select 
one answer only ) 
 Try and resolve the situation and not inform you. 
 Try and resolve the situation then inform you, allowing you to take further   
     action if  desired. 
 
 Inform you of the situation and provide you with a list of possible solutions   
     allowing you to choose the course of action to take. 
 
 Inform you of the situation and take no action. 
 Take no action. 
25.  Which statement below best completes the sentence?  
A system that resolves the security issues highlighted would  ________________ to 
purchase a home automation system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Not encourage me 
 Encourage me a little 
 Encourage me 
 Encourage me quite a bit 
 Encourage me a great deal 
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Section 4: The Ethical Concerns of Home Automation 
 
26. How comfortable do you feel about having the usage of your home appliances 
monitored by the home automation system? 
  Extremely comfortable 
 Comfortable 
 Neutral  
 Uncomfortable 
 Extremely Uncomfortable 
  
27. How comfortable do you feel about storing the information, regarding the usage of 
your home appliances, on your home automation system? 
  Extremely comfortable 
 Comfortable 
 Neutral  
 Uncomfortable 
 Extremely Uncomfortable 
  
28. How comfortable do you feel about storing the information, regarding the usage of 
your home appliances, on a company database, outside of the home automation 
system? 
  Extremely comfortable 
 Comfortable 
 Neutral  
 Uncomfortable 
 Extremely Uncomfortable 
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29. How concerned are you regarding potential privacy risks associated with home 
automation systems? (i.e. a third party gaining access to personal information stored 
on the home automation system) 
  Extremely Concerned 
 Concerned 
 Neutral  
 Unconcerned 
 Extremely Unconcerned 
  
 
30. 
 
How comfortable are you in handing over control for certain home activities to a 
home automation system? 
  Extremely comfortable 
 Comfortable 
 Neutral  
 Uncomfortable 
 Extremely Uncomfortable 
 
  
31. How comfortable are you in handing over control for certain home activities to a 
home automation system, if you can manually change back any automatic changes 
made? 
  Extremely comfortable 
 Comfortable 
 Neutral  
 Uncomfortable 
 Extremely Uncomfortable 
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Section 5: Comments 
 
If you wish to make any comments regarding home automation, any improvements to 
the home automation system or aspects of this questionnaire please feel free to do so 
hear. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your time and effort 
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Appendix B: System Evaluation: Questionnaire 
Dear Respondent, 
 Please complete the questionnaire as honestly and descriptively as possible. The 
answers you provide will be vital in the successful development of home automation 
technology that meets users’ needs. Thank you in advance for your time and effort. 
Please answer all questions by ticking the appropriate box(s) unless otherwise stated. 
Section 1: Personal Information 
 
1.  Gender 
  Male  Female  
2. Age group 
  Under 25 
 25 – 34  
 35 – 44 
 45 – 54 
 
 55 and over 
3. Based on the demonstration of the home automation system, I will adopt home 
automation technology in the future. 
 Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
 
 
4. Based on the demonstration of the home automation system and remote access 
approaches, I will want remote access to home automation devices in my home. 
 Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
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Section 2: Home Gateway Defence Approach Evaluation 
  
5. The delay in accessing and controlling devices whilst using the RHS-2 
communication approach is acceptable. 
 Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree  
6. For non-critical, everyday, operations I am happy to use the RHS-2 communications 
approach. 
  Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree  
7. During a DDoS attack on the home automation system, the delay in switching 
between the RHS-2 and RHS-1 approach is acceptable. 
 Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree  
8. The home gateway defence approach dealt with all my requests in an efficient and 
effective manner before, during and after the attack. 
 Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
Section 3: Third Party Defence Approach Evaluation 
  
9. For critical communications, I prefer to use the RHS-1 approach for communicating  
with a home automation system. 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
10. I am happy to use the RHS-2 approach for critical applications in emergencies, 
when the RHS-1 approach is not available. 
 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree  
11. The delay in accessing and controlling devices whilst using the RHS-1 
communication approach is acceptable. 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
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12.  During a DDoS attack on the third party, the delay in switching between the RHS-1 
and RHS-2 approach is acceptable. 
 Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
13. The RHS-2 approach dealt with all my requests in an efficient and effective manner 
before, during and after the attack. 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
Section 4: WSN DoS Defence 
14.  The access delay for locally controlling the WSN based HAS, during a DoS attack, 
with no defences provides an acceptable level of performance.  
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
15. The access delay for locally controlling the WSN based HAS, during a DoS attack, 
with existing DoS defences provides an acceptable level of performance.  
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
16.  The access delay for locally controlling the WSN based HAS, during a DoS attack, 
with existing DoS defences and the proposed defences provides an acceptable level 
of performance.  
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
Section 5: System Evaluation 
 
17. The proposed system was easy to use. 
 Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
18. I feel comfortable using the system with the different communication approaches. 
 Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
19. Based on the description and demonstration of the RHS-1 approach I am happy to 
use a third party to connect to a home automation system. 
 
Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
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20. I can effectively use the system to communicate with a home automation 
system. 
 Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree  
21. I am able to efficiently monitor and control home automation devices using the 
proposed system. 
 Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
22. Overall, I am happy to use such a system to communicate with my home 
automation system. 
 Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree  
Section 6: Comments 
 
If you wish to make any comments regarding home automation, any improvements to 
the home automation system or aspects of this questionnaire please feel free to do so 
hear. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your time and effort 
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Appendix C: Home Automation Test-bed Source Code 
This appendices, contains the source code for the WSN based HAS test-bed introduced in 
Chapter 5 and used to provide a practical evaluation of the proposed DoS defence 
approaches presented in Chapters 6 and 7. The source code highlights the basic code 
structure required to program a Jennic JN5139 end node, capable of joining a ZigBee 
network, responding to commands (i.e. turning a light on and off), and transmitting the 
status of onboard sensors to the network coordinator. To implement the code, and reproduce 
the WSN based HAS test-bed a prior knowledge of programming for embedded devices in 
C, the Jennic ZigBee SDK, and the ZigBee WSN standard is required. It is important to 
note that the following code is provided for the repeatability of the experiments conducted 
in this Thesis. The following code was developed as part of the indeedNET project, and as 
such created by a team of which the author was one member, as discussed in Chapter 5. 
Code Extract 
/**************************************************************************** 
 * 
 * MODULE:            Home Automation test-bed End Device code 
 * VERSION:           1.05 
 * DATED:               16 February 2009 
 * 
/*****************************************************************************/ 
/***  The following includes references to the Jennic ZigBee SDK required by the application**/                                                 
/*****************************************************************************/ 
#include "jendefs.h" 
#include "ALSdriver.h" 
#include "HTSdriver.h" 
#include "AppHardwareApi.h" 
#include "LedControl.h" 
#include "Button.h" 
#include "gdb.h" 
#include "JZ_Api.h" 
#include "AppApi.h" 
#include "HomeDemoProfile.h" 
#include "nwk.h" 
#include "Utils.h" 
/****************************************************************************/ 
/***       Definitions                                                                                                                    ***/ 
/****************************************************************************/ 
/* Timing values */ 
#define ONE_SEC_IN_32K_PERIODS 32000UL 
#define HW_INT_Q_SIZE          32 
#define HW_INT_Q_PTR_MASK      0x1f 
#define TX_WAIT_MS             20 
//#define SLEEP_PERIOD_ms        250UL 
//#define SLEEP_PERIOD           (SLEEP_PERIOD_ms * 32UL) 
/****************************************************************************/ 
/***        Type Definitions                                                                                                          ***/ 
/****************************************************************************/ 
/* State machine states */ 
typedef enum 
{ 
    E_STATE_READY_TO_READ_SENSORS, 
    E_STATE_READING_S1, 
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    E_STATE_READING_S2 
} teState; 
 
typedef struct 
{ 
    uint32 u32Device; 
    uint32 u32ItemBitmap; 
} tsHwIntData; 
 
/* All variables with scope throughout module are in one structure */ 
typedef struct 
{ 
    /* Transceiver (basically anything TX/RX not covered elsewhere) */ 
    struct 
    { 
        uint8   u8CurrentTxHandle; 
        uint8   u8PrevRxBsn; 
    } sTransceiver; 
 
    /* Controls (switch, light level alarm) */ 
    struct 
    { 
        uint8   u8Switch; 
        uint8   u8LedState; 
    } sControls; 
 
    /* Sensor data, stored between read and going out in frame */ 
    struct 
    { 
        uint8   u8TempResult; 
        uint8   u8HtsResult; 
        uint8   u8AlsResult; 
    } sSensors; 
 
    /* System (state, assigned address, channel) */ 
    struct 
    { 
        teState eState; 
        uint8   u8Channel; 
        uint32  u32CalibratedTimeout; 
    } sSystem; 
 
    /* Queue for hardware interrupts */ 
    struct 
    { 
        tsHwIntData    asHwIntData[HW_INT_Q_SIZE]; 
        volatile uint8 u8ReadPtr; 
        volatile uint8 u8WritePtr; 
    } sQueue; 
 
    bool_t bJoined; 
    bool_t bRejoining; 
 
} tsDemoData; 
 
/****************************************************************************/ 
/***        Local Function definitions                                                                                           ***/ 
/****************************************************************************/ 
PRIVATE void  vInitDemoSystem(bool_t bColdStart); 
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PRIVATE void  vInitEndpoint(void); 
PRIVATE void  vStartReadSensors(void); 
PRIVATE void  vReadSensor2(void); 
PRIVATE void  vReadSensor3(void); 
PRIVATE void  vSendData(uint8 u8LightValue, uint8 u8TempValue, 
                        uint8 u8HumidityValue, uint8 u8Switch); 
PRIVATE uint8 u8FindMin(uint8 u8Val1, uint8 u8Val2); 
PRIVATE void  vSleep(void); 
PRIVATE void  vAddDesc(void); 
#ifdef TEST_BOS_TIMER 
PRIVATE void vTimerFired0(void *pvMessage, uint8 u8Len); 
PRIVATE void vTimerFired1(void *pvMessage, uint8 u8Len); 
#endif 
PRIVATE void  vSendDatab(uint16 u16Addr,uint8 ID, uint8 u8LightValue, uint8 u8TempValue, 
                        uint8 u8HumidityValue, uint8 u8Switch); 
 
/****************************************************************************/ 
/***        Local Variables                                               ***/ 
/****************************************************************************/ 
tsDemoData sDemoData; 
#ifdef TEST_BOS_TIMER 
uint8 u8LedFlash0 = 0; 
uint8 u8LedFlash1 = 0; 
#endif 
 
/**************************************************************************** 
 * 
 * NAME: AppColdStart 
 * 
 * DESCRIPTION: 
 * Entry point for application. Initialises system, starts scan then 
 * processes interrupts. 
 * 
 * RETURNS: 
 * void, never returns 
 * 
 ****************************************************************************/ 
PUBLIC void AppColdStart(void) 
{ 
    /* Debug hooks: include these regardless of whether debugging or not */ 
    HAL_GDB_INIT(); 
    HAL_BREAKPOINT(); 
 
    /* General initialisation: reset hardware */ 
    JZS_sConfig.u32Channel = 0; 
    JZS_sConfig.u16PanId = DEMO_PAN_ID; 
    JZS_sConfig.u16AppDataLength = 0; 
 
    vInitDemoSystem(TRUE); 
 
    /* No return from the above function call */ 
} 
 
/**************************************************************************** 
 * 
 * NAME: AppWarmStart 
 * 
 * DESCRIPTION: 
 * Entry point for application from boot loader. Simply jumps to AppColdStart 
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 * as, in this instance, application will never warm start. 
 * 
 * RETURNS: 
 * Never returns. 
 * 
 ****************************************************************************/ 
PUBLIC void AppWarmStart(void) 
{ 
    vInitDemoSystem(FALSE); 
} 
 
/**************************************************************************** 
 * 
 * NAME: JZA_boAppStart 
 * 
 * DESCRIPTION: 
 * Called by Zigbee stack during initialisation. Sets up the profile 
 * information and starts the networking activity 
 * 
 * RETURNS: 
 * TRUE 
 * 
 ****************************************************************************/ 
PUBLIC bool_t JZA_boAppStart(void) 
{ 
#ifdef TEST_BOS_TIMER 
    bBosCreateTimer(vTimerFired0, NULL, 0, 10, NULL); 
    bBosCreateTimer(vTimerFired1, NULL, 0, 15, NULL); 
#endif 
 
    JZS_vStartStack(); 
    return TRUE; 
} 
 
/**************************************************************************** 
 * 
 * NAME: JZA_eAfKvpObject 
 * 
 * DESCRIPTION: 
 * Receives incoming KVP data frames 
 * 
 * PARAMETERS:      Name                RW  Usage 
 *                  eAddrMode           R   Address mode of incoming frame 
 *                  u16AddrSrc          R   Network address of source node 
 *                  u8SrcEP             R   Endpoint address of source node 
 *                  u8LQI               R   Link Quality Indication 
 *                  u8DstEP             R   Destination endpoint address 
 *                  u8ClusterId         R   Cluster ID of incoming frame 
 *                  *pu8ClusterIDRsp    R   Pointer to cluster ID of response frame 
 *                  *puTransactionInd   R   Pointer to incoming frame 
 *                  *puTransactionRsp   R   Pointer to response frame 
 * 
 * RETURNS: 
 * TRUE for stack to automatically generate KVP response frames when appropriate 
 * FALSE otherwise 
 * 
 ****************************************************************************/ 
PUBLIC bool_t JZA_bAfKvpObject( APS_Addrmode_e          eAddrMode, 
                                uint16                  u16AddrSrc, 
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                                uint8                   u8SrcEP, 
                                uint8                   u8LQI, 
                                uint8                   u8DstEP, 
                                uint8                   u8ClusterId, 
                                uint8                   *pu8ClusterIDRsp, 
                                AF_Transaction_s        *puTransactionInd, 
                                AF_Transaction_s        *puTransactionRsp) 
{ 
 bool_t bReturnVal = FALSE; 
/* 
 if (puTransactionInd->uFrame.sKvp.eCommandTypeID == SET_ACKNOWLEDGMENT) 
 { 
  bReturnVal = TRUE; 
 } 
 
    if ((eAddrMode != APS_ADDRMODE_SHORT) || (u8DstEP != 0x40)) 
    { 
        puTransactionRsp->uFrame.sKvp.eErrorCode = KVP_INVALID_ENDPOINT; 
        return bReturnVal; 
    } 
 
    if (    (puTransactionInd->uFrame.sKvp.eCommandTypeID != SET) 
        &&  (puTransactionInd->uFrame.sKvp.eCommandTypeID != SET_ACKNOWLEDGMENT)) 
    { 
        puTransactionRsp->uFrame.sKvp.eErrorCode = KVP_INVALID_COMMAND_TYPE; 
        return bReturnVal; 
    } 
 
 // Assume data is switch info, and set LED based on the received command // 
 sDemoData.sControls.u8LedState = puTransactionInd->uFrame.sKvp.uAttributeData.UnsignedInt8; 
vLedControl(0, sDemoData.sControls.u8LedState); 
 
    puTransactionRsp->uFrame.sKvp.eErrorCode =  KVP_SUCCESS; 
    return bReturnVal; 
*/ 
 
    uint8   *pu8Afdu; 
    uint8   u8Length; 
    int i; 
    uint64 u64DeviceAddr = 0; 
    uint64 u64Temp = 0; 
    bool_t boFound; 
 
if (puTransactionInd->uFrame.sKvp.eCommandTypeID == SET_ACKNOWLEDGMENT) 
 { 
  bReturnVal = TRUE; 
 } 
 
    u8Length = puTransactionInd->uFrame.sKvp.uAttributeData.CharacterString.u8CharacterCount; 
    pu8Afdu = puTransactionInd->uFrame.sKvp.uAttributeData.CharacterString.au8CharacterData; 
 
    if ((eAddrMode != APS_ADDRMODE_SHORT) || (u8DstEP != 0x40)) 
    { 
        puTransactionRsp->uFrame.sKvp.eErrorCode = KVP_INVALID_ENDPOINT; 
        return bReturnVal; 
    } 
 
    if (    (puTransactionInd->uFrame.sKvp.eCommandTypeID != SET) 
        &&  (puTransactionInd->uFrame.sKvp.eCommandTypeID != SET_ACKNOWLEDGMENT)) 
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    { 
        puTransactionRsp->uFrame.sKvp.eErrorCode = KVP_INVALID_COMMAND_TYPE; 
        return bReturnVal; 
    } 
 
 
    pu8Afdu++; 
 
    if(puTransactionInd->uFrame.sKvp.u16AttributeID == DAP_ATTR_SENSOR_DATA) 
    { 
        /* Search for address in list */ 
        boFound = FALSE; 
 
        for (i = 0; i < 7; i++) 
        { 
            u64DeviceAddr = u64DeviceAddr << 8; 
            u64DeviceAddr |= *pu8Afdu++; 
        } 
    } 
 
        uint8 Address = 0; 
 
        Address  = *pu8Afdu++; 
 
//Send an acknowledgment back to the device which sent the message to change the status of the 
//connected light, together with the sensor readings, including the current status of the light. 
 
vSendData(101,255,Address,254); 
 
   puTransactionRsp->uFrame.sKvp.eErrorCode = KVP_INVALID_COMMAND_TYPE; 
 return bReturnVal; 
 
} 
 
/**************************************************************************** 
 * 
 * NAME: JZA_vAfKvpResponse 
 * 
 * DESCRIPTION: 
 * Used to send response to incoming KVP frame 
 * 
 * PARAMETERS:      Name                RW  Usage 
 *                  eAddrMode           R   Address mode of incoming frame 
 *                  u16AddrSrc          R   Network address of source node 
 *                  u8SrcEP             R   Endpoint address of source node 
 *                  u8LQI               R   Link Quality Indication 
 *                  u8DstEP             R   Destination endpoint address 
 *                  u8ClusterId         R   Cluster ID of incoming frame 
 *                  *puTransactionInd   R   Pointer to incoming frame 
 * 
 * RETURNS: 
 * void 
 * 
 ****************************************************************************/ 
PUBLIC void JZA_vAfKvpResponse(APS_Addrmode_e           eAddrMode, 
                                uint16                  u16AddrSrc, 
                                uint8                   u8SrcEP, 
                                uint8                   u8LQI, 
                                uint8                   u8DstEP, 
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                                uint8                   u8ClusterID, 
                                AF_Transaction_s        *puTransactionInd) 
{ 
 
} 
 
/**************************************************************************** 
 * 
 * NAME: JZA_pu8AfMsgObject 
 * 
 * DESCRIPTION: 
 * Receives incoming MSG data frames. 
 * 
 * PARAMETERS:      Name                    RW  Usage 
 *                  eAddrMode           R   Address mode of incoming frame 
 *                  u16AddrSrc          R   Network address of source node 
 *                  u8SrcEP             R   Endpoint address of source node 
 *                  u8LQI               R   Link Quality Indication 
 *                  u8DstEP             R   Destination endpoint address 
 *                  u8ClusterId         R   Cluster ID of incoming frame 
 *                  *pu8ClusterIDRsp    R   Pointer to cluster ID of response frame 
 *                  *puTransactionInd   R   Pointer to incoming frame 
 *                  *puTransactionRsp   R   Pointer to response frame 
 * RETURNS: 
 * FALSE 
 * 
 ****************************************************************************/ 
PUBLIC bool_t JZA_bAfMsgObject(APS_Addrmode_e       eAddrMode, 
                                uint16              u16AddrSrc, 
                                uint8               u8SrcEP, 
                                uint8               u8LQI, 
                                uint8               u8DstEP, 
                                uint8               u8ClusterID, 
                                uint8               *pu8ClusterIDRsp, 
                                AF_Transaction_s    *puTransactionInd, 
                                AF_Transaction_s    *puTransactionRsp) 
{ 
    return FALSE; 
} 
 
 
/**************************************************************************** 
 * 
 * NAME: JZA_vZdpResponse 
 * 
 * DESCRIPTION: 
 * Called when a ZDP response frame has been received. In this case no action 
 * is taken as no ZDP responses are anticipated. 
 * 
 * PARAMETERS:      Name           RW  Usage 
 *                  u8Type         R   ZDP response type 
 *                  pu8Payload     R   Payload buffer 
 *                  u8PayloadLen   R   Length of payload 
 * 
 ****************************************************************************/ 
PUBLIC void JZA_vZdpResponse(uint8 u8Type, uint8 u8Lqi, uint8 *pu8Payload, 
                             uint8 u8PayloadLen) 
{ 
} 
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/**************************************************************************** 
 * 
 * NAME: JZA_vAppEventHandler 
 * 
 * DESCRIPTION: 
 * Called regularly by the task scheduler. This function reads the hardware 
 * event queue and processes the events therein. It is important that this 
 * function exits after a relatively short time so that the other tasks are 
 * not adversely affected. 
 * 
 ****************************************************************************/ 
PUBLIC void JZA_vAppEventHandler(void) 
{ 
    tsHwIntData *psHwIntData; 
    static bool_t bEBStatus = 0; 
 
    if(!bEBStatus) 
    { 
        if (sDemoData.bJoined == TRUE) 
        { 
            /* Things to do when first called */ 
            //vStartReadSensors(); /* Now done upon successful joining */ 
 
            vLedControl(1, FALSE); 
 
            bEBStatus = TRUE; 
        } 
    } 
 
    /* Check queue for hardware interrupts, and process */ 
    while (sDemoData.sQueue.u8WritePtr != sDemoData.sQueue.u8ReadPtr) 
    { 
        psHwIntData 
            = &sDemoData.sQueue.asHwIntData[sDemoData.sQueue.u8ReadPtr]; 
 
        switch (psHwIntData->u32Device) 
        { 
        case E_AHI_DEVICE_SYSCTRL: 
            /* Check for DIO pin used by humidity/temperature sensor */ 
            if (psHwIntData->u32ItemBitmap & HTS_DATA_DIO_BIT_MASK) 
            { 
                switch (sDemoData.sSystem.eState) 
                { 
                case E_STATE_READING_S1: 
                    vReadSensor2(); 
                    break; 
 
                case E_STATE_READING_S2: 
                    vReadSensor3(); 
                    break; 
 
                default: 
                    break; 
                } 
            } 
 
            /* Check for wake timer */ 
            if (psHwIntData->u32ItemBitmap & (1 << E_AHI_SYSCTRL_WK1)) 
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            { 
                /* Only restart sensor reading if not rejoining (if rejoining, 
                   sensor reading will be restarted when that is complete) */ 
                if (sDemoData.bRejoining == FALSE) 
                { 
                    vStartReadSensors(); 
                } 
            } 
 
            /* Check for buttons */ 
            if (psHwIntData->u32ItemBitmap 
                & (BUTTON_ALL_MASK_RFD << BUTTON_BASE_BIT)) 
            { 
                uint8 u8KeysDown 
                    = (uint8)(psHwIntData->u32ItemBitmap >> BUTTON_BASE_BIT); 
 
                switch (u8KeysDown) 
                { 
                case BUTTON_0_MASK: 
                    sDemoData.sControls.u8Switch = 0; 
                    break; 
 
                case BUTTON_1_MASK: 
                    sDemoData.sControls.u8Switch = 1; 
                    break; 
                } 
            } 
            break; 
 
        default: 
            break; 
        } 
 
        sDemoData.sQueue.u8ReadPtr 
            = (sDemoData.sQueue.u8ReadPtr + 1) & HW_INT_Q_PTR_MASK; 
    } 
} 
 
/**************************************************************************** 
 * 
 * NAME: JZA_vPeripheralEvent 
 * 
 * DESCRIPTION: 
 * Called when a hardware event causes an interrupt. This function is called 
 * from within the interrupt context so should be brief. In this case, the 
 * information is placed on a simple FIFO queue to be processed later. 
 * 
 * PARAMETERS: Name          RW  Usage 
 *             u32Device     R   Peripheral generating interrupt 
 *             u32ItemBitmap R   Bitmap of interrupt sources within peripheral 
 * 
 ****************************************************************************/ 
PUBLIC void JZA_vPeripheralEvent(uint32 u32Device, uint32 u32ItemBitmap) 
{ 
    tsHwIntData *psHwIntData; 
    uint8        u8WriteNextPtr; 
 
    /* Queue event for processing during appKeyOperationKey call */ 
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    u8WriteNextPtr = (sDemoData.sQueue.u8WritePtr + 1) & HW_INT_Q_PTR_MASK; 
 
    if (u8WriteNextPtr != sDemoData.sQueue.u8ReadPtr) 
    { 
        /* There is space on queue */ 
        psHwIntData 
            = &sDemoData.sQueue.asHwIntData[sDemoData.sQueue.u8WritePtr]; 
        psHwIntData->u32Device = u32Device; 
        psHwIntData->u32ItemBitmap = u32ItemBitmap; 
 
        sDemoData.sQueue.u8WritePtr = u8WriteNextPtr; 
    } 
 
    /* If no space on queue, interrupt is silently discarded */ 
} 
 
/**************************************************************************** 
 * 
 * NAME: JZA_vStackEvent 
 * 
 * DESCRIPTION: 
 * Called when a miscellaneous stack event occurs. 
 * 
 * PARAMETERS:      Name          RW  Usage 
 *                  eEventId      R   Event enumeration 
 *                  puStackEvent  R   Event information 
 * 
 * RETURNS: 
 * NULL 
 * 
 ****************************************************************************/ 
PUBLIC void JZA_vStackEvent(teJZS_EventIdentifier eEventId, 
                            tuJZS_StackEvent *puStackEvent) 
{ 
    switch (eEventId) 
    { 
    case JZS_EVENT_APS_DATA_CONFIRM: 
        if (puStackEvent->sApsDataConfirmEvent.u8Status != 0) 
        { 
            if (sDemoData.bRejoining == FALSE) 
            { 
                sDemoData.bJoined = FALSE; 
                sDemoData.bRejoining = TRUE; 
 
                /* Try to re-join network: timer will send a frame again in a 
                   second */ 
                JZS_vRejoinNetwork(); 
            } 
        } 
        else 
        { 
            if (sDemoData.bRejoining == FALSE) 
            { 
                /* Go to sleep: sleep itself will not be scheduled until BOS 
                   has completed any other actions */ 
                vSleep(); 
            } 
        } 
        break; 
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    case JZS_EVENT_NWK_JOINED_AS_ENDDEVICE: 
        vAddDesc(); 
        sDemoData.bJoined = TRUE; 
        sDemoData.bRejoining = FALSE; 
        vStartReadSensors(); 
 
        /* Note: can use puStackEvent->sNwkJoinedEvent.u16Addr to detect if 
           device address has changed */ 
 
        break; 
 
    default: 
        break; 
    } 
} 
 
/**************************************************************************** 
 * 
 * NAME: vInitDemoSystem 
 * 
 * DESCRIPTION: 
 * Initialises Zigbee stack and hardware. Final action is to start BOS, from 
 * which there is no return. Subsequent application actions occur in the 
 * functions defined above. 
 * 
 * RETURNS: 
 * No return from this function 
 * 
 ****************************************************************************/ 
PRIVATE void vInitDemoSystem(bool_t bColdStart) 
{ 
    /* Initialise software elements */ 
    vInitEndpoint(); 
 
#if 1 
    vAHI_UartEnable(E_AHI_UART_0); 
    vAHI_UartReset(E_AHI_UART_0, TRUE, TRUE); 
    vAHI_UartSetClockDivisor(E_AHI_UART_0, E_AHI_UART_RATE_19200);   //38400 
    vAHI_UartReset(E_AHI_UART_0, FALSE, FALSE); 
#endif 
 
    /* Initialise Zigbee stack */ 
    (void)JZS_u32InitSystem(bColdStart); 
 
    /* Set DIO for buttons and LEDs. Also, if waking up, set up the 
       BOS into the correct state */ 
    if (bColdStart == TRUE) 
    { 
        vLedControl(0, TRUE); 
    } 
 
    vLedControl(1, TRUE); 
    vLedInitRfd(); 
    vButtonInitRfd(); 
 
    /* Enable interrupts for DIO buttons */ 
    vAHI_DioWakeEdge(0, BUTTON_ALL_MASK_RFD << BUTTON_BASE_BIT); 
    vAHI_DioWakeEnable(BUTTON_ALL_MASK_RFD << BUTTON_BASE_BIT, 0); 
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    /* Set up interrupt for humidity/temp sensor (don't enable yet) */ 
    vAHI_DioWakeEdge(0, HTS_DATA_DIO_BIT_MASK); 
 
    /* Set up peripheral hardware */ 
    vALSreset(); 
    vHTSreset(); 
 
    /* Start ALS now: it automatically keeps re-sampling after this */ 
    vALSstartReadChannel(0); 
 
    /* Enable timer to use for sequencing */ 
    if (bColdStart == TRUE) 
    { 
        /* Calibrate wake timer */ 
        sDemoData.sSystem.u32CalibratedTimeout 
            = ONE_SEC_IN_32K_PERIODS * 10000 / u32AHI_WakeTimerCalibrate(); 
        vAHI_WakeTimerEnable(E_AHI_WAKE_TIMER_1, TRUE); 
    } 
 
    /* Start BOS */ 
    bBosRun(bColdStart); 
} 
 
/**************************************************************************** 
 * 
 * NAME: vSendData 
 * 
 * DESCRIPTION: 
 * Generates and sends a frame consisting of 4 KVP transactions, for the four 
 * values that are passed to the controller.  
 * 
 * PARAMETERS: Name             RW  Usage 
 *             u8LightValue     R   Value from light sensor 
 *             u8TempValue      R   Value from temperature sensor 
 *             u8HumidityValue  R   Value from humidity sensor 
 *             u8Switch         R   Switch value (0 or 1) 
 * 
 ****************************************************************************/ 
PRIVATE void vSendData(uint8 u8LightValue, uint8 u8TempValue, 
                       uint8 u8HumidityValue, uint8 u8Switch) 
{ 
    uint8               u8SrcEP = 0x30; 
    AF_Transaction_s    Transaction; 
    APS_Addrmode_e      eAddrMode; 
    uint16              u16DestAddr; 
    uint8               u8DestEndpoint; 
    uint8              *pu8Afdu; 
    uint8               transCount = 1; 
    uint8               *pu8ExtAdr; 
    uint8               i; 
#if 0 
    uint8               u8TimerID; 
#endif 
 
    /* Set pointer to point to location in internal RAM where extended addres  is stored */ 
    pu8ExtAdr = (uint8 *)pvAppApiGetMacAddrLocation(); 
 
    eAddrMode = APS_ADDRMODE_SHORT; 
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    u16DestAddr = 0x0000; 
    u8DestEndpoint = 0x40; 
 
    Transaction.u8SequenceNum = u8AfGetTransactionSequence(TRUE); 
    Transaction.uFrame.sKvp.eErrorCode = KVP_SUCCESS; 
    Transaction.uFrame.sKvp.eCommandTypeID = SET; 
    Transaction.uFrame.sKvp.eAttributeDataType = KVP_CHARACTER_STRING; 
    Transaction.uFrame.sKvp.u16AttributeID = DAP_ATTR_SENSOR_DATA; 
    Transaction.uFrame.sKvp.uAttributeData.CharacterString.u8CharacterCount = 13; 
 
    pu8Afdu = Transaction.uFrame.sKvp.uAttributeData.CharacterString.au8CharacterData; 
 
    /* Set length field */ 
    pu8Afdu[0] = 12; 
 
    /* Load extended address into frame payload */ 
    for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) 
    { 
        pu8Afdu[i + 1] = *(pu8ExtAdr + i); 
    } 
 
    /* Load sensor data into frame payload */ 
    pu8Afdu[9]  = u8LightValue; 
    pu8Afdu[10] = u8TempValue; 
    pu8Afdu[11] = u8HumidityValue; 
    pu8Afdu[12] = u8Switch; 
 
    afdeDataRequest(eAddrMode, 
                    u16DestAddr, 
                    u8DestEndpoint, 
                    u8SrcEP, 
                    DAP_PROFILE_ID, 
                    DAP_CID_SENSOR_READINGS, 
                    AF_KVP, 
                    transCount, 
                    &Transaction, 
                    APS_TXOPTION_NONE, 
                    ENABLE_ROUTE_DISCOVERY, 
                    0); 
 
    vSleep(); 
 
} 
 
/**************************************************************************** 
 * 
 * NAME: vStartReadSensors/vReadSensor2/vReadSensor3 
 * 
 * DESCRIPTION: 
 * Gets the current readings from each sensor. Uses the DIO line for the HTS 
 * sensor to signal when a value is ready to be read, as this allows the CPU 
 * to doze during the reading calculation. 
 * 
 * RETURNS: 
 * void 
 * 
 ****************************************************************************/ 
PRIVATE void vStartReadSensors(void) 
{ 
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    sDemoData.sSystem.eState = E_STATE_READING_S1; 
 
    /* Set wake timer for the next time that we want to read the sensors */ 
    vAHI_WakeTimerStart(E_AHI_WAKE_TIMER_1, 
                        sDemoData.sSystem.u32CalibratedTimeout * 1); 
 
    /* Start to read temperature */ 
    vHTSstartReadTemp(); 
 
    /* Enable interrupt on DIO to tell when read has completed */ 
    vAHI_DioWakeEnable(HTS_DATA_DIO_BIT_MASK, 0); 
} 
 
PRIVATE void vReadSensor2(void) 
{ 
    sDemoData.sSystem.eState = E_STATE_READING_S2; 
 
    /* Clear interrupt on DIO */ 
    vAHI_DioWakeEnable(0, HTS_DATA_DIO_BIT_MASK); 
 
    /* Read temperature, 0-52 are acceptable */ 
    sDemoData.sSensors.u8TempResult 
        = u8FindMin((uint8)u16HTSreadTempResult(), 52); 
 
    /* Start to read humidity */ 
    vHTSstartReadHumidity(); 
 
    /* Enable interrupt on DIO to tell when read has completed */ 
    vAHI_DioWakeEnable(HTS_DATA_DIO_BIT_MASK, 0); 
} 
 
PRIVATE void vReadSensor3(void) 
{ 
    /* Clear interrupt on DIO */ 
    vAHI_DioWakeEnable(0, HTS_DATA_DIO_BIT_MASK); 
 
    /* Read humidity, 0-104 are acceptable */ 
    sDemoData.sSensors.u8HtsResult 
        = u8FindMin((uint8)u16HTSreadHumidityResult(), 104); 
 
    /* Read light level, adjust to range 0-6 in a slightly non-linear way */ 
    sDemoData.sSensors.u8AlsResult 
        = u8FindMin((uint8)(u16ALSreadChannelResult() >> 6), 6); 
 
    /* Send the frame */ 
    vSendData(sDemoData.sSensors.u8AlsResult, 
              sDemoData.sSensors.u8TempResult, 
              sDemoData.sSensors.u8HtsResult, 
              sDemoData.sControls.u8LedState);    
} 
 
/**************************************************************************** 
 * NAME: vInitEndpoint 
 * DESCRIPTION: 
 * Initialises software structures and variables. 
 * RETURNS: 
 * void 
 ****************************************************************************/ 
PRIVATE void vInitEndpoint(void) 
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{ 
    /* Set defaults for software */ 
    sDemoData.sTransceiver.u8CurrentTxHandle = 0; 
    sDemoData.sControls.u8Switch = 0; 
    sDemoData.sSensors.u8TempResult = 0; 
    sDemoData.sSensors.u8HtsResult = 0; 
    sDemoData.sSensors.u8AlsResult = 0; 
    sDemoData.sSystem.eState = E_STATE_READY_TO_READ_SENSORS; 
    sDemoData.sQueue.u8ReadPtr = 0; 
    sDemoData.sQueue.u8WritePtr = 0; 
    sDemoData.bJoined = FALSE; 
    sDemoData.bRejoining = FALSE; 
} 
/**************************************************************************** 
 * 
 * NAME: vAddDesc 
 * 
 * DESCRIPTION: 
 * Initialises software structures and variables. 
 * 
 * RETURNS: 
 * void 
 * 
 ****************************************************************************/ 
PRIVATE void vAddDesc(void) 
{ 
    /* Sensor has 1 endpoint, only expects data from coordinator */ 
    uint8  u8DeviceVer = 0x00; 
    uint8  u8Flags = 0x00; 
    uint8  u8EndPoint = 0x40; 
    uint16 u16DeviceId = 0x0000; 
 
    uint8 u8InputClusterCnt = 1; 
    uint8 au8InputClusterList[] = {DAP_CID_SWITCH}; 
    uint8 u8OutputClusterCnt = 0; 
    uint8 au8OutputClusterList[] = {}; 
 
    (void)afmeSimpleDescAdd(u8EndPoint, DAP_PROFILE_ID, u16DeviceId, 
                            u8DeviceVer, u8Flags, u8InputClusterCnt, 
                            au8InputClusterList, u8OutputClusterCnt, 
                            au8OutputClusterList); 
} 
/**************************************************************************** 
 * 
 * NAME: u8FindMin 
 * 
 * DESCRIPTION: 
 * Returns the smallest of two values. 
 * 
 * PARAMETERS:      Name    RW  Usage 
 *                  u8Val1  R   First value to compare 
 *                  u8Val2  R   Second value to compare 
 * 
 * RETURNS: 
 * uint8, lowest of two input values 
 * 
 ****************************************************************************/ 
PRIVATE uint8 u8FindMin(uint8 u8Val1, uint8 u8Val2) 
{ 
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    if (u8Val1 < u8Val2) 
    { 
        return u8Val1; 
    } 
    return u8Val2; 
} 
/**************************************************************************** 
 * 
 * NAME: vSleep 
 * 
 * DESCRIPTION: Sends device to light sleep. 
 * 
 * RETURNS: 
 * void 
 * 
 ****************************************************************************/ 
PRIVATE void vSleep(void) 
{ 
#if 0 /* Enable sleep operation: if #if 0, everything still works but never 
         sleeps */ 
 
    /* Turn off LEDs to save power */ 
    vLedControl(0, FALSE); 
    vLedControl(1, FALSE); 
 
    /* Power down: device will wake up from wake timer 1, which was set 
       in vStartReadSensors */ 
    vBosRequestSleep(TRUE); 
#endif 
} 
 
#ifdef TEST_BOS_TIMER 
PRIVATE void vTimerFired0(void *pvMessage, uint8 u8Len) 
{ 
    uint8 u8Dummy; 
 
    u8LedFlash0 = 1 - u8LedFlash0; 
    vLedControl(0, u8LedFlash0); 
 
    bBosCreateTimer(vTimerFired0, NULL, 0, 10, &u8Dummy); 
} 
 
PRIVATE void vTimerFired1(void *pvMessage, uint8 u8Len) 
{ 
    uint8 u8Dummy; 
 
    u8LedFlash1 = 1 - u8LedFlash1; 
    vLedControl(1, u8LedFlash1); 
 
    bBosCreateTimer(vTimerFired1, NULL, 0, 15, &u8Dummy); 
} 
#endif 
 
/****************************************************************************/ 
/***        END OF FILE                                                   ***/ 
/****************************************************************************/ 
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Appendix D: RHS-1 and RHS-2 Source Code 
This appendices, contains the source code used for the establishment of both 
the RHS-1 and RHS-2 code. 
RHS-1 Approach, Mobile Client Source Code 
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
// Local Variables                                                                          //  
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
     
private StreamConnection streamConnection = null; 
private OutputStream outputStream = null; 
private DataOutputStream dataOutputStream = null; 
private InputStream inputStream = null; 
private DataInputStream dataInputStream = null; 
private String connectString = "socket://192.168.0.102:11000";  //The fixed address of the RHS 
  
private byte[] K1 = Hex.decode("404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f"); 
private byte[] N1 = Hex.decode("101112131415161718191a1b1c");  
 
private byte[] K2 = Hex.decode("303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f"); 
private byte[] N2 = Hex.decode("202122232425262728292a2b2c");  
 
private byte [] sessionKey; 
private byte [] AESinitV; 
private int randomNumber; 
 
private byte [] sessionKey2; 
private byte [] AESinitV2; 
 
private int randomNumber2; 
 
private byte[] enc; 
private int len; 
 
 ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
//The login code – connects to the RHS using a pre-shared key, request a session key, then sends a // 
//a new dual encrypted session key directly to the WSN based HAS                                                  // 
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
     
    public void login(String userName, String userPassword){ 
     
                millsStart = System.currentTimeMillis();          
         
           String loginStatus = Home.login(userName, userPassword);     
          
            if(!loginStatus.equals("-1")){ 
                
               String data = ""; 
               String testData = ""; 
               HomeID = loginStatus;        
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               data = Home.RequestSessionKey(); 
               testData = Home.sendSessionKey(HomeID);                           
               System.out.println(data);           
               MainMenu(); 
                        
                //Load the local database with sensor readings 
                sensorDatabase();                      
           }else if(loginStatus.equals("-1")){ 
                loginStatuslbl.setText("The login detailes you provided were incorrect, please try 
again.\n\n "); 
           }else{ 
           message("Critical Login Error Recived: " + loginStatus); 
           }                       
    } 
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
//The login function encrypts the user username and password and sends it to the RHS for               // 
//authentication, if the RHS can establish a connection on behalf of the mobile client with the WSN//                                                  
//based HAS, the RHS returns that the login is successful                                                                  // 
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
    public String Home.login(String userName, String userPassword){ 
           
        StringBuffer results = new StringBuffer(); 
        String resultField = "No data recived"; 
         
        try{ 
             
            streamConnection = (StreamConnection) Connector.open(connectString); 
            outputStream = streamConnection.openOutputStream(); 
            dataOutputStream = new DataOutputStream(outputStream); 
 
            byte[] byteMessage = Encrypt(true,("<lgn>" + "," + userName + "," + userPassword + "," + 
"<EOF>"),K1,N1); 
             
            int x = 0; 
             
            while(x < (byteMessage.length) ){ 
                dataOutputStream.writeByte(byteMessage[x]); 
                //System.out.println(byteMessage[x]); 
                x++; 
            } 
             
            //Prints a comma 
            dataOutputStream.writeByte(44);             
             
            //Prints <EOF> at the end of string to end conection 
            dataOutputStream.writeByte(60); 
            dataOutputStream.writeByte(69); 
            dataOutputStream.writeByte(79); 
            dataOutputStream.writeByte(70); 
            dataOutputStream.writeByte(62); 
            dataOutputStream.flush(); 
            inputStream = streamConnection.openInputStream(); 
            dataInputStream = new DataInputStream(inputStream); 
             
            int inputChar; 
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            while((inputChar = dataInputStream.read()) != -1){ 
                results.append((char) inputChar); 
            } 
             
            resultField = new String(results.toString()); 
                         
        }catch(IOException e){ 
            System.err.println("Exception Caught:" + e); 
        }finally{ 
         
                try{ 
                    if(dataInputStream != null){ 
                    dataInputStream.close(); 
                    } 
                }catch(IOException ignored){}; 
         
                try{ 
                    if(dataOutputStream != null){ 
                    dataOutputStream.close(); 
                    }                 
                }catch(IOException ignored){}; 
                 
                try{ 
                    if(outputStream != null){ 
                    outputStream.close(); 
                    }                 
                }catch(IOException ignored){}; 
                 
                try{ 
                     if(inputStream != null){ 
                    inputStream.close(); 
                    }                
                }catch(IOException ignored){}; 
                 
                try{ 
                     if(streamConnection != null){ 
                    streamConnection.close(); 
                    }                
                }catch(IOException ignored){}; 
        }            
           
           String loginStatus = resultField.trim();     
            return loginStatus; 
                       
    } 
 
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
//The request session key function , requests a session key from the RHS, decrypts the retuned        // 
//session key and uses the key for all future communications with the RHS for the current               // 
//communication session.                                                                                                                     //  
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
    public String RequestSessionKey(){ 
         
        StringBuffer results = new StringBuffer(); 
        String resultField = "No session key recived"; 
Appendix D: RHS-1 and RHS-2 Source Code 
 
-225- 
 
         
        //Generate a random number and store in the global randomNumber variable 
        Random generator = new Random(); 
        generator.setSeed(System.currentTimeMillis()); 
         
        randomNumber = generator.nextInt(10000000); 
         
        while(randomNumber < 0){ 
            randomNumber = generator.nextInt(10000000); 
        } 
         
        String randomNumberString = Integer.toHexString(randomNumber);          
        byte[] rand = randomNumberString.getBytes(); 
        byte[] cmd =  "<KEY>,".getBytes(); 
        byte[] end = ",<EOF>".getBytes(); 
        byte[] comma = ",".getBytes(); 
        byte[] rawData = new byte[cmd.length + rand.length + end.length]; 
             
            int p = 0; 
             
            while(p < cmd.length){ 
                rawData[p] = cmd[p]; 
                p++; 
            } 
             
            int o = 0; 
             
            while(o < rand.length){ 
                rawData[p] = rand[o]; 
                o++; 
                p++; 
            } 
 
            int q = 0; 
             
            while(q < end.length){ 
                rawData[p] = end[q]; 
                q++; 
                p++; 
            }             
         
         byte[] byteMessage = EncryptByte(true,(rawData)); 
          
        try{ 
             
            streamConnection = (StreamConnection) Connector.open(connectString); 
            outputStream = streamConnection.openOutputStream(); 
            dataOutputStream = new DataOutputStream(outputStream); 
         
            int x = 0; 
             
            while(x < (byteMessage.length) ){ 
                dataOutputStream.writeByte(byteMessage[x]); 
                //System.out.println(byteMessage[x]); 
                x++; 
            } 
         
         
            //Prints a comma to seperate parameters 
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            dataOutputStream.writeByte(44);             
             
            //Prints <EOF> at the end of string to end conection 
            dataOutputStream.writeByte(60); 
            dataOutputStream.writeByte(69); 
            dataOutputStream.writeByte(79); 
            dataOutputStream.writeByte(70); 
            dataOutputStream.writeByte(62); 
             
            dataOutputStream.flush(); 
             
            inputStream = streamConnection.openInputStream(); 
            dataInputStream = new DataInputStream(inputStream); 
             
            int inputChar; 
             
            while((inputChar = dataInputStream.read()) != -1){ 
                results.append((char) inputChar); 
            } 
             
            resultField = new String(results.toString()); 
        
             
        }catch(IOException e){ 
            System.err.println("Exception Caught:" + e); 
        }finally{ 
         
                try{ 
                    if(dataInputStream != null){ 
                    dataInputStream.close(); 
                    } 
                }catch(IOException ignored){}; 
         
                try{ 
                    if(dataOutputStream != null){ 
                    dataOutputStream.close(); 
                    }                 
                }catch(IOException ignored){}; 
                 
                try{ 
                    if(outputStream != null){ 
                    outputStream.close(); 
                    }                 
                }catch(IOException ignored){}; 
                 
                try{ 
                     if(inputStream != null){ 
                    inputStream.close(); 
                    }                
                }catch(IOException ignored){}; 
                 
                try{ 
                     if(streamConnection != null){ 
                    streamConnection.close(); 
                    }                
                }catch(IOException ignored){}; 
        }        
         
               String data = ""; 
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               data = Decrypt_v2(false, resultField);  
                
               private byte [] sessionKey; 
                private byte [] AESinitV; 
                private int randomNumber; 
         
               String IVtest = new String(data.substring(data.length()-26,data.length())); 
String keytest = new String(data.substring(data.length()-26-34,data.length()-28)); 
               String recievedNonceHex = new String(data.substring(0,data.length()-26-36)); 
               int NonceTest = Integer.parseInt(recievedNonceHex,16); 
              
 if(NonceTest == (randomNumber+1)){ 
                    resultField = "Session Keys Shared"; 
                    sessionKey = Hex.decode(keytest); 
                    AESinitV = Hex.decode(IVtest); 
               }else{ 
                    resultField = "Failed to Share Session Keys"; 
               } 
                
         return resultField; 
         
    } 
 
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
 
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
//The send session key function is used to generate a session key, encrypt it with the pre-shared      // 
//client master key, add routing information and encrypt it again using the sever mater session key //  
//and send it to the RHS for redirection to the WSN based HAS                                                        //  
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
public String sendSessionKey(String HomeID){         
        try{ 
           generateAESKey(); //called to initialise the keys and IV 
        }catch(Exception e){ 
            System.out.println("error generating AES key"); 
        } 
         
         byte[] keyBytes = Hex.encode(sessionKey2); 
         String hexKey = new String(keyBytes); 
          
         byte[] IVBytes = Hex.encode(AESinitV2); 
         String hexIV = new String(IVBytes);          
           
         int rand = 8; 
         String randString = Integer.toHexString(rand); 
          
         //There is a size limit to the length of data that the aes coprocessor can decrypt on the zigbee   
        //nodes so data needs to be split into the appropriate sized packets and reassembled on the  
        //ZigBee node. The substring in j2me is (start index, end index - 1) 
          
         String tempA = "<SK1>," + randString + hexKey.substring(0,12) + ",<EOF>"; 
         String tempB = "<SK2>," + randString + hexKey.substring(12,24) + ",<EOF>"; 
         String tempC = "<SK3>," + randString + hexKey.substring(24,32) + ",<EOF>"; 
         String tempD = "<SN1>," + randString + hexIV.substring(0,13) + ",<EOF>"; 
         String tempE = "<SN2>," + randString + hexIV.substring(13,26) + ",<EOF>"; 
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         String innerEncryptedMessageA = Encryptb(true, tempA, K2, N2); 
         String HexinnerEncryptedMessageA = innerEncryptedMessageA; 
         String innerEncryptedMessageB = Encryptb(true, tempB, K2, N2); 
         String HexinnerEncryptedMessageB = innerEncryptedMessageB;  
         String innerEncryptedMessageC = Encryptb(true, tempC, K2, N2); 
         String HexinnerEncryptedMessageC = innerEncryptedMessageC;        
         String innerEncryptedMessageD = Encryptb(true, tempD, K2, N2); 
         String HexinnerEncryptedMessageD = innerEncryptedMessageD;           
         String innerEncryptedMessageE = Encryptb(true, tempE, K2, N2); 
         String HexinnerEncryptedMessageE = innerEncryptedMessageE;        
          
         //Have had to use @ instead of , as have used , to seperate hex values 
String temp2 = "<ETE>,@" + HomeID + "@" + HexinnerEncryptedMessageA + "@" + 
HexinnerEncryptedMessageB + "@" + HexinnerEncryptedMessageC + "@" + 
HexinnerEncryptedMessageD +  "@" + HexinnerEncryptedMessageE + "@,<EOF>"; 
          
         byte[] outerEncryptedMessage = Encrypt(true, temp2, sessionKey, AESinitV); 
         String HexouterEncryptedMessage = new String(outerEncryptedMessage);  
        
        StringBuffer results = new StringBuffer(); 
        String resultField = "No data recived"; 
         
        try{ 
             
            streamConnection = (StreamConnection) Connector.open(connectString); 
            outputStream = streamConnection.openOutputStream(); 
            dataOutputStream = new DataOutputStream(outputStream); 
         
            System.out.println("TCP Connection Established"); 
             
            int x = 0; 
             
            while(x < (outerEncryptedMessage.length) ){ 
                dataOutputStream.writeByte(outerEncryptedMessage[x]); 
                x++; 
            } 
         
         
            //Prints a comma to seperate parameters 
            dataOutputStream.writeByte(44);             
             
            //Prints <EOF> at the end of string to end conection 
            dataOutputStream.writeByte(60); 
            dataOutputStream.writeByte(69); 
            dataOutputStream.writeByte(79); 
            dataOutputStream.writeByte(70); 
            dataOutputStream.writeByte(62); 
             
            dataOutputStream.flush(); 
 
        }catch(IOException e){ 
            System.err.println("Exception Caught:" + e); 
        }finally{ 
         
                try{ 
                    if(dataInputStream != null){ 
                    dataInputStream.close(); 
                    } 
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                }catch(IOException ignored){}; 
         
                try{ 
                    if(dataOutputStream != null){ 
                    dataOutputStream.close(); 
                    }                 
                }catch(IOException ignored){}; 
                 
                try{ 
                    if(outputStream != null){ 
                    outputStream.close(); 
                    }                 
                }catch(IOException ignored){}; 
                 
                try{ 
                     if(inputStream != null){ 
                    inputStream.close(); 
                    }                
                }catch(IOException ignored){}; 
                 
                try{ 
                     if(streamConnection != null){ 
                    streamConnection.close(); 
                    }                
                }catch(IOException ignored){}; 
        }             
              
        String data = new String("Done");    
        return data; 
     
    } 
 
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
//The encryption function used to encrypt data                           // 
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
public byte[] EncryptByte(boolean Encrypt, byte[] rawData){ 
         
                CCMBlockCipher ccm  = new CCMBlockCipher(new AESEngine()); 
                         
        try{ 
                byte[] message = rawData; 
                ccm.init(true, new ParametersWithIV(new KeyParameter(K1), N1)); 
                enc = new byte[message.length + 8]; 
                len = ccm.processBytes(message, 0, message.length, enc, 0); 
                len += ccm.doFinal(enc, len); 
          
        }catch(InvalidCipherTextException e){ 
            encryptedData = "error"; 
        } 
             
            byte encryptedData [] = Hex.encode(enc); 
            return encryptedData; 
             
    }     
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///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
//The decryption function used to decrypt data                           // 
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
public String Decrypt_v2(boolean Encrypt, String cipher){ 
System.out.println("Decryption Started"); 
            String test = ""; 
             
            cipher = cipher.trim(); 
             
            CCMBlockCipher ccm  = new CCMBlockCipher(new AESEngine()); 
 
            ccm.init(false, new ParametersWithIV(new KeyParameter(K1), N1));         
         
                try{ 
                    byte[] enc = new byte[100]; 
                    enc = Hex.decode(cipher); 
                    byte[] tmp = new byte[enc.length]; 
                    len = ccm.processBytes(enc, 0, enc.length, tmp, 0); 
                    len += ccm.doFinal(tmp, len); 
                    byte dec[] = new byte[len]; 
                    System.arraycopy(tmp, 0, dec, 0, len);             
                    int i = 0; 
                    int judgement = 0; 
                     
                    while(i < dec.length){ 
                        if(dec[i] == 44){                             
                            i=i+1; 
                            test = test + Integer.toHexString(44); 
                        }else{ 
                            if(dec[i+1] != 44){ 
                                int sum = 0; 
 
                                    if(dec[i] >= 48 && dec[i] <=57){ 
                                        sum = sum + (dec[i]-48)*16; 
                                    } 
 
                                    if(dec[i] >= 65 && dec[i] <=70){ 
                                        sum = sum + (dec[i]-55)*16; 
                                    } 
 
                                    if(dec[i] >= 97 && dec[i] <=102){ 
                                        sum = sum + (dec[i]-87)*16; 
                                    } 
 
                                    if(dec[i+1] >= 48 && dec[i+1] <=57){ 
                                        sum = sum + (dec[i+1]-48); 
                                    } 
 
                                    if(dec[i+1] >= 65 && dec[i+1] <=70){ 
                                        sum = sum + (dec[i+1]-55); 
                                    } 
 
                                    if(dec[i+1] >= 97 && dec[i+1] <=102){ 
                                        sum = sum + (dec[i+1]-87); 
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                                    }                         
 
                                        if(sum >= 0 && sum <= 15){ 
 
                                        test = test + "" + "0" + Integer.toHexString(sum); 
 
                                        }else{ 
                                            test = test + "" + Integer.toHexString(sum); 
                                        } 
 
                                    i=i+2; 
 
                                }else{ 
                                 
                                int sum = 0; 
                                 
                                    if(dec[i] >= 48 && dec[i] <=57){ 
                                        sum = sum + (dec[i]-48); 
                                    } 
 
                                    if(dec[i] >= 65 && dec[i] <=70){ 
                                        sum = sum + (dec[i]-55); 
                                    } 
 
                                    if(dec[i] >= 97 && dec[i] <=102){ 
                                        sum = sum + (dec[i]-87); 
                                    }                         
 
                                        if(sum >= 0 && sum <= 15){ 
 
                                        test = test + "" + "0" + Integer.toHexString(sum); 
 
                                        }else{ 
                                            test = test + "" + Integer.toHexString(sum); 
                                        } 
 
                                    i=i+1; 
                                } 
                        } 
                    }         
                     
                }catch(InvalidCipherTextException e){ 
                    test = "Error: Decryption Failed"; 
                }  
             
            test.trim(); 
            return test; 
        } 
 
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
//Code used to generate AES session keys                                  // 
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
    public void generateAESKey() throws Exception { 
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      SecureRandom sr = new SecureRandom(); 
         
      sessionKey2 = new byte[16]; 
      sr.nextBytes(sessionKey2); 
      AESinitV2 = new byte[13]; 
      sr.nextBytes(AESinitV2); 
         
    } 
 
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
RHS-2 Approach, Mobile Client Source Code 
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
// Local Variables                                                                              //  
//These variables are similar to those for the RHS-1 approach ,       // 
//however the home IP address is left empty, for input by the RHS // 
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
private StreamConnection streamConnection = null; 
private OutputStream outputStream = null; 
private DataOutputStream dataOutputStream = null; 
 
private InputStream inputStream = null; 
private DataInputStream dataInputStream = null; 
 
private String connectString = "socket://192.168.0.102:11000"; 
private String connectStringHome = "socket://0.0.0.0:2101"; 
 
//The hex decode function converts the hex key and IV into their dec equivalent 
     
private byte[] K1 = Hex.decode("404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f"); 
private byte[] N1 = Hex.decode("101112131415161718191a1b1c");  
 
private byte[] K2 = Hex.decode("303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f"); 
private byte[] N2 = Hex.decode("202122232425262728292a2b2c");  
 
private byte [] sessionKey; 
private byte [] AESinitV; 
private int randomNumber; 
private int randomNumberHome; 
 
private byte [] sessionKey2; 
private byte [] AESinitV2; 
private int randomNumber2; 
 
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
 
 
 
 
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
//The login code – during the home.login function discussed later the homes IP address is               // 
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//retrieved from the RHS and a direct connection to the WSN based HAS is made                           // 
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
  public void login(String userName, String userPassword){ 
     
            String loginStatus = Home.login(userName, userPassword);     
          
            if(!loginStatus.equals("-1")){ 
                
               String data = ""; 
               String testData = ""; 
HomeID = loginStatus; 
                
               System.out.println(HomeID);               
                
               MainMenu(); 
                        
                //Load the local database with sensor readings 
                sensorDatabase(); 
                         
           }else if(loginStatus.equals("-1")){ 
                loginStatuslbl.setText("The login detailes you provided were incorrect, please try 
again.\n\n "); 
           }else{ 
           message("Critical Login Error Recived: " + loginStatus); 
           } 
 } 
 
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
//The login function encrypts the user username and password and sends it to the RHS for               // 
//authentication, the RHS responds with the IP address of the WSN based HAS. After this point     //                                                              
//the mobile communicates directly with the WSN based HAS. The encryption function for the      // 
//RHS-2 approach and the RHS-1 approach are the same, consequently it is not repeated hear.        // 
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
 
public String login(String userName, String userPassword){ 
     
         
        StringBuffer results = new StringBuffer(); 
        String resultField = "No data recived"; 
        randomNumberHome = 10; 
         
         
        try{ 
             
            streamConnection = (StreamConnection) Connector.open(connectString); 
            outputStream = streamConnection.openOutputStream(); 
            dataOutputStream = new DataOutputStream(outputStream); 
             
            byte[] byteMessage = Encrypt(true,("<lgn>" + "," + userName + "," + userPassword + "," + 
"<EOF>"),K1,N1); 
             
            int x = 0; 
             
            while(x < (byteMessage.length) ){ 
                dataOutputStream.writeByte(byteMessage[x]); 
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                //System.out.println(byteMessage[x]); 
                x++; 
            } 
             
            //Prints a comma 
            dataOutputStream.writeByte(44);             
             
            //Prints <EOF> at the end of string to end conection 
            dataOutputStream.writeByte(60); 
            dataOutputStream.writeByte(69); 
            dataOutputStream.writeByte(79); 
            dataOutputStream.writeByte(70); 
            dataOutputStream.writeByte(62); 
             
            dataOutputStream.flush(); 
 
            inputStream = streamConnection.openInputStream(); 
            dataInputStream = new DataInputStream(inputStream); 
             
            int inputChar; 
             
            while((inputChar = dataInputStream.read()) != -1){ 
                //System.out.println("test: " + (char)inputChar); 
                results.append((char) inputChar); 
            } 
             
            resultField = new String(results.toString()); 
             
            dataInputStream.close(); 
             
        }catch(IOException e){ 
            System.err.println("Exception Caught:" + e); 
        }finally{ 
         
                try{ 
                    if(dataInputStream != null){ 
                    dataInputStream.close(); 
                    } 
                }catch(IOException ignored){}; 
         
                try{ 
                    if(dataOutputStream != null){ 
                    dataOutputStream.close(); 
                    }                 
                }catch(IOException ignored){}; 
                 
                try{ 
                    if(outputStream != null){ 
                    outputStream.close(); 
                    }                 
                }catch(IOException ignored){}; 
                 
                try{ 
                     if(inputStream != null){ 
                    inputStream.close(); 
                    }                
                }catch(IOException ignored){}; 
                 
                try{ 
Appendix D: RHS-1 and RHS-2 Source Code 
 
-235- 
 
                     if(streamConnection != null){ 
                    streamConnection.close(); 
                    }                
                }catch(IOException ignored){}; 
        }         
         
         
           
           String loginStatus = resultField.trim();     
          
           return loginStatus; 
            
            
    } 
 
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// 
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